HARLAN, J., dissenting. 381 U.S. Our conclusion is that these petitioners have been punished by Virginia for doing nothing more than exercising the constitutional right of an accused and his counsel in contempt cases such as this to defend against the charges made. The judgment of conviction is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has in effect held that the manner in which petitioners presented their motion for a change of venue violated professional standards governing members of the Virginia Bar. This Court now sets aside the trivial disciplinary penalty imposed simply because in its view petitioners' conduct was not out of bounds. Believing that any differences over the professional propriety of petitioners' actions involve nothing of constitutional proportions, I would affirm the judgment of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.* *I do not think that any of the other contentions not reached by this Court can be said, on this record, to present a substantial federal question (ante, pp. 135-136, n. 2). Syllabus. UNITED STATES v. CALIFORNIA. BILL IN EQUITY. No. 5, Original. Argued December 7-8, 1964.- The United States brought this suit in 1945 against California to determine dominion over the submerged lands and mineral rights under the three-mile belt of sea off the California coast. In 1947 this Court held (332 U. S. 19) that the United States possessed paramount rights in such lands and minerals underlying the Pacific Ocean seaward of the low-water mark on the California coast and outside of inland waters. Thereafter the Court appointed a Special Master to determine for specific coastal segments the line of ordinary low water and the outer limit of inland waters. In his Report, filed in 1952, the Master based his definition of inland waters on that applied by the United States in its foreign relations as of the date of the 1947 decree. Both parties noted exceptions to the Report, but before any further action, the Submerged Lands Act was enacted in 1953. This Act gave the States ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters within their boundaries, including the seaward boundaries "as they existed at the time such State became a member of the Union," but in no event to be interpreted as extending from the "coast line" more than three geographical miles into the Pacific Ocean. "Coast line" was derivatively defined in terms of the seaward limit of "inland waters," a term not defined by the Act. No action was taken on the Master's Report until 1963, when the United States filed an amended complaint reviving the Report and redescribing the issues as modified by the Submerged Lands Act. The United States contends that the Act simply moved the line out three miles from the line established by the 1947 decree, while California asserts that "inland waters" as used in the Act means not what the United States would claim as such in international relations but what the States historically considered to be inland when they joined the Union. Held: 1. The Act's legislative history shows that "inland waters" was to be defined by the courts. Pp. 150-160. (a) By eliminating the definition of inland waters from the bill Congress intended to leave the meaning of the term to the courts, independently of the Act. Pp. 150-154. (b) The addition of the three-mile limitation provision to the bill shows that Congress must have intended that some criterion be used by the courts other than one dependent upon a State's subjective concept of its inland waters. Pp. 154-160. 2. The definition of inland waters, as used in the Act, should conform to the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. Pp. 161-167. (a) While this Court did not define inland waters in the 1947 opinion in this case, it did indicate that it was to have an international content since the outer limits of such waters would determine our international coastline. Pp. 161-162. (b) Subsequent to the Special Master's Report, this country ratified the Convention, which is now in force and represents the position of the United States. Pp. 163-164. (c) The Act does not restrict the Court to the time of enactment in determining the best and most workable definition of inland waters, which is found in the Convention. Pp. 164-165. (d) Adopting the meaning of inland waters in terms of the Convention definition, with a 24-mile maximum closing line for bays and a "semicircle" test for the sufficiency of the water area enclosed, will provide definiteness and stability to the rights granted in the Act. Pp. 165–167. 3. Although the Convention permits the use of the straightbase-line method for ascertaining inland waters claimed against other nations, the choice is one that rests with the United States, which is responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs, and not with the individual States. Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240, distinguished. Pp. 167-169. 4. Applying the Convention's 24-mile closing rule and the "semicircle" test for classifying bays, Monterey Bay is inland water, but none of the other coastal segments in dispute meets the requirements. Pp. 169-170. 5. California's assertion that Santa Barbara Channel may be considered a "fictitious bay" under international law cannot force the United States, which disagrees, to take such a position to extend our international boundaries. Pp. 170–172. 6. The exception to the Convention's 24-mile closing rule for "historic" bays, those over which a nation has traditionally asserted and maintained dominion, cannot benefit California unless the United States endorses its claims or there is clear historic evidence supporting such claims. None of the disputed water areas (not considering Monterey Bay which is covered by the 24-mile rule) is an historic inland water of the United States. Pp. 172-175. 7. Open roadsteads used for loading, unloading and anchoring ships are, pursuant to the Convention, areas of the territorial sea and are therefore not to be considered inland waters. P. 175. 8. The average of the lower of the two daily low tides should be used in determining the Act's "line of ordinary low water," recognized by the Convention. Pp. 175-176. 9. The sovereignty of the States extends to new land obtained by artificial accretion as well as natural modification of the shoreline. Pp. 176-177. Special Master's Report approved as modified. Solicitor General Cox argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Stephen J. Pollak, George S. Swarth and Martin Green. Richard H. Keatinge, Special Assistant Attorney General of California, argued the cause for defendant. With him on the briefs were Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Stanley Mosk, former Attorney General, Charles E. Corker, Howard S. Goldin and Jay L. Shavelson, Assistant Attorneys General, and Warren J. Abbott and N. Gregory Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General. George N. Hayes, Special Assistant Attorney General of Alaska, by special leave of Court, argued the cause for the State of Alaska, as amicus curiae. With him on the brief were Warren C. Colver, Attorney General, and Avrum M. Gross, Special Assistant Attorney General. John B. Ogden filed briefs for Carl Whitson, as amicus curiae. 773-305 0-65-14 Opinion of the Court. 381 U.S. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court. The present case requires us to determine the extent of submerged lands granted to the State of California by the Submerged Lands Act of 1953,1 and in particular to declare whether specified bodies of water on the California coast are "inland waters" within the meaning of that Act. A substantial amount of background is necessary to place the issues in perspective. I. THE SETTING OF THE CASE. This is a suit begun in 1945, brought by the United States against California to determine dominion over the submerged lands and mineral rights under the three-mile belt of sea off the coast of California. In 1947 the Court decreed: . "The United States of America is now, and has been at all times pertinent hereto, possessed of paramount rights in, and full dominion and power over, the lands, minerals and other things underlying the Pacific Ocean lying seaward of the ordinary lowwater mark on the coast of California, and outside of the inland waters, extending seaward three nautical miles The State of California has no title thereto or property interest therein." United States v. California, 332 U. S. 804, 805, Order and Decree. After the entry of this decree, the United States asked that the lands awarded to it be defined in greater detail in certain areas where there was substantial oil well activity, and which California asserted lay within inland waters. The Court appointed a Special Master, and directed him to consider seven specified segments of the 167 Stat. 29, 43 U. S. C. §§ 1301-1315 (1958 ed.). The late William H. Davis of New York City. |