provisions relating to overtime, starting and stopping, holidays, and so on. Numerous details relating to working conditions and other matters, are frequently incorporated.

15. Almost invariably, either in the collective agreements or in agreed-upon rules of joint standing bodies composed equally of representatives of union and employer organizations, there are provisions specifying the steps to be taken before strikes or lockouts may occur.

(c) PROVISIONS IN THE AGREEMENTS FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF BASIC TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT, AND DISPUTES AND GRIEVANCES, WITHOUT STOPPAGE OF WORK

16. Despite the intricate and diverse nature of the collective bargaining process in Great Britain, the arrangements which have been embodied in agreements and rules for settling basic terms of employment, disputes and grievances, have certain common characteristics, as follows:

17. First, basic changes in wages and hours are commonly negotiated by the national unions not with each employer individually but with associations of employers;

18. Second, if negotiations on these basic subjects fail, resort is generally had either by the terms of the agreement or by mutual agreement at the time, to some impartial agency whose decision is generally followed, though the parties rarely bind themselves in advance to follow it. The very gravity of the situation, when differences arise in negotiations applying to the whole or to a considerable portion of an industry, is such as to counsel resort to peaceful means of settlement;

19. Third, when a local dispute as to the application or interpretation of an agreement, or a grievance, arises which cannot be settled between the particular worker and employer, it is then taken up by the local union representative or works committee. If not thus settled, an intermediate step is often provided, by referring the matter to a joint body composed of representatives of a district employers' association and of district union representatives. Failing settlement in this manner, under the terms of the agreement, the question is referred to a joint body composed of representatives of the national union and the employers' association. Sometimes in the final stage, if the national representatives cannot agree, provision is made by the agreement (or by an agreement between the national representatives at the time) for reference of the matter to arbitration which may or may not be binding. There are other variations in the pattern, but throughout the agreements the principle is the same, namely that local disputes and grievances which cannot be settled locally are referred to employer and union representatives who are not themselves directly concerned with the controversy, and who can bring to bear upon it an informed and relatively detached judgment. While the time period necessary for these steps to be completed differs in different industries according to the details of the methods provided, the objective is to settle locally as many disputes as possible, and if they cannot be so settled, to make the procedure short enough to satisfy the workers involved, and long enough

to allay the tension and to make sure that the possibilities of collective conciliation and settlement are fully utilized.

20. Although this procedure for settling local disputes is generally effective, nevertheless unofficial stoppages, that is, local strikes called without the approval of the national union and without completing the settlement procedure laid down in the agreements, have occurred from time to time in each of the industries in question but rarely were they serious either in number or in extent and the national unions invariably sought and usually obtained a prompt resumption of work. These local flareups, while not approved of by either the unions or the employer's associations, appeared to be regarded by those who met with us as a more or less inevitable accompaniment of the procedure adopted for the settlement of grievances and local disputes. As we have already pointed out, the essential feature of that procedure is that local controversies when not settled locally are removed from the immediate disputants and are disposed of by persons on both sides who have not themselves been engaged in the controversy and who can, therefore, view it dispassionately. Necessarily some delay is involved in the process though it is recognized that grievances must be dealt with promptly and attempts are made to expedite the steps as much as possible, and some of the arrangements specify maximum time periods within which action, whether regional or national, or both, must be taken. Even the shortest procedure, however, has not always been effective; occasionally where the grievance is an acute one the men have not waited; as one union leader put it, "the temper gets in their souls." Occasionally, also, the men have deliberately quit work knowing that in a few days they would be ordered back by their officials and expecting to go back, but hoping by their demonstration to obtain redress for grievances more speedily than could be otherwise accomplished, or to make certain that the seriousness of their complaints would be recognized. As has been said, the national officials of the union are energetic in procuring a resumption of work in instances where unofficial stoppages occur. The general principle that there shall be no negotiations while the workers are out on unauthorized strikes is insisted upon and generally maintained. From none of those with whom we conferred did we secure evidence of any substantial rank and file discontent.

21. Fourth, while the agreements provide that there shall be no strikes or lock-outs until the procedure for negotiating basic changes, or for settling local disputes and grievances, has been completed, these and the other provisions of collective agreements rest upon moral force rather than upon legal compulsion. We could find no desire on the part of either employers' associations or unions to seek legislation which would make the voluntary agreements legally enforceable; on the contrary, perhaps the chief characteristic of the attitudes of both groups is that legal sanctions for these agreements are undesirable, and that the agreements should rest upon mutual understanding and good faith.

22. In the cotton textile industry, as described in appendix A, a special act of Parliament, passed in 1934 at the request of both the unions and the employers organizations, authorizes the Minister of Labor by order to make legally binding on the weaving section of the

industry, as minimum rates, the wage rates collectively agreed to by unions and employer organizations; and orders have been so issued. This legislation, the first of its kind in Great Britain, was occasioned by the break-downs in wage standards beginning in the unorganized portions of the industry and spreading to some of the organized employers. It is an exception to the preference for unenforceable agreements in only a very limited sense, for the whole collective agreements are not made legally enforceable, but only their wage provisions; and in another sense the legislation illustrates a further and complementary British attitude, namely, that where the collectivebargaining process is not by itself able to maintain wage standards, and the conditions are sufficiently serious, Government sanction for standards should be sought, but only as a supplement and aid to collective bargaining and not in substitution for it. The trade board legislation later described is another illustration of the same approach.

23. In keeping with this general philosophy, the idea of compulsory statutory arbitration of industrial disputes is opposed. This opposition, following experiments in the early industrial era, goes back at least as far as the Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions in 1869. The Whitley Committee Report of 1918 said: "The experience of compulsory arbitration during the war period has shown that it is not a successful method of avoiding disputes and in normal times it would undoubtedly prove even less successful." Repeatedly union and employer representatives who conferred with us expressed their opinion quite definitely against compulsory arbitration, whether imposed by statute or, so far as basic terms of employment are concerned, by collective agreements. In addition to the desire of both sides to retain the right of direct action as a last resort, they believe that provision for compulsory arbitration at the end weakens the utility of preliminary conferences, since the parties tend to rely on the final arbitration. Moreover, though some collective agreements bind the parties in advance to abide by arbitration in the case of local disputes and grievances, provisions of that sort appear to be rather infrequent; and sometimes it will be found. that though the term "arbitration" is used and the parties have agreed to resort to it, there is an express stipulation that the "arbitration" award shall not be binding, though it is usually accepted.

24. This discussion of the general principles underlying the British methods of collective bargaining is illustrated by the descriptions of the bargaining machinery in the industries whose spokesmen, for the employers and workers, we met. (See appendix A.) These descriptions reveal not only the constancy of the principles just referred to but the diversity of detail with which they are applied.

(d) ADJUSTMENT OF INTERUNION DISPUTES

25. Methods have been evolved for the avoidance or settlement of disputes between unions. These disputes involve questions of two sorts. The first is whether a particular operation should be performed by one type of craftsman or another-the so-called jurisdictional disputes. The second question is whether one union or another shall organize a certain type or group of workers-the so-called organizational disputes.

26. For the settlement of jurisdictional disputes (or demarcational disputes as they are called in England) some of the national federations of unions, in industries where the disputes are most likely to occur, have created their own internal agencies of settlement. In addition, since 1920, under the standing orders of the Trades Union Congress, the general council of the congress has had power to summon any contending unions to appear before a disputes committee of the general council, the committee being composed of members having no connection with the unions involved in the controversy. The disputes committee decides the case, and in case of noncompliance the general council may suspend the offending union until the next annual congress, the congress having final authority to deal with the case whether by way of readmission, further suspension, or exclusion from membership. Furthermore, if a given situation becomes sufficiently serious a court of inquiry may be appointed by the Ministry of Labor to investigate the matter. These methods have been generally, but not entirely, successful in avoiding stoppages of work from jurisdictional difficulties.

27. As to the organizational disputes, it should be noted that there are three main types of unions in Great Britain: (1) The craft unions, some of which are federations of two or more separate craft unions; (2) unions which are substantially industrial in form, of which the National Union of Railwaymen and the local and district miners' unions are the chief examples; and (3) the so-called general unions, which take in unskilled workers from all industries and which are open, also, to skilled or craft workers in unorganized areas. There are two large unions of the latter sort, the Transport and General Workers Union and the National Union of General and Municipal Workers. These two unions have arrived at a working arrangement regarding the men that each will take in, and they have, on occasion, transferred memberships from one to the other in accordance with that arrangement.

28. Several principles have been laid down for avoiding organizational disputes, the most important of which are:

(1) The Trades Union Congress, composed as it is of craft, industrial, and general unions, has consistently taken the stand that no union has an exclusive right to organize any class of worker. This principle has not been formally embodied in resolutions, but it has been repeatedly applied in the decisions of the disputes committee, which the congress has endorsed.

(2) By formal action of the general council, endorsed by the 1924 congress, further principles were adopted: (a) That all union membership applications "should contain an inquiry to be answered by the candidate as to whether he is or has been a member of any other union, and, if so, what his financial relationship to that union is"; (b) that no member of any union should be accepted by another without inquiry from the union concerned, or be allowed to escape his obligations by leaving one union while in arrears and joining another; and (c) "that under no circumstances should a union accept members from any other union which is engaged in a trades dispute. 29. This settlement machinery works well and stoppages of work do not result from organizational disputes. In the year immediately preceding the adoption of the 1924 principles, 23 organizational dis

putes were referred to the disputes committee, and thereafter the number steadily declined, only 3 being referred in 1937. We were informed that one factor reducing the number of disputes heard has been the insistence of the general council 10 that the national officers of the unions concerned should first make every effort to settle the matter by negotiation: An insistence similar in character to the provisions in collective agreements which seek to exhaust all possibilities of direct settlement between the parties before recourse is had to other agencies.

(e) LEGISLATION RELATING TO THE EXISTENCE AND ACTIVITIES OF TRADE-UNIONS

30. In Great Britain the term "trade-union" is not limited in its meaning to labor unions. It embraces combinations of employers as well as combinations of workers to regulate the relations between employers and workers, or among workers, or among employers; or to impose restrictive conditions on the conduct of any trade or business, or to provide benefits for members. In appendix B, prepared for the Commission by Messrs. Davis and Garrison, the status and development of the law relating to trade-unions is set forth, and the text of the statutes is appended. What appears below is a summary of the material in the appendix, supplemented by information obtained in conference with employers, trade-union representatives, barristers, and others.

(1) Legal status of unions and strikes.

31. From a state of affairs in which trade-unions (whether of employers or of workers) had no legal status, and their activities were banned by law, the English law has been brought by a series of acts (the most important of which are the Trade-Union Acts of 1871 and 1913, the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act of 1875, and the Trade Disputes Act of 1906) to a state in which trade-unions not only have a recognized legal status but have been given immunity from any charge of restraint of trade and, with respect to their activities in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, from any action for civil or criminal conspiracy or for any tortious act. Of course, the courts are not thereby closed to appropriate legal action against individual wrongdoers and, although a trade-union as such cannot be sued for a tortious act, its trustees may be sued for an act touching or concerning the property of the union, provided it is not an act done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute. Although the 1871 act legalizes trade-union contracts in restraint of trade, it provides that such contracts cannot be directly enforced in court. The practical effect of all these statutes is that agreements between employers' associations and labor unions or associations of unions rest upon good faith rather than upon legal enforceability. The statutory immunity of trade-unions from suit for acts done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute is denied only in the case of illegal strikes or lock-outs, as defined in the Trades Disputes and Trade Unions Act of 1927; i. e., a strike or lock-out having an object other than or in addition to the furtherance of a trade dispute within the industry in which the strikers are

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