90 Appendix B to opinion of GOLDBERG, J., dissenting. "That provision in section 23 is broader than the language in section 3, where the definition of navigable waters is used, the one that you were asking me about, on Saturday. "The definition of navigable waters in section 3 applies only to those waters that are in fact navigable. "Section 23 applies to waters that are not in fact navigable, but where construction may affect interstate or foreign commerce. "Mr. MAPES. Yes. Has the court sustained the Commission in that respect, the jurisdiction of the Commission? "Mr. DEVANE. Of nonnavigable waters? "Mr. MAPES. Yes. "Mr. DEVANE. You are asking about the jurisdiction of Congress over these nonnavigable waters, that affect navigation? "Mr. MAPES. Yes. "Mr. DEVANE. Yes; the jurisdiction of Congress over such streams was upheld in the case of the United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 690. That was decided under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, which in effect is the same as section 23 of this act." Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 471-472, 474, 476, 489, 490. (Emphasis added.) CORBETT, GUARDIAN v. STERGIOS, APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA. No. 179. Argued April 27, 1965-Decided May 3, 1965. 256 Iowa 12, 126 N. W. 2d 342, reversed. Robert R. Eidsmoe argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was George S. Porikos. Phillip S. Dandos argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Harry H. Smith. PER CURIAM. In light of our construction of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and the Kingdom of Greece, signed August 3, 1951, effective October 13, 1954,* a construction confirmed by representations of the signatories whose views were not available to the Supreme Court of Iowa, the judgment is reversed. Clark v. Allen, 331 U. S. 503. *5 U. S. Treaties and Other International Agreements 1829; T. I. A. S. No. 3057. SUSSER ET AL. v. CARVEL CORP. ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. No. 355. Argued April 29, 1965.-Decided May 3, 1965. Certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted. Arnold Fleischmann argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Sidney W. Rothstein and Robert G. Levy. Herman L. Weisman and John A. Wilson argued the cause for respondents. With Mr. Weisman on the briefs for Carvel Corp. et al. were Herbert F. Roth and Lester G. Renard. With Mr. Wilson on the brief for H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., was Willard M. L. Robinson. Albert L. Wigor filed a brief for Eagle Cone Corp. William G. Mulligan and Doris Carroll filed a brief for Rakestraw's Dairy Products, Inc. Jerrold G. Van Cise filed a brief for the International Franchise Association, Inc., as amicus curiae. PER CURIAM. The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG took no part in the decision of this case. 773-305 0-65-13 _ WATTS ET AL. v. SEWARD SCHOOL BOARD ET AL. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ALASKA. No. 923. Decided May 3, 1965. The cause, involving schoolteachers who claim that their dismissals for activities in attempting to remove a school official and board members violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, is remanded to the Supreme Court of Alaska to allow that court to consider the effect, if any, of supervening changes in state law upon this case. Certiorari granted; 395 P. 2d 372, judgment vacated and case remanded. George Kaufmann for petitioners. George N. Hayes for respondent Seward School Board. PER CURIAM. Petitioners Watts and Blue were dismissed from their positions as schoolteachers in Seward, Alaska, on grounds of "immorality," which under Alaska Statutes 1962, § 14.20.170 was defined as "conduct of the person tending to bring the individual concerned or the teaching profession into public disgrace or disrespect." Petitioners' dismissals were upheld by the Alaska Superior Court (Third Judicial District), and on appeal the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision. 395 P. 2d 372. The Alaska Supreme Court noted that "[t]he immoral conduct complained of as to the appellant Watts was his holding of private conversations with various teachers in which he solicited their support in an attempt to oust the school superintendent from his job. The allegedly immoral conduct of the appellant Blue was his making of a speech to a labor union at Seward in which he stated, 'We have been unable to get rid of the [school] Superintendent, so we are going to get rid of the Board,' or words to that effect." 395 P. 2d, at 374. The Alaska Supreme Court held that this conduct "had a tendency to bring the [petitioners] . . . and the teaching profession into public disgrace or disrespect," within the terms of the statute, 395 P. 2d, at 375, and it therefore sustained their dismissals. Petitioners contend that their dismissals for engaging in the conduct here described unconstitutionally infringe their rights to political expression guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We need not consider petitioners' contentions at this time, for since their petition for certiorari was filed Alaska has amended its statutes in this area. House Bill 27, adopted by the Alaska Legislature and signed by the Governor on March 31, 1965, now defines "immorality" as grounds for revocation of a teaching certificate, as "the commission of an act which, under the laws of the state, constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude." Moreover, Alaska Statutes, Tit. 14, c. 20, have been amended by the addition of a new section which reads: "Sec. 14.20.095. Right to Comment and Criticize Not to be Restricted. No rule or regulation of the commissioner of education, a local school board, or local school administrator may restrict or modify the right of a teacher to engage in comment and criticism outside school hours, relative to school administrators, members of the governing body of any school or school district, any other public official, or any school employee, to the same extent that any private individual may exercise the right." This Court has held that supervening changes in state law that may be relevant to the disposition of a case may require that the cause be remanded for appropriate action by the state court. See, e. g., Missouri ex rel. Wabash R. |