This decision is in conflict with prior cases decided in Pennsylvania,1 and has been practically overruled or its doctrine ignored by the same court in a later case.2 Secretary Smith's views were in direct conflict with a decision by Judge Ross in the case of Good v. California Oil Co., where it was said: "The premises in controversy are oil-bearing lands "the government title to which, under existing laws, can alone be acquired pursuant to the provisions of "the mining laws relating to placer claims." 66 They were also contrary to the prior rulings of the land department.* Acting Secretary Ryan, however, overruled the decision of Secretary Smith, and in the course of his opinion thus stated the result of his examination of the records of the land department on the subject of petroleum lands: "From an examination of the records of your office "[commissioner of the general land office] which I have "caused to be made, it is ascertained that ever since the "circular of July 13, 1873, until the date of the decision "complained of, the practice of allowing entry and 66 patent for lands chiefly valuable for their deposits of "petroleum under the law and regulations relating to placer claims has been continued and uniform. Under Stoughton's Appeal, 88 Pa. St. 198; Thompson v. Noble, 3 Pittsb. 201. See, also, 10 Morr. Min. Rep., p. 421. * Gill v. Weston, 110 Pa. St. 313, 1 Atl. 921. The doctrine of Dunham v. Kirkpatrick (supra) has been followed by the supreme court of Ohio (Detlor v. Holland, 57 Ohio St. 492, 49 N. E. 690), but repudiated in Tennessee (Murray v. Allard, 100 Tenn. 100, 66 Am. St. Rep. 740, 43 S. W. 355) and West Virginia (Williamson v. Jones, 39 W. Va. 231, 19 S. E. 441). 4 360 Fed. 531, 532. Copp's Min. Lands, p. 61; Sickles's Min. Laws, p. 491; In re Hooper, 1 L. D. 560; Maxwell v. Brierly, 10 Copp's L. O. 50; Roberts v. Jepson, 4 L. D. 60; Piru Oil Co., 16 L. D. 117; In re Dewey, 9 Copp's L. O. 51; Downey v. Rogers, 2 L. D. 707; Samuel E. Rogers, 4 L. D. 284. 1 "the practice a large number of patents have been "issued and very large and valuable property interests "acquired."1 Subsequently it was specifically held by the department that land chiefly valuable for its petroleum deposits could not be selected by the states in satisfaction of their floating grants.2 Shortly after the announcement of the ruling of Secretary Smith above referred to, congress passed an act providing in terms that lands valuable for petroleum may be acquired under the placer mining laws. This was but the adoption by the national legislature of the construction (uniform, except for the sporadic case above cited) theretofore placed upon the mining laws by the tribunal charged with their administration.* It follows that land chiefly valuable for its deposits of petroleum never could, nor can it now, be selected by the states in satisfaction of any of their grants. 139. Lands chiefly valuable for building-stone.Prior to the passage by congress of the act of August 4, 1892, specifically placing lands chiefly valuable for their deposits of building-stone in the category of mineral lands subject to entry under the placer mining laws, the land department had frequently held that such lands were mineral in character and subject to such appropriation, although there were rulings to the contrary. 'Union Oil Co. (on review), 25 L. D. 351, 354. 9 McQuiddy v. State of California, 29 L. D. 181. 'Bennett's Placer, 3 L. D. 116; McGlenn v. Weinbroeer, 15 L. D. 370; Van Doren v. Plested, 16 L. D. 508; Forsythe v. Weingart, 27 L. D. 680; Maxwell v. Brierly, 10 Copp's L. O. 50. • Conlin v. Kelly, 12 L. D. 1; Hayden v. Jamison, 16 L. D. 537; Clark v. Erwin, Id. 122. In the case of Pacific Coast Marble Co. v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co.,1 a careful and analytical review of the prior decisions of the department on this subject was made by Secretary Bliss, from which it clearly appears that the weight of departmental authority is decidedly in favor of the broad interpretation of the term "mineral lands," and placing lands chiefly valuable for their deposits of building-stone within the purview of the mining laws. So far as the federal courts have expressed themselves on the subject, the departmental construction has been commended and followed.2 66 That building-stone lands are to be classified as mineral lands, and as such are reserved from grants made to railroad companies, is well settled by the rulings of both the land department and the courts.* 3 A similar rule should be applied in the administration of land grants to the states, unless there is something in the language of the act of August 4, 1892, which inhibits such application. This act contains the following pro vision: "That any person authorized to enter lands under "the mining laws of the United States may enter lands "that are chiefly valuable for building-stone under the "provisions of the law in relation to placer mining "claims; provided, that lands reserved for the benefit "of public schools or donated to any state shall not be "subject to entry under this act."5 125 L. D. 233. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, 99 Fed. 506, S. C. on appeal, 104 Fed. 425. Pacific Coast Marble Co. v. Northern Pac. R. R. Co., 25 L. D. 233; Aldritt v. Northern Pac. R. R. Co., Id. 349; Beaudette v. Northern Pac. R. R. Co., 29 L. D. 248; Schrimpf v. Northern Pac. R. R. Co., Id. 327; Morrill v. Northern Pac. R. R. Co., 30 L. D. 475. 4 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, 99 Fed. 506, 8. C. on appeal, 104 Fed. 425. 527 Stats. at Large, p. 348. The only lands specifically reserved in the legislative grants to the states are the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections. These acquire precision by the approval of the survey, and title thereupon vests in the state without further action by the land department, if the state has been admitted at the time of the survey, or upon its admission if it occupied the status of a territory at the time of the grant. As to these lands, it would seem that the proviso of the act above quoted applies, and building-stone lands within sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections would pass to the state. The land department has so determined.1 It has also been held that a mining location made upon building-stone lands prior to the passage of the act at a time when such locations were recognized, which location had passed to entry in the land office prior to a grant to the state, took precedence over the grant to the state.2 The land department has also decided, in effect, that the terms of reservation embodied in the act of August 4, 1892, included the floating and indemnity grants to the state, and that building-stone lands can be selected by the state in satisfaction of their floating grants. This seems to us illogical. By the terms of the grants falling within this category there are no reservations of any particular tracts. No part of the public domain is placed in a state of reservation or withdrawn from location and entry under the mining laws to await the selection by the state of its quota of lands under floating or indemnity grants. These grants are donations of unidentified acres to be selected from the non-mineral public domain. Such In re Hooper, 16 L. D. 110; South Dakota v. Vermont Stone Co., Id. 263, (although, as to this last case, see In re Gibson, 21 L. D. 327). In re Gibson, 21 L. D. 327. State of Utah, 29 L. D. 69. grants do not acquire precision until after the selection and its approval.1 It would seem that as building-stone lands fall by legislative definition as well as by departmental ruling within the term "mineral lands," and are subject to location under the mining laws, it should follow that the states cannot select lands of this character in satisfaction of its floating grants, no specific lands being reserved or donated under such grants. The proviso under discussion is not so clear in its terms as to enable us to dogmatically assert that building-stone lands may not be selected by the state in satisfaction of this class of grants; but to reach the contrary conclusion requires, in our judgment, the application of extremely liberal rules of interpretation and a reading between the lines, which is not always a safe method to adopt in construing statutes. In the absence of this proviso, the rule applicable to selection of lands under indemnity railroad grants would apply, as the two classes of laws in this regard are in all respects similar.2 140. In construing the term "mineral lands," as applied to administration of school land grants, the time to which the inquiry is addressed is the date when the asserted right to a particular tract accrued, and not the date upon which the law was passed authorizing the grant. We have digressed for the moment to discuss a question which might be more appropriately presented when dealing with the character of lands subject to appropriation under the so-called placer laws; but it seems necessary for us here to present the matter as introductory to the main subject presently under consideration. See, post, § 143. Swank v. State of California, 27 L. D. 411. |