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able admit advantage America answer appear appointed armies authority body causes citizens collection commerce common concerning Confederacy Confederation Congress consequences consideration considered Constitution continue Convention copy course courts danger departments direct duties edition effect entire equal establishment evident Executive exercise existing experience extent Federal Federal Government Federalist force foreign former give greater Hamilton hand happen immediately important independent individual influence instances interest judge kind latter laws Legislative Legislature less liberty limits Madison means measures ment military National Government nature necessary necessity never objects observed officers operation opinion original particular parties peace persons political possess present principle probably proper proposed provision question reason referred regulation remarks render representatives republic require respect result Senate side situation supposed tion Union United volume whole York
Stran 311 - No state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any duty on tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another state or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.
Stran 267 - Philadelphia for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as shall when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the States render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government and the preservation of the Union.
Stran 541 - ... that as nothing can contribute so much to its firmness and independence as permanency in office — this quality may, therefore, be justly regarded as an indispensable ingredient in its constitution, and in a great measure as the citadel of the public justice and the public security. The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited constitution.
Stran 171 - That the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of parliament, is against law.
Stran 61 - Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose.
Stran 614 - To balance a large state or society [says he], whether, monarchical or republican, on general laws, is a work of so great difficulty, that no human genius, however comprehensive, is able, by the mere dint of reason and reflection, to effect it.
Stran 346 - For this reason that convention, which passed the ordinance of government, laid its foundation on this basis, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be separate and distinct, so that no person should exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time.
Stran 244 - ... the definition of them may be rendered inaccurate, by the inaccuracy of the terms in which it is delivered. And this unavoidable inaccuracy must be greater or less, according to the complexity and novelty of the objects defined.
Stran 285 - It has been urged and echoed, that the power " to lay " and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay " the debts, and provide for the common defence and " general welfare of the United States...
Stran 330 - But ambitious encroachments of the federal government, on • the authority of the State governments, would not excite the opposition of a single State or of a few States only ; they would be signals of general alarm. Every government would espouse the common cause. A correspondence would be opened. Plans of resistance would be concerted.