Thought Experiments

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Oxford University Press, 1992 - 318 strani
Can merely thinking about an imaginary situation provide evidence for how the world actually is--or how it ought to be? In this lively book, Roy A. Sorensen addresses this question with an analysis of a wide variety of thought experiments ranging from aesthetics to zoology. Presenting the first general theory of thought experiment, he sets it within an evolutionary framework and integrates recent advances in experimental psychology and the history of science, with special emphasis on Ernst Mach and Thomas Kuhn.

Sorensen explores what thought experiments are, how they work, and what their virtues and vices are. In his view, philosophy differs from science in degree, but not in kind. For this reason, he claims, it is possible to understand philosophical thought experiments by concentrating on their resemblance to scientific relatives. Sorensen assesses the hazards of thought experiments and grants that there are interesting ways in which the method leads us astray, but attacks most scepticism about thought experiments as arbitrary. He maintains that they should be used--as they generally are--as part of a diversified portfolio of techniques, creating a network of cross-checks that make for impressive reliability.

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Vsebina

Introduction
3
1 Our Most Curious Device
7
2 Scepticism About Thought Experiments
21
3 Mach and Inner Cognitive Africa
51
4 The Wonder of Armchair Inquiry
76
5 Kuhntradictions
111
6 The Logical Structure of Thought Experiment
132
7 Conflict Vagueness and Precisification
167
8 The Evolution of Thought Experiment
186
9 Are Thought Experiments Experiments?
216
10 Fallacies and Antifallacies
252
Notes
291
Select Bibliography
307
Subject Index
311
Name Index
315
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O avtorju (1992)

Roy A. Sorensen is at New York University.

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