much greater control than formerly over the carrying trade of the country, and has defined in many respects the ways in which this important branch of business shall be carried on. The regulations for Merchant Shipping enforced by the Marine Department of the Board of Trade may be more fitly considered below, as their avowed object has been the securing the lives and comfort of seamen not the better management of the purely commercial interests of the public. But the special interference with Railway Companies was based on other grounds: it originated in 1873 when a fear was felt lest amalgamation schemes might be pushed to such an extent that in many cases the traffic over a large area of England would be monopolised by a single company, and when it was urged that some means must be found of protecting the public against a possible abuse of this great monopoly. At the same time it became obvious to a committee which considered the subject that amalgamations were often beneficial to the public, and that the anticipated dangers were just as likely to arise from combination between the railways, which might be as destructive of real competition as formal amalgamation would have been. But other grievances were much felt in the existing Railway management. The Act of 1854 had been intended to secure that "every railway company should be compelled to afford full advantage of convenient interchange from one system to another, to give every class of traffic fair facilities, and especially to observe the rule of equal charges under similar circumstances." In regard to the interchange of traffic the Act had remained a dead letter, and the Railway Commission2 was formed chiefly for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of that Act for this desirable object, 13 Hansard, ccxiv. 234. 2 36 and 37 Vict. c. 48.

"1

though all questions as to amalgamation and the granting of through-rates also were to come before it as well.

"as

The objections which were urged at the time against the appointment of this new tribunal were twofold. Mr. Hunt would apparently have preferred that steps should be taken for the purchase of the railways by the State,1 and feared that the new tribunal would prove inoperative this has not been the case, as it has constantly tended to enlarge the sphere of its interference, even though it has had but comparatively slight powers for enforcing its requirements. On the other hand Mr. Pease 2 took strong exception to the "great fundamental principle of the measure, which proposed to transfer the whole railway power of the kingdom to three commissioners." But Parliament on the whole approved the measure an experiment. Whether the tribunal it proposed to establish would answer its purpose was a matter that experience alone could demonstrate. It might succeed or not; it might have a great deal too much to do, or very little; but considering the state of feeling with regard to railway companies, it was expedient that some attempt should be made to satisfy the public that there was a ready means of arbitration, and of requiring those companies to carry out the principles of the Traffic Act without recourse to the slow and costly machinery of a purely legal tribunal. The experiment was worth making, the Bill treated it as an experiment, and there was a disposition, he believed, on the part of the House to give it a fair trial.”

1 3 Hansard, ccxiv. 1044.

2 Ibid. ccxiv. 1046.

"3

3 Mr. Dodson, 3 Hansard, ccxiv. 1053. According to the phraseology adopted above (§ 44, b, d), this measure would have been described as tentative as the powers of the new body were exceedingly vague: it was not a definite step in a definite direction, the results of which can be accurately estimated, as is the case in an experiment.

The result of this tentative expedient may be most tersely stated by quoting the terms in which Mr. Chamberlain endorsed Mr. Samuelson's resolution that the Railway Commission should be made permanent. "To that proposition he gave his unqualified adherence. The Commission had done its duty uncommonly well, and its work was thoroughly appreciated by the public.” The evidence which was given before the Select Committee of 1881 and 1882, and the additional facts adduced and elicited by Mr. Samuelson in bringing forward his resolution have really put the matter beyond a doubt.

62. In the session of 1883 a measure was passed which, while granting a remission of taxation to the companies, greatly enlarged the powers of the Board of Trade in dealing with Railway Traffic.2 The railway passenger duty had originally been imposed as a countervailing duty; but when the taxes levied on other public conveyances were repealed, there was an anomaly in retaining this solitary survival of the old taxes on locomotion. By this measure third-class fares were to be exempted from taxation, and the Metropolitan lines were to receive a reduction on other fares, conditionally on their consenting to more moderate rates for the conveyance of troops, and submitting to the new powers which the Bill gave the Board of Trade. Lord Brabourne took strong exception to the last provision, which empowered the Board of Trade to "interfere with private enterprise by regulating the time and manner of running workmen's trains:"3 and the complaint has been repeated with considerable vehemence at the half-yearly meetings of 13 Hansard, cclxxviii. 1899. 2 46 and 47 Vict. c. 34.

3 3 Hansard, cclxxxii. 1612.

companies and at a gathering of Railway Shareholders.1 It is difficult to show that there is any injustice to the shareholders in thus granting a conditional remission of taxation. No attempt has been made to prove that the new demands to be put on railway companies are likely to be more onerous than the taxation from which they are relieved, and indeed they have the means of avoiding this control if they prefer to do so. But the bill is of importance as showing the constant increase of State interference in the management of undertakings started with private capital. It was left to Mr. Warton to assert the constitutional rights of private capitalists. He protested that "the House was allocating too much power to the Board of Trade. The question of electric lighting had been placed in the hands of the Board of Trade: the administration of the Bankruptcy Act was to be confided to the care of the Board of Trade, and the object of this Bill was to give additional power to this Board." 2

63. An interesting discussion of the wisdom of this policy took place with respect to the Electric Lighting Act of 1882, which followed the lines recommended by the Select Committee which reported on the subject. There was a general feeling that a public blunder had been made with respect to the introduction of gas, and that it was desirable that no similar error should be committed with regard to this new means of lighting. Gas companies had made large profits, but they were not always careful to use their monopoly for the advantage of the public, while the powers they had of breaking up streets for repair of pipes and so forth were often an in

1 3d Jan. 1884.

23 Hansard, cclxxxii. 1094.

3 45 and 46 Vict. c. 56.

tolerable nuisance: to save the inhabitants from these inconveniences, several corporations had purchased the gas works, and carried on the business for themselves: but they sometimes had to pay exorbitant prices for property which had been profitable because it had been successfully worked as a monopoly. With the view of remedying similar evils in this new instance it was proposed to license local authorities for carrying on the business of electric lighting, and to give them powers of compulsorily purchasing the property of private electric lighting companies where the enterprise proved successful. This was undoubtedly a new departure, but it was strictly parallel as Mr. Chamberlain1 showed to the course which had been forced on the towns in connexion with gaslighting. Mr. W. Fowler expressed a fear that Parliament was "going too far in the way of protecting local Corporations and discouraging private enterprise," and this is a danger which may be dreaded; but we cannot save the accruing gain for the community and stimulate private enterprise at the same time: the experience of the next few years and a comparison of our own with other countries in this matter will show whether we have steered a wise

course or no.

64. The Bankruptcy Act of 1883 furnished another example of the extension of the powers of the Board of Trade: the object of the Bill was twofold, for as Mr. Chamberlain pointed out "Parliament had to protect the salvage, and also to diminish the number of wrecks." These points may be kept quite separate in examining the Bill, and in discussing the alleged necessity for State interference in this matter.

1

1 3 Hansard, cclxxii. 574.

2 Ibid. cclxxii. 571.