Judgments of the Court of Claims of the United States

WILLIAM GRAY, ADMINISTRATOR, V. THE UNITED

STATES1

[No. 7, French Spoliations. Decided May 17, 1886]

On the Proofs

The treaties of 17782 bind America and France in reciprocal obligations looking to independent sovereignty for the one and certain exclusive privileges for the other. Subsequent to the peace of 1782 the French revolutionary government charges violations of the treaty in not according to France her exclusive privileges, and on the publication of the Jay treaty, 1795, breaks off diplomatic relations. Between 1791 and the treaty of 1800 France is guilty of depredations on American commerce in violation both of treaties and the law of nations. A state of partial, maritime war exists. In 1800, negotiations being renewed, the French Government demands restoration of the exclusive privileges and indemnity for their withdrawal. The American offers 8,000,000 francs to be released, but insists on indemnity for its citizens. Finally the treaty of 1800 is ratified with both pretensions stricken out, France renouncing her claim for the treaty privileges and America her claim for the wrongs done her citizens. In 1885 an act is passed authorizing American citizens having "valid claims to indemnity upon the French Government arising out of illegal captures, detentions, seizures, condemnations, and confiscations," prior to the treaty of 1800, to bring suit, and directing this court to "determine the validity and amount" thereof.

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I. The power of this court to grant redress in the French spoliation cases is necessarily limited by the terms of the Act of January 20, 1885 (23 Stat. L. 283), conferring jurisdiction.

II. The act casts upon the courts the duty of determining judicially both that the French seizures were “illegal” and the American claims are "valid."

III. The treaties of alliance and commerce with France 1778, having been concluded upon the same day and the result of the same negotiation and signed by the same plenipotentiaries, are in diplomatic effect one instrument.

IV. The treaty of commerce assured to France exclusive privileges; the treaty of alliance cast upon the American Government the obligation

1 Court of Claims Reports, vol. 21, page 340. 3 Infra, p. 487.

2 Infra, pp. 441, 466.

* Supra, p. 92.

of maintaining French possessions in America; the Jay treaty of 1795, granting the same commercial privileges to England, necessarily conflicted with the French treaties.

V. A judicial tribunal must treat the facts of a former international dispute only as they affect private rights. Its decision can not properly be regarded as a reflection upon the treaty-making power.

VI. A seizure upon the high seas of an American vessel bound for a neutral port on the alleged ground of her having violated French regulations "concerning the navigation of neutrals," was an illegal seizure, and the claims resulting therefrom a valid claim, for which the American Government was morally bound to demand redress.

VII. Concerning the question whether war existed between America and France prior to the treaty of 1800 and the nature and extent thereof, the judicial department must follow the political.

VIII. The acts of 1798 and 1799, the declarations and actions of the Executive, and the conduct and assurances of the two Governments conclusively show that while there was a limited maritime war (in its nature a prolonged series of reprisals), nevertheless no state of public general war existed, such as would abrogate treaties, suspend private rights, or authorize indiscriminate seizures and condemnations.

IX. The claims which the French Government renounced by the treaty of 1800 were national; those which our Government renounced were individual; and the reciprocal renunciation constituted the bargain effected by the treaty of 1800.

X. All claims urged by one nation upon another are technically national; but there is a distinction between claims founded upon injury to the whole people and those founded upon injury to particular citizens. XI. The bargain whereby this Government obtained the renunciation of the French claims against itself, and the relinquishment of its obligations under the treaty of 1778, brings these cases within the provision of the Constitution, that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."

XII. The claims renounced by the treaty of 1800 were unliquidated demands for wrong and injury; the debts provided for by the treaty of 1803 were obligations in the nature of contract, or for captures as to which restitution had been ordered by the council of prizes. Therefore the latter treaty does not extend to the former demands.

XIII. The attempt of the French Government to regulate by its own decrees the conduct of neutral merchantmen upon the high seas was contrary to the law of nations and void; and the seizure of an American vessel on the alleged ground that her "rôle d'équipage" was not in the form prescribed by French law was illegal.

XIV. A citizen must exhaust his remedy in the courts of a foreign power before he can call upon his own Government for diplomatic redress;

but the decision of the foreign tribunal is not final, being the very beginning of the international controversy; and the doctrine is applicable only where the courts are open and the citizen free to seek redress.

XV. The treaty of 1819 with Spain does not extend to the French spoliation

cases.

XVI. The treaty of 1831 with France does not extend to the claims renounced and, from an international point of view, extinguished by the treaty of 1800.

XVII. Whether the Act of May 28, 17981 (Stat. L. 561), abrogated the treaty of 1778 is an immaterial question here, inasmuch as the claims rest on the violation of neutral rights under the law of nations.

XVIII. The French Spoliation Claims Act, 1885 2 (23 Stat. L., § 3, p. 283), while requiring this court to determine the "present ownership" of a claim, does not require it to act as a court of probate and settle estates of deceased owners. Hence an action may be maintained by an administrator.

The Reporters' statement of the case:

This is the leading French spoliation case, but at the time when it was brought before the court a number of cases were presented by the various counsel, whose names are given below, and the general question of the Government's liability, and the general principles more or less applicable to all of these cases, were discussed at great length. The decision was understood to be final as to this case, but no order was entered at the time of its rendition.

Mr. William Gray for the claimant, William Gray, administrator.

Mr. William E. Earle (with whom was Mr. Samuel Shellabarger) for the claimant, F. K. Carey.

Mr. Fisher Ames for the claimant, Fisher Ames, administrator.

Mr. Leonard Myers for various claimants residing in Philadelphia. Mr. Lawrence Lewis, Jr., for the same and other parties.

Mr. J. Hubley Ashton for the city of Philadelphia.

Mr. Benjamin Wilson for the defendants.

DAVIS, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

This claim, one of the class popularly called "French spoliations," springs from the policy of the French revolutionary government be

tween the execution of King Louis XVI and the year 1801, a policy which led to the detention, seizure, condemnation, and confiscation of our merchant vessels peacefully pursuing legitimate voyages upon the high seas. Over ninety years have these claims been the subject of discussion and agitation, first between the two nations, and then between the individuals injured and the Government of the United States. Prolonged and heated negotiation resulted in the treaty of 1800, by which, it is urged on behalf of the claimants, their rights were surrendered to France for a consideration valuable to this Government. The claims being valid obligations admitted by the French Government, they contend that the United States, through this agreement, in which demands of the one nation were set off against those of the other, assumed as against their citizens these obligations and should pay them. This position is denied by the Government, which in addition presents other defenses based upon subsequent transactions between the two countries, urging that thereby were destroyed any beneficial rights possibly vested in the claimants, if their contention as to the treaty of 1800 be correct.

The act sending the claims to this court, while the third that has passed both Houses of Congress, is the first that has received the approval of a President, as one was vetoed by President Polk, another by President Pierce, while this, the third, was signed by President Arthur.

Whatever the rights of the claimants, they are without remedy other than that which Congress may have seen fit to give them; and our power to grant redress, be our opinion as to the justice of their claims what it may, is limited by the terms of the remedial statute. The force and effect of the act, by virtue of which the claimants appear at this bar seeking relief, must then be examined at the threshold of the discussion. The act authorizes "citizens of the United States or their legal representatives," having "valid claims to indemnity upon the French Government arising out of illegal captures, detentions, seizures, condemnations, and confiscations," prior to the ratification of the convention of 1800 with France, to apply here within a time limited (§ 1), that (§ 3) this court may "examine and determine the validity and amount" of their claims, the present ownership, and, if owned by an assignee, certain details in regard thereto. The act excludes from its benefits claims embraced in certain conventions with France and Spain, concluded in 1803, 1819, and 1831, and with pro

visions as to rules of court, defense of the United States, evidence and other matters not important for our immediate purpose, directs this court, as to the claims thus placed within our jurisdiction, to report to Congress the first Monday of each December the facts found by us and our conclusions, which are to be taken, both as to law and facts, as advisory and not conclusive upon either party, the claimants or the Government.

So peculiar a jurisdiction was probably never before conferred upon a strictly judicial tribunal. The rights of the claimants, if any exist, arise from the acts of the political branch of the Government done in the protection and aid of the nation. For such rights there can be no remedy other than that granted by the legislature; in this instance the legislature has elected to transmit to the judiciary, under certain restrictions, the examination of the claimants' demands, with the proviso that the conclusion reached in this forum shall not be finally binding upon either party, but that the defendants, as well as the claimants, have reserved to them an appeal, not in the regular line of judicial procedure to the Supreme Court of the United States, but back again to that body, from which alone any remedy can come to the citizen for wrongs done him by his Government.

The reason for this peculiar grant of remedy is found in the nature of the claims, which spring from international controversies of the gravest character intimately entwined with the history of our struggle for independence; also in the age of the claims; and, lastly, in the absolutely indeterminate amount of financial responsibility which will be thrown upon the Government should the claims be found to exist as valid obligations due from the United States to their citizens. Good or bad, not one of these claims is enforceable but by the consent of the Congress, and the Congress can affix to that consent such condition as in their wisdom seems just and for the best interests of the Republic. The remedy now granted is an examination and advisory report by the judiciary, to be followed by a decision by the legislative branch of the Government.

It has been said that the validity of the claims as a class is admitted by the act, and this court should confine the examination to each individual claim for the purpose only of determining whether it falls within the class. This is understood to be in effect the argument on behalf of some of the claimants. Our labor and responsibility would be greatly lightened could we agree with this proposition, but the act