Per Curiam.

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. TEXACO, INC., ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.

No. 635. Decided June 7, 1965.

The Court of Appeals set aside a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) cease-and-desist order on the grounds that the FTC Chairman was disqualified for prejudging the case and the order was not supported by substantial evidence and remanded it to the FTC with instructions to dismiss in view of the long delays. No review of the Chairman's disqualification was sought. The judgment is remanded with instructions to remand immediately to the FTC for further proceedings, without participation of the Chairman, in light of Atlantic Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, ante, p. 357.

Certiorari granted; 118 U. S. App. D. C. 366, 336 F. 2d 754, vacated and remanded.

Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Orrick, Lionel Kestenbaum, James Mcl. Henderson, Alvin L. Berman and Louis R. Harding for petitioner.

Milton Handler and Frederick W. P. Lorenzen for Texaco, Inc., and Edgar E. Barton and Macdonald Flinn for B. F. Goodrich Co., respondents.

PER CURIAM.

In this case the Federal Trade Commission entered a cease-and-desist order prohibiting Texaco, Inc., and the B. F. Goodrich Company from participating in any salescommission program for the distribution of tires, batteries and accessories. The Court of Appeals set the order aside and remanded to the Commission with instructions to dismiss the complaint. The court held, first, that Chairman Dixon was disqualified from participating in the decision

because he had indicated in a speech made while the case was pending that he had prejudged it. The majority of the court held, further, that the Commission's order was not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Although it recognized that under these circumstances a remand would ordinarily be called for, the court concluded that because of the delays that had existed throughout the litigation the complaint should be dismissed.

The United States does not seek review of the ruling that Chairman Dixon was disqualified from participating in this case. We therefore venture no opinion as to the correctness of that conclusion. The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is vacated and the case is remanded with instructions to remand it immediately to the Federal Trade Commission for further proceedings, without the participation of Chairman Dixon, in light of Atlantic Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, ante, p. 357. The judgment shall issue forthwith.

Vacated and remanded.

MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for reconsideration by the Federal Trade Commission, without the participation of Chairman Dixon, in accordance with the views expressed in MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG's dissenting opinion in Atlantic Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, ante, at 382.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE STEWART would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the reasons stated in MR. JUSTICE STEWART's dissenting opinion in Atlantic Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, ante, at 377.

CAMERON ET AL. v. JOHNSON, GOVERNOR OF MISSISSIPPI, ET AL.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI.

No. 587, Misc. Decided June 7, 1965.

Judgment vacated and cause remanded.

Reported below: 244 F. Supp. 846.

Arthur Kinoy, William M. Kunstler, Benjamin E. Smith, Bruce C. Waltzer, Melvin Wulf and Morton Stavis for appellants.

Joe T. Patterson, Attorney General of Mississippi, and William A. Allain, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Appellants brought this action, inter alia, under § 1979 of the Revised Statutes, 42 U. S. C. § 1983 (1958 ed.), to enjoin enforcement of the Mississippi Anti-Picketing statute,* on the grounds that it was an unconstitutionally broad regulation of speech, and that it was being applied for the purpose of discouraging appellants' civil rights activities.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The judgment is vacated and the cause remanded for reconsideration in light of Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479. On remand, the District Court should first consider whether 28 U. S. C. § 2283 (1958 ed.) bars a federal injunction in this case, see 380 U. S., at 484, n. 2. If § 2283 is not a bar, the court should then deter

*House Bill No. 546, Gen. Laws of Miss. 1964, c. 343.

mine whether relief is proper in light of the criteria set forth in Dombrowski.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE STEWART join, dissenting.

I dissent from the reversal of this judgment and from the manner in which it is done. A cryptic, uninformative per curiam order is no way, I think, for this Court to decide a case involving as this one does a State's power to make it an offense for people to obstruct public streets and highways and to block ingress and egress to and from its public buildings and properties. The case also involves the question whether, having passed such a law, valid on its face, the State can prosecute offenders in its own courts or whether United States courts have power to enjoin all state prosecutions merely because of a charge that the law is unconstitutional on its face, without first determining the constitutionality of the statute.

Every person who has the slightest information about what is going on in this country can understand the importance of these issues. The summary disposition the Court makes of this case fails properly to enlighten state or federal courts or the people who deserve to know what are the rights of the people, the rights of affected groups, the rights of the Federal Government, and the rights of the States in this field of activities which encompasses some of the most burning, pressing and important issues of our time. There are many earnest, honest, good people in this Nation who are entitled to know exactly how far they have a constitutional right to go in using the public streets to advocate causes they consider just State officials are also entitled to the same information. The Court has already waited entirely too long, in my judgment, to perform its duty of clarifying these consti

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tutional issues. These issues are of such great importance that I am of the opinion that before this Court relegates the States to the position of mere onlookers in struggles over their streets and the accesses to their public buildings, this Court should at least write an opinion making clear to the States and interested people the boundaries between what they can do in this field and what they cannot. Today's esoteric and more or less mysterious per curiam order gives no such information.

This action was brought by and on behalf of picketers and demonstrators in Mississippi, some of whom have charges now pending against them which were brought in the Mississippi state courts for violating a Mississippi statute which provided:

"It shall be unlawful for any person, singly or in concert with others, to engage in picketing or mass demonstrations in such a manner as to obstruct or interfere with free ingress or egress to and from any public premises, State property, county or municipal courthouses, city halls, office buildings, jails, or other

1 See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U. S. 226, 242 (opinion of DOUGLAS, J.); id., at 318 (BLACK, J., dissenting); Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U. S. 306, 318 (BLACK, J., dissenting).

2 We are informed that after the decision of the District Court in the present case, 170 of the state-court defendants removed their prosecutions to a federal district court, purportedly under authority of 28 U. S. C. § 1443 (1958 ed.). The Federal District Court ordered the cases remanded to the state courts. The Court of Appeals stayed the remand orders, and an appeal from those orders is now pending before the Fifth Circuit. Hartfield v. Mississippi, No. 21811; Anderson v. Mississippi, No. 21813; Carmichael v. City of Greenwood, No. 22289. It can be assumed that if appellants are unsuccessful in the Fifth Circuit they will seek review in this Court, which will take at least another year. Today's decision appears to add more devices to the collection of delaying tactics by which state criminal defendants may use collateral litigation in the federal courts to prevent their prosecutions in state courts from coming to trial for many years, if ever.