intervention of the Board of Trade. Thus opposition was silenced. No body of officials could be expected to underrate their own efficiency or the possibility of doing additional work well if their numbers were increased: the hesitation of the President of the Board of Trade could not serve as a serious obstacle against outside pressure. On the other hand the popular estimate of the functions and of the powers of the State led to the growth of an overwhelming public sentiment in favour of Mr. Plimsoll's proposals. To the ordinary mind it appears that it is the duty of the State to protect life and property, and therefore to protect the lives of sailors. But as we have argued above (p. 140) it is not the function of the State to protect from physical evils, but to enforce proper attention to duty on the part of responsible agents. Mr. Plimsoll recommended a course which as he distinctly stated would protect lives, but diminish the responsibility of shipowners he thus urged Parliament to neglect its proper function, and to expend the energies of public officers on work which lies outside the sphere of State action. : This error could not have been committed however if he had not exaggerated the power of the State to secure our sailors from the dangers which arise from overloading and unseaworthiness: his system was not carried out in its entirety, but it was so far carried out that the agitation which he led ceased; and under the scheme he accepted, as Mr. Chamberlain's statement shows, overloading and faults in construction have enormously increased. It has been a terrible price for the nation to pay in order to exhibit the mischief which may be done. by benevolent enthusiasm coupled with misconceptions as to the duties and the powers of the State. 84. Since 18801 the intentions of Mr. Chamberlain, the responsible minister, appear to have been forming in the direction, not of divesting his department of powers which they have not exercised with success, but of putting more pressure on shipowners by interfering with the terms on which they contract to be indemnified in case ships are lost. It is the case that some ships are insured at a value which not only indemnifies the owner for his actual outlay in ship and cargo, but which indemnifies him for all the outlay which would have occurred and the profits which would have accrued on a successful double voyage; and it is contended that his care in the management of his business is unconsciously relaxed on account of gain which may arise from this source. We have already seen ample reasons of another kind to account for relaxed energy on the part of shipowners; and a very careful analysis of figures would be necessary to prove that over-insurance was even an important concomitant cause of loss at sea. Insurance premiums are so high that it is extremely doubtful whether a business could be profitably carried on in this manner, even though single cases of enormous gain to the owner may be quoted. Besides, it must be remembered that though insuring may be accountable for a certain amount of loss, a system has arisen in connexion with the great association of underwriters at Lloyd's which has done more than any of the legislative enactments for raising the character of our mercantile marine. The owner of a ship classed at Lloyd's has had her built by respectable shipbuilders in such a manner as to secure her getting the class he requires on Lloyd's Registry. From the time she receives her class" she is subject to a general inspection every year, 13 Hansard, cclii. 287. and to a special survey at longer intervals. . . . The surveyor (or surveyors as the case may require) being unconnected with either the shipowners or the underwriters, is in a position to make an impartial report; and this he is the more bound to do because Lloyd's Register Committee, who have to examine and take action on his report, are composed of representatives of both the shipowners and the underwriters, and they are not slow to detect and to check any tendency of the surveyors adverse to their respective interests. The expense of the repairs due to the damage sustained by the ship, when it is serious, falls chiefly on the underwriters. The interest of the owner therefore is to have the ship thoroughly set right again— not to shirk repairs. If the surveyor does not see that this is done efficiently the owner has a right to complain, and he can always find shipowners on the Register Committee ready to support his complaint if it is at all a fair one. On the other hand the surveyors have no inducement to deal unfairly with the underwriters, or to require more done than is necessary because the owner is content if the vessel is restored to her original condition and retains her class." This being the influence exercised by Lloyd's, it may be urged that insurance effected through agencies which bring this system to bear on the shipowners is distinctly productive of good, and that no greater mischief could befall than to have shipowners less willing to work through Lloyd's, and more willing to effect their insurance by means of "mutual clubs" where no such supervision. is exercised. And it seems not impossible that any attempt to limit the amounts insured might have this effect, and instead of stopping over-insurance, only succeed in forcing men to effect it through different channels. 1 Shipping Legislation, reprinted from Engineering, 34 f. The policy which would correspond most closely with that which has been followed in regard to employment on land would be quite different. If we tried to follow on the same lines we should give the seaman full means of proceeding against the owner on the plea of the unseaworthiness of the ship in which he was to sail : but we should enable the owner to insure to the value he set on his "venture," including the loss to which he might be exposed because of undue detention on account of sailors' complaints. On the other hand, it might be possible to strengthen the hands of underwriters in proceeding against owners who were guilty of making fraudulent over-valuation of their risks. In this way we should attempt to guard against loss at sea, not by limiting the powers of the shipowners through the action of the Board of Trade on the one hand and the legal terms of insurance on the other, but by rendering more effective the checks on misconduct which can be brought to bear by sailors on one side and by underwriters on the other. 85. The task of describing in a few sentences the main features of the Irish Land Bill of 1881, is one of no ordinary difficulty; while the issues it raised are so many and the feelings it excited were so keen that one can hardly hope to weigh its economic merits and demerits very satisfactorily at best we can but indicate the lines on which the criticism of the measure must proceed. There are several points which were discussed at considerable length in the debates on the Bill, which we may entirely discard, such as the proofs which Mr. Tottenham1 brought forward that Mr. Gladstone's attitude in introducing the Bill was quite inconsistent with the doctrines 13 Hansard, cclx. 1373. he laid down in 1870, and with his opposition to the measures advocated by Mr. Butt: that may be a matter of great importance for party politicians, but we are merely concerned in discussing the economic bearings of the measure, not in justifying the consistency of those who voted for it, nor in trying to settle the disputed question as to its parentage.1 On the other hand we cannot dismiss the whole subject with a phrase, and condemn it as contrary to sound economic principles 2 because it interfered with freedom of contract. It undoubtedly was inconsistent with the laisser faire political economy, and the efforts of Mr. Arthur Arnold3 to demonstrate its consistency with these principles were by no means forcible or clear. A wiser line was taken by Mr. Thorold Rogers who remarked that "much had been said about that three-legged horse freedom of contract; but if they allowed persons to do just as they pleased in their relations with their fellowsubjects, the result would be universal swindling in the whole of society."4 We must endeavour to examine its provisions fairly and judge of their economic bearing by seeing how far they were calculated to increase or to dissipate the physical means of sustaining national life (p. 117). The object of the Bill was always treated as social not as economic one part of the Bill was intended to "improve the tenure of the Irish tenant" and another to facilitate the purchase of the freehold land by the Irish 1 Mr. Gladstone always treated it as the necessary interpretation of a recommendation of the Richmond Commission and fathered it on Mr. Chaplin, 3 Hansard, cclx. 897, cclxi. 601 : while the opposition and the Irish members constantly contended that it was practically due to Mr. Parnell and the League: see e.g. Lord R. Churchill and Mr. Healy on third reading, 3 Hansard, cclxiv. 2 Lord Elcho's amendment on second reading. 3 3 Hansard, cclx. 1135. 43 Ibid. cclx. 1608. |