executed by a Constable and Sub-Constable in the absence of Constable B, the execution was held illegal.—Blue v. Fullerton, E. 10 C. L. 233.

Binding to good behaviour.--In an application under the statute of 34 Edw. III., c. 1, to bind a party to be of good behaviour, several distinct instances of misconduct may be alleged and relied upon. The defendant is not a competent witness and should not be examined.-The Queen and Justices of Queen's Co. 10 L. R. I., p. 294.

Jurisdiction of Justices.--Justices sitting at Petty Sessions have not only the power of adjournment given them by the Petty Sessions Act, but also an inherent power of adjourning a case at any time to any future Sessions. But when a case is fully heard by several Justices, and only adjourned for the purpose of determining and pronouncing the order, the same Justices who heard the case must also concur in the order pronounced.—R. (Sullivan) v. Justices of County Cork, 18 L. R. I., Q.R. 99.

Justices of the Peace sitting in and acting for one Petty Sessional Division of a County have jurisdiction to commit for trial on a charge arising in another Petty Sessional Division of same county, and are not bound to remand such charge for hearing in the division in which offence was committed. In this case Lord Coleridge said, "In dealing with an offence committed in the county the Magistrates for the county have jurisdiction throughout the county."—R. v. Beekley, 20 Q. B. D. 187.

Street Preaching.-Upon motion for a certiorari to bring up orders made by justices at petty sessions, requiring persons to find sureties to keep the peace and be of goodbehaviour, the Queen's Bench Division has jurisdiction to examine the evidence given before the justices, and to quash the orders if such evidence was, in the opinion of the divisional court, insufficient to sustain them. The defenants were charged on summons at Petty Sessions under the statute 34 Edw. 3, c. 1, with having assembled and paraded in the city of Londonderry, with a band, under such circumstances as were calculated to provoke a breach of the peace. Evidence was given that the defendants, with others all being members of a religious association known as the Salvation Army-paraded a thoroughfare in Londonderry on the occasion in question (a Sunday), playing musical instruments and carrying a flag, and continued to do so, notwithstanding the remonstrance of the constabulary. The proceedings were witnessed by a large

crowd

No misconduct on the part of the defendants or any of their party was proved, and no act of hostility on the part of the crowd was shown to have occurred. It was proved that a riot took place four years previously, when the Salvation Army were proceeding through the streets of Derry.

Some members of the constabulary deposed that they apprehended a breach of the peace. Held that upon this evidence, orders to find sureties to keep the peace and be of good behaviour could not be sustained. In this case, Sir Peter O'Brien, L.C.J., said "It must be remembered that the fact of being engaged in the performance of religious exercises is no justification of the obstruction of those lawfully using the streets, and that an unjustifiable obstruction of the highway renders the person responsible for it amenable not only to the magistrates' jurisdiction to compel sureties for good behaviour, but also to be criminally indicted."-The Queen v. Justices of Londonderry, 28 L.R.I., Q.B.D: 440.

Assault. A police officer who appears as complainant on a charge of assault at Petty Sessions is not a party acting or the person aggrieved within 24 & 25 Vic., c. 100, s. 42. A complaint by or on behalf of a person aggrieved by a common assault, or affirmative evidence that the aggrieved person has declined or refused to prefer a complaint, is necessary to found the jurisdiction of justices at Petty Sessions to summarily convict an offender under 24 & 25 Vic., c. 100, s. 42. and 25 & 26 Vic. c. 50, s. 9.-Reg (Ryan) v. Justices of Co. Wicklow, 30 L. R. I., Q.B., page

633.

Bicycle.-A person riding a bicycle on a foot-path along the side of a public road in a country district, may, although no evidence can be produced of obstruction to the free passage of foot-passengers along that footpath, or of any foot-passenger on the same footpath being in sight of the person riding be summarily convicted under sub-sec. 3 of 14 & 15 Vic. c. 92 for wilfully preventing and interrupting the free passage of persons along the road of which the footpath forms a part. A bicycle is a carriage.-M‘Kee v. M'Grath, 30 L. R. I., Ex. D. 41.

Arrest by Warrant after Service of Summons.-Referring to 14 and 15 Vic., c. 93, s. 11, ss. 1.—If a justice has reason to believe from sworn information before him that the defendant having been served with a summons meditates his escape from justice, it will be his duty to issue his warrant and cause him to be at once arrested; but there must be an information, else there is no foundation for the warrant. Stevens v. Clark, Car. and M. 509.

Arrest by Warrant.-It has been said by high authorities that a constable is not bound to show his warrant, though demanded, and that it is enough for him to say, "I arrest you for felony, &c., in the Queen's name "; (see 2 Hale P.C. 116, &c.). But this doctrine has been condemned by Lord Kenyon, C.J., in Hall v. Roche, 8 T.R. Where he says at p. 187:— "It is a most dangerous doctrine, because it may affect the party criminally in case of resistance, and if homicide ensues the legality of the warrant enters materially into the merits of the question. I do not think that a person is to take it for granted that another who says he has a warrant against him without producing it speaks the truth. It is very important that in all cases where an arrest is made by virtue of a warrant, the warrant (if demanded at least) should be produced."

Gaming houses. 8 and 9 Vic. c 109.-A 66 common gaming house" is a house kept or used for playing therein at any game of chance or any mixed game of chance and skill in which (1) a bank is kept by one or more of the players exclusively of the others, or (2) in which any game is played the chances of which are not alike favourable to all the players, including among the players the banker or other person by whom the game is managed, or against whom the other players stake, play, or bet. It is immaterial whether the bank is kept by the owner or occupier, or keeper of the house, or one of the players, per Smith, J. : Jenks v, Turpin, 13 Q.B.D., 530.

Sheriff Posse comitatus: the power of the county, that is the people of the county, which the sheriff may command to attend him for keeping of the peace and passing felons, and also for defending the county against the Queen's enemies. This command every male person above fifteen years of age and under the degree of a peer is bound to attend upon warning under pain of fine and imprisonment. 4 Black Com., p. 121. The laws for raising extended to justices of the peace: 26 Geo. III., c. 24 (Ir).

Sunday (Code 2060). No judicial act can be performed on a Sunday, and a summary conviction on that day would be bad. Mackally's case, 9 Co. 65a.

Cruelty to Animals.-Dishorning of cattle if the operation be performed with due care and skill, and when practised for the purpose of rendering beasts more profitable to farmers and exporters in the course of their trade is not cruelty within the meaning of 12 and 13 Vic., c. 12, S. 2. Reg. (Newland) v. M'Donagh, 28 L.R.I., Q.B.D., 204.

Illicit Distillation.-To constitute an offence under ] and 2 Wm. 4, c. 55, s. 17, the horse or place where illicit

spirits are found must be one in which illicit distillation was intended to be, was being, or had been carried on. Doherty, App.; McClelland, Respdt., L.R.I., E.D.

168.

Executions of Writs by night.--The Sheriff in his sole discretion, has the right to require the protection and assistance of the constabulary as part of the power of the county (Posse Comitatus) in the execution of the writs of fieri facias of the superior courts, whether by night or day, and a refusal of that protection and assistance will be punishment as a contempt of court whence the writs were issued. Att.-Genl. v. Kissane, 32 LR.I. Q.B., 220.

Evidence.-There is no rule of law against a party stating his case as an advocate and then being examined as a witness on his behalf: Cobbett v. Hudson, 1 El. and Bl. 11.

Reversal of conviction or order of a justice.-There are three modes by which a party may proceed to obtain the reversal of a conviction or order of a justice, namely-

(1.) By an appeal to Quarter Sessions. In every case of summary jurisdiction a general power of appeal is given by 14 and 15 Vic., c. 93, s. 24. The right of appeal to the Quarter Sessions is, as a general rule, given only to the defendant and not to the complainant.

(2) By a case stated under 20 and 21 Vic., c. 43, which statute makes provision for obtaining the opinion of any of the superior courts of law in Dublin on any question of law, where either party, whether complainant or defendant, is dissatisfied with the determination by a justice or justices of any information or complaint as being erroneous in point of law.

(3.) By certiorari.--A writ issuing out of the Crown Office in the name of the Queen and tested by the Chief Justice. The Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice has power to issue this writ, to procure an inspection of the proceedings of all inferior courts in judicial matters; for it is the common law of the land that the decisions of all inferior courts should be liable to the reviewal by the Queen's Bench Division upon certiorari. This writ is the only mode (except on habeas corpus or when a case is stated by which a revision of a proceeding of justices by the superior court can be obtained. The proceeding by certiorari in the cases of summary jurisdiction differs from the right of appeal in this respect, that the right of appeal does not exist unless created by statute, while certiorari lies unless expressly taken away by statute. Even where a statute in express terms enacts that the proceedings shall not be removed by certiorari, this does not

prevent its issuing at the suit of the prosecutor. The writ is granted, not as a matter of right, but in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion; and it does not lie to remove other than judicial Acts. Molloy's Justice of the Peace, 309.

Merchandise Marks Act, 1887, 50 & 51 Vic., c. 28. S. 2.—(1.) Every person who forges any trade mark; or falsely applies to goods any trade mark or any mark so nearly resembling a trade mark as to be calculated to deceive; or makes any die, block, machine, or other instrument for the purpose of forging, or of being used for forging a trade mark; or applies any false trade description to goods; or disposes of or has in his possession any die, block, machine, or other instrument for the purpose of forging a trade mark; or causes any of the things above in this section mentioned to be done, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, and unless he proves that he acted without intent to defraud, be guilty of an offence against this Act.

(2.) Every person who sells, or exposes for, or has in his possession for, sale, or any purpose of trade or manufacture, any goods or things to which any forged trade mark or false trade description is applied, or to which any trade mark or mark so nearly resembling a trade mark as to be calculated to deceive, is falsely applied, as the case may be, shall, unless he proves--(a) that having taken all reasonable precautions against committing an offence against this Act, he had at the time of the commission of the alleged offence no reason to suspect the genuineness of the trade mark, or trade description; and (b) that on demand made by or on behalf of the prosecutor, he gave all the information in his power with respect to the persons from whom he obtained such goods or things; or (c) that otherwise he had acted innocently, be guilty of an offence against this Act.

(3.) Penalties on conviction on indictment and on summary conviction.

(4.) Court may order any forfeited articles to be destroyed or otherwise disposed of. S. 3.-Definitions of "trade mark,' ""trade description,"

&c.

S. 4.--A person shall be deemed to forge a trade mark who either (a) without the assent of the proprietor of the trade mark makes that trade mark or a mark so nearly resembling that trade mark as to be calculated to deceive; or (b) falsifies any genuine trade mark, whether by