CHAPTER V.

THE CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

It was on July 16 and 17, 1861, that the advance of the army from the lines of Washington commenced. The clamour of the press, the excitement and impatience of the people, the shortness of the period for which a great portion of the troops had been enlisted, all conduced to urge the authorities to order an immediate advance, although the officers accustomed to deal with regular armies-and who, by practice and study, were cognisant of the difficulties to be encountered in campaigning-were fully aware of the deficiencies of the volunteer troops placed under their command. Men there were in sufficient numbers, armed and clad in uniform, but disciplined very imperfectly, under the guidance of officers for the most part ignorant of the very appearance of a soldier, formed into regiments, but unprovided with the machinery of a staff-with the matériel of an army, but with none of the organisation necessary to utilise it—excited by an evanescent enthusiasm, but without the deep-rooted motives which lead men to face death-puffed up with vanity, and gratified by the idea of the magnitude and power of the army and the nation, but not imbued with the military esprit de corps-in fact, a crowd of civilians dressed and armed to represent soldiers,

but possessing few of their qualifications. Such was the force, under the command of Brigadier-General M'Dowell, destined for the defeat of the Confederates and for the capture of Richmond. It was known that the army of General Beauregard was stationed in the neighbourhood of Centreville, about twenty-five miles from Washington, and that General Johnston was in the Shenandoah Valley. It was also known that the two armies, although distant from each other about fifty miles, were yet connected together by a rail and line of telegraph. Still, their junction was considered to have been sufficiently guarded against by the position of General Patterson, who was supposed to be able to hold General Johnston engaged, whilst the main force under General M'Dowell marched against General Beauregard. This arrangement was, however, rendered abortive by the behaviour of the troops of General Patterson. They were mostly composed of Pennsylvanian regiments, and were volunteers enlisted for three months. As the termination of their period of service approached, it became apparent that few would consent to remain one day longer than the period for which they had originally enlisted. In vain the general entreated them to re-engage, if only for ten additional days; the officers, indeed, declared that they were not unwilling to do so, but the men absolutely refused. Only four regiments out of the army of about twenty thousand consented to remain. The others alleged as their ground of refusal that they had been badly treated by their States, that their pork was unfit to eat, and that they received often but two or three crackers* per day. How, then, could

* Anglicè, biscuits.

General Patterson act? He was forced, at the most momentous crisis of the campaign, to withdraw from his post, and to retreat from the enemy's country towards Harper's Ferry and the State of Pennsylvania. On the 15th he advanced from Martinsburg to Bunker's Hill, on the road to Winchester; but on Tuesday he commenced a retrograde movement to Charleston, about twenty miles from Winchester, and from thence retired on the 20th and 21st to Harper's Ferry. When the news of the great battle of Manassas was received by his army, and the consequent baseness of their conduct dawned on them, they were loud in their expressions of hatred and fury against their general. He was received with hisses and shouts of anger by the troops on parade—by the very men who had tended to cause the failure of the campaign by their want of patriotism, and by conduct unbecoming soldiers professedly fighting for their country. What plea can be urged for them? They were not mercenaries fighting merely for pay; they were citizens of Pennsylvania who had taken up arms in the cause of, and were animated professedly by the most devoted love for, their country. It can hardly be supposed that to such men the absence of home comforts and the hardships of a few weeks' campaign would be sufficient to induce them to desert the cause. To what, then, can their conduct be attributed? Are the calculations and arrangements of trade so imbued in the minds of Americans that even what they believe to be their most sacred duties are subservient to engagements which might suffice to bind apprentices, but are scarcely such as usually tie the hands of men armed for a holy cause? Or were the men lukewarm in that cause, and ignorant of a military

spirit-were they also deficient in the feelings of patriotic citizens? Possibly to all these causes, as also to the carelessness in regard to their men of ignorant regimental officers, is the defalcation of General Patterson's army to be attributed. However, it was necessary that some one should be sacrificed; and, as it was easier to get rid of the general than to punish the troops, it was ordered that Generals Patterson and Cadwallader should be honourably discharged from the service of the United States. These events, occurring contemporarily with the advance of General M'Dowell's army, were productive of the gravest results, as we shall have occasion to notice.

The numerical strength of the Federal army which marched from the lines around Alexandria, Arlington Heights, and Washington, was about 53,000 men. This number was made up as follows: viz. 50,000 volunteers, mostly infantry, and 3,000 regular troops, comprising artillery, and a small proportion of cavalry. Many of the volunteer regiments had a few guns, or even a battery of artillery, attached to them; but only a portion of these batteries had been organised into a proper artillery force. Among the volunteer regiments were several clothed in the dress, but possessing few of the characteristics, of Zouaves; and it was the delight of the press to narrate anecdotes of these men, to evince the recklessness which they were supposed to have imbibed with their loose breeches. The army was divided into five divisions, and each division into an unequal number of brigades; they were commanded as follows:

1ST DIVISION. Brigadier-General Tyler.-Comprising: 1st Brigade, Colonel E. D. Keys; 2nd Brigade, Brigadier-General Schenck; 3rd Brigade, Colonel W. Sherman; 4th Brigade, Colonel J. Richardson.

2ND DIVISION. Colonel Hunter.-1st Brigade, Colonel A. Porter; 2nd Brigade, Colonel A. Burnside.

3RD DIVISION. Colonel S. Heintzelman.-1st Brigade, Colonel W. Franklyn; 2nd Brigade, Colonel O. Wilcox; 3rd Brigade, Colonel O. Howard.

4TH DIVISION. Brigadier-General T. Runyon.—Composed of New Jersey troops.

5TH DIVISION. Colonel D. Miles.-1st Brigade, Colonel Blenker; 2nd Brigade, Colonel Davies.

The artillery of the army consisted of 49 field-pieces, of which 28 were rifled. All the batteries excepting two were fully horsed.*

Many of the senior officers commanding divisions and brigades belonged to the regular army, but were totally unpractised in the movements of large bodies of men, few having had any experience beyond the tactics of a regiment or company. The army moved in four columns, composed of the four divisions, with one division, the fourth, in reserve. 16,000 men, in addition to the above-mentioned force, under General Mansfield, were retained as the garrison of Washington, and guards were also detached to take charge of the bridges over the Potomac and the entrenchments on the right bank of that river. The four roads by which the columns advanced, viz. the Georgetown Turnpike, a branch from the Leesburg and Centreville Road, the Little River Turnpike, and the Old Braddock Road, converged together in the neighbourhood of Centreville. The 1st Division, under General Tyler, marching by the first of these roads, formed the right column; the 2nd and 3rd the centre; and the 5th, advancing along the Old Braddock Road, the left. The 4th Division followed in rear.

The right column commenced its march at 2 P.M. on

* Major Barry's (chief of artillery) report.