hills and thinly settled districts of New Mexico, the war had extended. A small force of Texans, under General Sibley, had invaded the State, and were opposed by Colonel Canby, who had under his command. a mixed force of regular troops and volunteers. The want of water, and the consequent almost barren nature of the greater portion of the country, rendered the employment of large bodies of men impossible. The Federal troops held certain forts and positions, from which the Confederates were unable to drive them, from the want of a sufficient artillery. In some instances actions, or rather skirmishes, took place in the open, and according as the result favoured either party, so was that side able to ravage the farms and levy contributions on the settlers of New Mexico. The population took but little part, and showed little interest in the struggle: if they inclined to either side, it was to that of the Federals, probably because they were the stronger, and had, by their occupation of the country, bound the principal inhabitants by motives of interest to remain faithful to the cause of the North. The principal engagement was dignified by the name of the battle of Valverde; it was fought between the Texans under General Sibley, and the garrison of Fort Craig under Colonel Canby, on February 21, 1862. In this action the Texans obtained an advantage, but not of sufficient importance to give them possession of the fort; however, they occupied for upwards of a month the principal towns of New Mexico, Santa Fé, and Albuquerque. The forts, viz. Forts Union and Craig, remained in the hands of the Federals, and their garrisons were sufficiently formidable to undertake an offensive campaign in the spring. Skirmishes ensued between the two armies, which resulted in the

*

determination of General Sibley to abandon the territory, leaving his hospitals at the towns of Santa Fé, Albuquerque, and Socorro. In concluding his report of the campaign, General Sibley expressed his opinion that, excepting for its political geographical position, the territory of New Mexico was not worth a quarter of the blood and treasure expended on its conquest. The neighbouring Indians had taken advantage of the intestine troubles of the territory, and the Navojoés and Apachees had carried off an innumerable number of sheep; indeed, their depredations were so great, that General Sibley determined to encourage private enterprises against the Indians, and to legalise the enslaving of them.† New Mexico was removed at far too great a distance from the seat of war to be in itself of importance to either party. As a means by which the Confederates could communicate with the Pacific coast, its occupation might possibly have possessed some value; but their Government could spare no resources for distant enterprises, as all its energies were required for the protection of the very heart of the country, menaced by the vast armaments organised by the enemy during the winter months.

* The treasure principally consisted of Confederate paper money. † General Sibley's official report.

CHAPTER XIV.

CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN VIRGINIA.

WHILST the success which had attended the Federal arms during the commencement of the year 1862 roused the enthusiasm and excited the hopes of the people of the North to the highest degree, it also rendered them impatient of the inaction of the great army of Virginia, henceforth to be known as the army of the Potomac. The Young Napoleon, as it was the fashion to call General M'Clellan, had as yet, to vulgar eyes, done little. He had, indeed, made an army out of the discordant elements remaining from the battle of Bull Run; he had trained officers, organised the artillery and transport services, and reduced the crowd of men placed under his command to something resembling soldiers in appearance and discipline. But this was not enough for the people, or for a great majority of their representatives in Congress. Greater brilliancy of action was required, and the Young Napoleon was called on to vindicate the name that had been bestowed

on him. The more ignorant the critics the more bitter were their criticisms; and men, even among those in high positions, who, previous to the commencement of the war, had never seen a brigade of troops together, talked of strategy and planned campaigns as if they had studied military affairs from their

boyhood. The force deemed necessary for active operations has already been given, as stated in the memorandum addressed by General M'Clellan to President Lincoln; it was subsequently estimated more minutely in a report made to the Secretary of War, and was as follows:

or an aggregate, present and absent, of about 240,000 men.* On October 15, 1861, the number of troops in and about Washington, inclusive of the garrison of the city, the troops on the Maryland shore, and the garrison of Baltimore, was a little over 143,000; but by March 1, 1862, the total number had increased to 193,142 fit for duty, with a grand aggregate of 221,987. The actual number of troops demanded had been almost reached, but other requirements besides men were necessary before the army could move. The manufacture of arms had scarcely kept pace with the demand, consequently, the regiments as they arrived in Washington were ordered to remain on the Maryland side of the Potomac until they were equipped, when they were assigned to their respective brigades and divisions on the right bank. The infantry was organised in brigades consisting of four regiments, and when the troops had been somewhat disciplined and instructed, divisions of three brigades

* M'Clellan's report on the organisation and campaign of the army of the Potomac, p. 46.

were gradually formed. The same care was extended towards the artillery and the cavalry, although the latter arm was never, in General M'Clellan's opinion, so strong as it ought to have been. The regular infantry, collected from distant parts, was formed into a reserve, to be employed at critical moments; such a body being considered of especial importance in an army composed of raw and imperfectly disciplined levies. Great attention was given to the organisation of an effective artillery force, an arm of the service highly estimated both by General M'Clellan, and by most of the other Federal commanders. In July, 1861, the whole of the artillery was composed of nine imperfectly equipped batteries, whilst in March, 1862, it consisted of ninety-two batteries of 520 guns, 52,500 men, and 11,000 horses, fully equipped and in readiness for active service in the field; a sufficient evidence both of the activity of the Ordnance Department and of the energy of General Barry, chief of artillery. The fieldbatteries were assigned to divisions, not to brigades, in the proportion of four to each division, one of which was to be a battery of the regular artillery, whilst the artillery reserve of the whole army was to consist of 100 guns. The Engineer Department was increased from its at first small and inadequate organisation by the employment of volunteer regiments composed of men who, by their former professions and education, were, to a certain degree fitted for its duties. It was divided into two distinct services, that of the engineer service, properly so called, and that of the topographical engineers, a branch of more than ordinary importance in a country which had never been properly surveyed, and which was as little known for the purposes of military movements as in the days of the