Francisco shall organize in pursuance of a of a charter framed and adopted in the manner prescribed in section 8, article 11, of the constitution, it will be a city organized after the adoption of the constitution, and will be "subject to and controlled by general laws." (Article 11, section 6.)

Now, the words " general laws" in the last clause of section 6, whether applied to cities organized before the constitution was adopted or organized afterward, must mean precisely the same thing.

Observe how carefully the constitution has guarded against legislative interference with any charter which shall be adopted in the manner provided in section 8. Such a charter (which by section 6 will undoubtedly "be subject to and controlled by general laws," — whatever the phrase may mean) can only be amended "at intervals of not less than two years"; each amendment must be submitted to the local electors, and must be ratified "by at last three fifths of the qualified voters." To become operative, it must then be approved by a majority of all the members of the legislative "elected to each house."

Verily, if a new charter, which may be adopted for San Francisco by San Francisco, can be amended out of existence by statutes passed in the legislature by a majority composed in no part of members representing San Francisco, as it may be if the present charter can be so amended, the laborious effort of the constitutionmakers to prohibit amendments, except with the consent of three fifths of the qualified electors of the city, have been of very little avail. With all respect, such a result seems to me reductio ad absurdum.

6. The act of 1885 "to provide for work upon streets, etc., in municipalities," if a general law in any sense, is a general law changing in essential particulars the governmental organization of the municipal corporation known as the city and county of San Francisco. "Cities

and towns heretofore organized may become organized under such general laws [those commanded in the same section] whenever a majority of the electors voting at a general election shall so determine, and shall organize in conformity therewith.” (Constitution, art. 11, sec. 6.) If anything is due to the strongest implication, the general laws under which municipal corporations may be formed cannot be made applicable to San Francisco without the consent of the citizens. They cannot be enforced anywhere except upon communities which shall first voluntarily subject themselves to them.

In Desmond v. Dunn, 55 Cal. 242, this court held that the charters of cities and towns created before the present constitution took effect remain in force in each case until a majority of the electors shall determine to become organized under general laws, or, in the case of San Francisco, to frame a charter for their own govern

ment.

But it is asked, Is the legislature deprived of all power to amend the corporate organization of a city? Must the people of a city created before the constitution of 1879 suffer under a bad or unfortunate provision in their charter until they organize under the general law, which itself may be inapplicable to their peculiar wants? The constitution provides for a classification of cities and towns, in proportion to population, and it is not to be supposed that the people of any one city or town, containing the same population as others of its class, are surrounded by such peculiar conditions as to require a different local government. The same question might be asked and the same difficulty urged as a reason for annulling the constitutional prohibition of special statutes creating municipal corporations. It was because it had appeared in the past that special acts amending a particular law creating a municipal corporation were very often not sought or desired by the tax-payers and others comprising a majority of the voters, that the

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framers of the constitution prohibited amendments of charters formed before the adoption of that instrument. The constitution declares the public policy, corporations for municipal purposes ought not to be created by special laws, but ought to be organized under general laws." To prevent confusion, however, and to consult so far the wishes of the people within the limits of corporations already formed, it continues such corporations until the citizens thereof shall choose to come in under the general laws, or, in the case of San Francisco, until a new charter shall be framed in the manner provided in section 8 of article 11. Ever since, if not before, the decision in People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15, attention has been drawn to the evils of special legislation affecting the government or people of a particular municipality, and it would certainly seem that the framers of the constitution of 1879, and the people who ratified it, intended to prevent all special legislative interference with existing charters, except with the consent of the citizens. This was sought to be accomplished by commanding general laws for the incorporation of cities and towns, just as the former constitution provided for general laws under which private corporations could be formed, and had prohibited special acts creating such. It was not intended that a special charter could be created for a particular municipality under the specious pretense of amending the charter previously created. It was undoubtedly supposed that wise and just legislators could perfect a general and uniform system which would secure an efficient local government to every municipality. If it be true that an amendment of a particular charter may render it satisfactory to the people of an existing city, this is no reason why the people of all other existing cities should be subject to a "general law" changing their charters in a manner which may not be satisfactory to them. The argument goes the whole length of demanding that special laws should be passed amending par

ticular charters. It needs but a glance at the special acts for city and town charters passed before the adoption of the present constitution, and the widely differing methods for street work, adapted in each case to population and supposed peculiar conditions, to see how violent is the presumption that the citizens of all demand a still different system of street work which disregards any "classification in proportion to population."

8. Whatever may be the meaning of the words "general laws," as used in the latter portion of section 6, article 11, of the constitution, I think it perfectly clear they do not mean laws which affect, alter, or amend the corporate organization of any city or town created before or after the constitution took effect. As to corporations organized under the general laws for municipal purposes, commanded in the first clause of the section, the expression as applied to such, if meaning the same thing, would be a mere repetition, for the section has already provided that such general laws "may be altered, amended, or repealed." As to a corporate organization for San Francisco brought into existence in the manner laid down in section 8 of article 11, we have seen how prudently that section guards against alterations without the consent of the people. As to the corporations in existence when the constitution was adopted, the "general laws " applicable to them are the same kind of general laws to which corporations formed under general laws for municipal purposes, and any corporation organized in pursuance of section 8, are subject, etc., and by which they are controlled. controlled. And section 6 itself provides that corporations existing prior to the constitution shall be subject to the general laws mentioned in the first part of that section (and of course to general laws amending such general laws) only with the consent of the people residing within the territorial limits of such corporations.

What are the general laws mentioned in the last clause of section 6?

Cities are composed of citizens, and it seems to me hypercriticism to say that "general laws" which control cities, or to which they are subject, cannot include general laws of the state directly controlling, or to which are directly subject, the people living in a city; the more especially as it appears from the context, and other portions of the constitution, that the term was not intended to apply to laws which changed the powers or obligations of incorporated municipalities.

State laws have sometimes been said to be general when they apply to all of a class of individuals, as distinguished from special laws applicable to an individual. I find it difficult to apprehend that a statute is general, in the sense mentioned, which is not a general statute under which cities may be organized, the alteration of which is reserved to the legislature by the constitution, but which changes the government of two or more cities organized under separate charters. However this may be, the word "general is not alone employed to distinguish statutes binding on a class of persons from those binding on a single person. Statutes are not merely public or private, and a statute affecting the government of a single city is public. Statutes are general or local, having operation throughout the state, or in a particular place or places. The very autonomy of the cities would seem to emphasize the statement that laws operative in the cities alone are local laws, as distinguished from laws operative everywhere within the territorial limits of the state, whether such local laws are enacted by the state legislature, or by the legislative body of the city within the powers conferred by its charter.

In view of the very extended powers conferred on the municipalities, and in harmony with the policy apparent throughout the instrument, the constitution leaves