It is uncertain what Grotius' plans were in embarking from Stockholm. Vondel, the Dutch poet, thought he intended to go to Osnabrug, where the Peace of Westphalia was in course of negotiation. Others thought he was returning to Holland, where the Republican party was growing stronger, or that he was going to Poland in the hope that the King would send him to France as ambassador. It seems highly probable that Grotius' steps were leading him to Münster and Osnabrug to interest himself in the great peace which was to end the last professedly religious war Europe has known. But after that? Perhaps, wearied of the intrigue of negotiations, he only sought a quiet retreat where he could devote the remainder of his life to his project for the union of all Christians into one tolerant body, and all nations into an harmonious civilization.

The vessel on which Grotius embarked had hardly cleared the port when it was overtaken by a terrible storm and was obliged to put in, on the 17th of August, fourteen miles from Danzig. Grotius set out in an open wagon for Lübeck and arrived at Rostock on the 26th of August, very ill. A physician, named Stochman, was summoned, who said that Grotius was suffering from fatigue and that rest would restore his health, but the next day he was worse, being very weak and in a cold sweat. Grotius, thinking that his end was near, asked for a clergyman, and John Quistorpius was called, who, in a letter to Calovius, gives us an account of the last moments of the great man.105 It reads as follows:

You are desirous of hearing from me how that Phoenix of Literature, Hugo Grotius, behaved in his last moments, and I shall gratify your wish. He embarked at Stockholm for Lübeck, and, after being tossed for three days by a violent storm, was shipwrecked and got to shore on the coast of Pomerania, whence he came to our town of Rostock, distant over sixty miles, in an open wagon, through wind and rain. He lodged with Balleman and sent for Stochman, the physician, who, observing that he was extremely weakened by years, by the shipwreck and the inconveniences of the journey, judged that he could not live long. The second day after the arrival of Grotius in this town, that is, on the eighteenth of August (old style), he sent for me about nine o'clock at night. I went, and found him almost in the throes of death. I said there was nothing I desired more than to have seen him in good health, that I might have the pleasure of his conversation. He replied that God had willed it thus. I told him to prepare himself for a happier

106 Burigny's Vie de Grotius, II, p. 72.

life, to acknowledge that he was a sinner and to repent of his sins; and, having made mention of the Publican, who confessed that he was a sinner and asked God's mercy, he answered: "I am that Publican." I continued and told him that he must have recourse to Jesus Christ, without whom there is no salvation. He replied, "I have all my hope in Jesus Christ." I began to repeat aloud in German the prayer which begins, "Herr Jesu"; he followed me, in a very low voice with his hands clasped. When I had finished, I asked him if he had understood me. He answered, "I understand you very well." I continued to repeat to him those passages of the word of God which are usually recalled to the memory of the dying, and, asking him if he understood me, he answered, "I hear your voice well, but I understand with difficulty what you say." These were his last words. Soon after he expired, exactly at midnight.106

Thus died this celebrated man, on the night of August 28 or the morning of August 29, 1645,107 at the age of sixty-two.

After the vital organs were sealed in a copper casket and buried in the Cathedral of Rostock, to the left of the choir, the embalmed body was brought to Delft and there buried in the Nieuwe Kerk, October 3, 1645, where it now rests, beside the bodies of the Princes of Orange, 108

He had written this epitaph for himself:

"Grotius hic Hugo est, Batavum captivus et exul,
Legatus Regni, Suecia magna, tui." 109

HAMILTON VREELAND, JR.

106 Burigny's Vie de Grotius, II, pp. 73–74. See Ep. Eccles. et Theol., 583, p. 828. 107 Cattenburgh's Vervolg van het leven van Huig de Groot, Bk. X, p. 412. Burigny's Vie de Grotius, II, p. 74.

108 Cattenburgh's Vervolg van het leven van Huig de Groot, Bk. X, pp. 412–415; Fruin's Hugo de Groot en Maria van Reigersbergh, Verspreide Geschriften, IV, p. 93, note 4. 109 Ep. 536, p. 915.

AUTONOMOUS NEUTRALIZATION

THE practical application of the principle of autonomous neutralization is, in certain cases, neither so formidable nor so difficult as its name might seem to indicate. It states this doctrine: that any state may, of its own volition, declare itself permanently neutral. A state may not only engage itself to remain neutral during a particular war; but may also assume an abstract neutrality, not conditioned by the acts of any other states. Such a doctrine implies an analogy between a state and a person; namely this, that a state is given a personality, a free will, and a body of rights and obligations.

From the time when states first become distinguishable amid the shifting flux of primeval society, they have experienced a steady accretion of personal characteristics. The "State" became a being, different from the aggregate of individuals comprehended within its territorial boundaries. Patriotism developed as a cult to foster this idea, and men have lived and died for the state, with a disregard for personal interests only equaled by that which the Christian martyrs showed. The sentiment expressed by Vergil, Dulce et decore est, pro patria morior, has not been among the least of the great motives that have stirred the human heart. In the face of this evidence, coincident almost with the dawn of history, we must admit that the characteristic of a distinct personality is not unsuitably attached to the organization of a political society.

From time to time there have been amplifications in the idea of the state. Of late, we believe, its importance has been vastly overemphasized. It has, in certain instances, become, not a means to an end, but an end in itself. The purer sentiments of patriotism have degenerated into a Baal-worship. The benevolent conception of the state, as the mother of her children, has given way to the sterner picture of a Moloch, into whose burning maw the dearest things of life must be hurled. While deprecating this misguided worship, and realizing that

the state is only an expedient for the better ordering of the lives of individuals, there yet remains enough of individuality and personality in the idea of the state so that we can assign to it certain rights and obligations, and speak with accuracy of a society of nations.

The rights of sovereignty are commonly classified; as (1) existence, (2) independence, (3) equality, (4) jurisdiction, (5) property, and (6) intercourse. These have all not the same antiquity as the recognized attributes of a state. By degrees each has come to take its place as a definite component of sovereignty. As nations have become more closely bound together, the precise limits of these rights have become increasingly important, and more exactly defined.

Permanent neutralization is either a seventh right of a state, or a complementary part to the right of existence or independence. By becoming permanently neutral a state does not take an action which invades any right of another state. It does not threaten its existence, compromise its independence, relegate it to an inferior station, limit its jurisdiction, take its property, nor curtail its intercourse. The fundamental rights of no state are infringed; and such an autonomous neutralization does not prevent or hinder the same neutralization on the part of every other state.

In establishing this principle as a right, we enter a field in the realm of sovereignty hitherto unexplored. A new dimension of the concept is discovered, which bears the only test which could challenge its validity; namely, any transgression of acknowledged rights already existing or of the new right when applied reciprocally. Obligations are implied, of course, but none which invade the sovereign prerogatives of a state. The acceptance of neutralization as a right adds to the complexity of sovereignty; but, in so doing, it also adds a higher connotation to sovereignty as a legal principle. Such a step is in the direction toward binding the world by a new vinculum juris, which should be fruitful in a more intimate understanding between nations, and hasten the day when the world can take steps to gather under a reign of law, and lay aside forever "that last dread arbiter." To abolish war, under the present legal nexus of our world, by the mere reiteration of its moral turpitude and by fervid invective against its dire destruction, is only a dream. To develop a basis of law that will ulti

mately obviate war as a factor is a reasonable means to the realization of this dream.

The propaganda whereby these legal substitutes will supersede the more archaic conceptions must be the conviction that the unexplored fields of international law are yet vast; that the fruits therefrom are valuable; that discoveries therein are worthy of consideration; and, that conviction when acquired on any principle should be acted upon. In developing the right of autonomous neutralization as a sovereign right, the realm of application of no already existent right has been invaded. It is, therefore, a step in a new field, and its recognition must stir within all the determination to enforce it. Any infringement of this right, when enunciated by a sovereign state, should bring down the wrath of every other state, just as would the infringement of the right of existence. All the world must stand by these sovereign rights, if the world is to maintain its place of advancement. The world is even now at heart struggling to preserve these fundamental rights for the sake of their personal application to each state. The recalcitrant state must feel the weight of the world's hand at its throat. It is not only a concern of each state in its own interest, but it is the most altruistic of ideals, to strive to preserve intact those fundamental principles upon which the fabric of social life depends. When the invasion of sovereign rights can occur with impunity, it means that the world is receding with all speed to a state of international anarchy like that which brooded over Europe at the close of the Thirty Years' War. When any nation, for economic, moral, or political reasons, determines to assume the obligations and to demand the rights of a permanently neutral state, and when it has proclaimed that fact, it has in no way transcended its sovereign prerogatives, as we have shown, and the world must accept such a nation's act as binding, sanctioned by that ideal of law which has alone inspired all international life.

With such a conception of autonomous neutralization, we can readily see the nonessential character of the so-called guaranty, on which writers have set such great store as a ground for the validity of neutralization. As a sine qua non for state neutralization, a guaranty is of no value at all. The proclamation made by Switzerland in 1813 was the instrument which made that nation permanently neutral,