ment, when any movement by the enemy in the direction of Washington was made, became a byword and subject of amusement in the army of the Potomac. At the same time that Mr. Lincoln withdrew a corps d'armée from General M'Clellan's command, he urged an immediate assault on the enemy's works, saying that the country would no longer stand delay, and again reiterating his opinion that a direct movement by Manasses would have been a better mode of marching on Richmond than a transfer of the scene of operations to the Peninsula. In so far as regarded an assault on the enemy's lines, Mr. Lincoln's opinion was probably correct; but as he was believed to be totally uninfluenced by any knowledge of the strength of the enemy, either as regarded numbers or position, and to look upon the matter as a question of policy only, his mere assertion that it would be well to adopt such a course had no influence on the general commanding the army. General M'Clellan made up his mind that the works could not be taken by assault, and therefore commenced a siege in due form, which gave time to General Johnston, first, to collect his army in the Peninsula, and, secondly, to prepare entrenchments nearer Richmond, to which he could retire when he so wished it, and when he became too hardly pressed by the enemy in front of Yorktown. Among the forests in front of Yorktown, and between it and the Warwick River, the army of the Potomac encamped. The principal depôt for stores was changed from Fortress Monroe to Shipping Point, and the great labour commenced of

*The fears entertained for the safety of Washington so soon after the battle of Winchester argue that the results of that battle were not considered to have been decisive, and were very different from the great victory trumpeted abroad by the Federal press.

preparing roads, erecting bridges, and filling up swamps in order to allow of the transport of the guns, ammunition, and stores requisite for so large an army. It was in these works that the American soldier especially distinguished himself; the men went through an amount of hard labour, without murmur or complaint, which would have tested severely the discipline of an European army. Miles and miles of road had to be corduroyed, or planked with logs, and often after rain the corduroy would sink, and fresh timber covered with brushwood had to be placed over it. Many of the officers and men, from their former habits of life, possessed a knowledge of rough but practical engineering,most useful in such works as they were now engaged in. It was some considerable time before the stores and ammunition for a siege were brought to the front, and it was whilst he was conducting the operations before Yorktown that General M'Clellan received information of a fresh reduction of his power. Already had the armies of the West been removed from his jurisdiction, and General M'Dowell's corps retained nominally for the defence of Washington. More new military departments were now formed: that of the Shenandoah Valley was given to General Banks, whilst the portion of Virginia east of the Blue Ridge and west of the Potomac and the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, including the district of Columbia and the country between the Potomac and the Patuxent, was formed into the district of the Rappahannock and allotted to General M'Dowell. This appointment was the cause of great irritation on the part of General M'Clellan's friends, as it was alleged that General M'Dowell had, in the absence of his chief, intrigued for his own advantage. However, subsequently, that officer

had an opportunity of clearing himself from these imputations, and of proving that the appointment was made unsolicited by himself. By reason of these fresh distributions, there remained in April to General M'Clellan, who in March commanded the whole of the army of the United States, only that portion of it which was before Yorktown. General Wool was not under his orders, neither was General Dix at Baltimore, nor General M'Dowell at Fredericksburgh, with all of whom perfect cooperation was almost necessary to secure success, and cooperation of such a kind as is usually the result of the exercise of controlling authority. If General M'Clellan had been unsuccessful, or had otherwise proved himself incapable, no one could blame the Government for removing him; but the underhand manner in which his plans were thwarted and his power circumscribed, before he had had any opportunity of proving his ability, would almost argue that the rulers at Washington were equally fearful of his success as of his defeat. The nation was, indeed, reaping the fruits of its system of government; men who in other countries would never have risen beyond the narrow sphere for which they were fitted were, in America, invested with power which few constitutional governments possess, and brought the petty ideas of small minds to bear on the destinies of their country.

CHAPTER XV.

CAMPAIGN OF TENNESSEE.

DURING the time occupied by the army of the Potomac in the advance to Centreville, and the subsequent change of the base of operations to Fortress Monroe, the Federal army and navy in the Tennessee and the inland waters had not been idle. The command of the whole Western district had been allotted to General Halleck; but, whilst he retained his headquarters at St. Louis, his subordinates continued the offensive campaign, which had been so successfully commenced by the capture and occupation of Forts Henry, Donelson, and Columbus, and the city of Nashville. Generals Grant and Buell continued to advance into Tennessee, whilst General Pope and Commodore Foote conducted the operations on the Mississippi River, and endeavoured to reduce the new position which the Confederates had occupied after the evacuation of Columbus. As Columbus may be said to have formed the left of the first line of defence taken up by the Confederates to cover Tennessee, so may Island No. 10 be considered as the left of their second line, extending from thence through Corinth to Murfreesborough and Cumberland Gap. It had, however, the disadvantage, irrespective of its actual position considered for purposes of defence, of lying at too great a distance from the main army,

and consequently of being subject to the danger not only of being cut off from communication with that army, but from the knowledge of its isolation acting badly on the temper of its defenders. Its actual position was not well adapted for defence. The island. is situated at the southern point of a peninsula of land formed by one of those sharp bends common to the Mississippi River. Immediately beyond the island the river, which until then had flowed in a southerly direction, turns almost directly to the north, consequently the small town of New Madrid, situated on the right bank of the river, is, although twelve miles lower down than Island No. 10, considerably to the north of it. The land on the left bank rises considerably higher than that on the right, which is low and swampy. The island itself is flat, and partially covered. with timber. This was the place that had been selected to guard the Mississippi, and its defences had been constructed under the superintendence of General Beauregard, who was in command until the last days of the siege, when he handed it over to General M'Call. The successful defence of the island from its situation depended greatly, if not entirely, on the possession by its defenders of the town of New Madrid,. and of the higher ground on the left bank of the river. This was apparent to the Federal general, and whilst Commodore Foote with his gunboats engaged the attention of the defenders of the island from the upper river, General Pope himself led an expedition against the force occupying New Madrid. On February 28 a skirmish took place between the troops under his command and some irregular cavalry, and shortly afterwards a detachment under General Plummer was sent to take possession of a point on the right bank ten miles below