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to the treaty of Campo Formio? When official intelligence of that tranfaction was fent by him to the directory, Mongé, fpeaking in his name, and delivering his act, his acknowledged inftrument and confidential agent, declared, that the French republic and England could not exift together. So that, if he even were allowed to have an evident intereft in promoting peace, would not their lordships be perfectly juftified in paufing and reflecting on what degree of faith fhould be given to the intereft and power of fuch an individual? They had been lately told, by the prefent government of France, that there exifted no fecurity, no guarantee for the prefervation of peace in the republic from 1793, to November, 1799. So much did the actors in the laft revolution believe the ftatement of Boulay de la Meurthe,* that they founded their claims to the approbation and affent of the people of France, on the declaration that their government was founded on a juft view of thofe vices and defects, which were to ftop the revolutions of the republican order. What other courfe then would wildom bid Great Britain adopt, but await' the event of things, to await the refult of future experience, and not to enter on negociation at a time when no advantage could be fairly expected from it? If they abandoned the manly and energetic conduct which had hitherto diftinguithed their proceedings, they would defcend from a station which they had filled with fo much honour to themfelves, and advantage to their country. On these grounds he moved, That a humble addrefs be pre

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fented to his majesty, thanking him for his gracious meffage, and expreffing the concurrence of that houfe, in the fentiments which it contained.

The duke of Bedford rofe to give the addrefs his decided negative. The noble fecretary had attempted to defend the conduct of his majefty's minifters in refufing to accede to overtures for peace, from the impoffibility of any government that France had, fince the revolution, affording a fufficient guarantee for the fuccefs of any negociations that might be entered into. But all the objections now advanced to preclude negociation might have been urged when the negociations were opened at Lifle. This argument the duke placed in various points of view, and urged it with much ability.It was clear that the wild scheme of reftoring the French monarchy was the fine qua num, if not of peace, at least of negociation. What hopes there were of such an event ever taking place by the exertions of this country, he would leave their lordships to determine : but of this fact he was certain, that in proportion as this country opprelled France, in the fame proportion did its government become violent. When a country was kept in a fate of warfare, it was always able to adopt and carry on more violent mealures than in times of peace.-If the restoration of the monarchy were not the object of minifters, what was it? Were they contending for a more favourable opportunity of entering on negocia tion? How, if that was the cafe, was a more favourable opportunity to be attained? Was it by railing at

See his fpeech in the committee of elders, in chap. III. page 32.

Buonaparte?

Bonaparte? He could not, in terms fufficiently strong, cenfure that littlenefs of mind which prompted his majefty's minifters to attack the character of Buonaparte, with a view to ruin him in the efteem of the French nation; as if, by doing fo, they would be able to negociate with more effect, or gain a fairer profpect of peace.-His grace admitted that there might be occafions when it might be neceflary to decline the negociation: but no fuch occafion exifted at the prefent moment. He referred to former declarations of the noble fecretary, wherein he had ftated that his majefty would never fuffer the enemies of the country to poffefs that advantage which they necelarily muft derive from his refufal to difcufs their overtures for peace. In fact, every thing he had advanced, as reafons for entering into the former negociation, was at variance with what he had faid to-night. It had, in the note to Barthelemy, been afferted, that England would always be willing to treat, when its enemies fhewed a difpofition to that effect.-If this difpofition was not a mockery, why did it not treat now? France had fhewn a pacific difpofition, and the only way to afcertain whether fhe was fincere, and whether Buonaparte was willing to do thefe acts, by which he could guarantee the fecurity of this country, was to enter into a negociation. To determine to perfift in the war after the conceffions on the part of the French government, was neither open, manly, nor characteristic of the British nation. He next referred to the report of Boulay de la Meurthe, relative to the government and fituation of France and its rulers for the laft feven. years, and admitted, VOL. XLII.

that what was faid by Boulay de la Meurthe was the fame as proceeding from Buonaparte: but his report was no more to be used by the people of this country as an argument against the lately abolified conftitution of France, than a report of any violent jacobin upon the ancient government of Louis XVI. He referred alfo to the reports of Mongé, upon prefenting the treaty of Campo Formio to the directory; and maintained, that his declaration in that report was far from complete evidence; that it was the general opinion of the French nation that England and France could not exist together. With regard to the character of Buonaparte, he did not fee any ufe that could be drawn from going into it. He, like all ftatelmen, no doubt, wifhed to make a peace, advantageous to himfelf, and the nation over which he prefided. Like all other ftatefmen, his mo tives in willing to make a peace were not influenced by humanity; it was to be fuppofed that he would not make any peace, but fuch an one as would fatisfy the French nation. He believed him fincere, becaule France withed for peace, and peace alone could confolidate his power. The events of war were uncertain; and, whenever a leader failed, and was deferted by fortune, the people deferted him likewife. If Buonaparte fhould experience reverfes, he would, no doubt, be deftroyed, and fome other idol fubftituted. It was for their lordfhips to confider, whether they would continue the war for the purpofe of eftablishing fome other perfon in the room of Buonaparte. As to the abufe which minifters had thrown upon the character of that man, he felt no concern upon [G]

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the fubject; for he entertained no doubt that they would retract all they had faid if it fhould be neceffary to do fo. They had abufed every ruling power in France; but, whenever they had been driven by the general voice of the people to negociate, their former ill language had never been any impediment. Minifters had tried negociation, and had failed, and, becaufe they had failed, it was to be a reafon why they fhould not perfevere, Let the people tell them to make peace, and they would make it. Without the voice of the people they never would: for they were fenfible, that in the calm moments of peace, the people would inquire of themselves for what they had been fpending their beft blood and treafure. They would find, that they had obtained nothing to juftify fuch expenditure and heavy calamities as war had produced. Such would be their reflections; and minifters, knowing this, wifhed to procraftinate the war. Nothing but the courage and magnanimity of the people themfelves could reHeve the country. The people were bending, the duke obferved, under the accumulated weight of taxes, and it was for the rulers to take care that they did not fink. A continuance of that oppreffion, which they had endured, would either make them torpid flaves, or prepare them for revolution. If the people were driven to defpair, by griping tax-gatherers, like the French, they would look up to themfelves, and redrefs their own grievances. If he failed in ftemming the torrent, and checking that fyftem which involved the people's liberties, and threatened to plunge the country into all the horrors of

a devaftative revolution, he should in future refrain from troubling the house. He would now only obferve, that they could not regard the addrefs propofed by minifters, as containing the fentiments of their fovereign, but their own; and, as fuch they fhould freely and vigoroufly difcufs and examine it. He then fubmitted to their lordships confideration a counter addrefs; which, after enumerating the repeated declarations, of a pacific difpofition, and overtures for peace on the part of his majefty, expreffed the " Regrets of the lords fpiritual and temporal at perceiving that his majefty had been advised to reject the firft overtures for a general pacification on the part of the enemy; and humbly implored his majefty to give directions for the immediate renewal, if poffible, of a negociation for peace with the French republic, moft fervently befeeching his majefty to recur to thofe principles of moderation and equity, fo folemnly and forepeatedly avowed, and which, if ftrictly ad hered to, muft enfure the fpeedy reftoration of all the bleffings of peace, or, render our enemies alone accountable for all the calamities too certainly attendant on a continuance of hostilities.”

Lord Borringdon faid, that a revolution, perhaps the moft important that even France, herself, had yet witneffed, had lately placed on the throne of power, in that country he would give him no epithets-he was certainly a most celebrated and extraordinary man. Without confidering his perfonal. character, it was fufficient for his purpofe, if he stated that he was very recently arrived at the poft which he occupied; that it was utterly impoffible

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impoffible to gus how long he might remain there; and confequently equally impoffible to feel any fecurity with refpect to his power of obferving any treaty that might be concluded with him. He might be fucceeded in the government by the jacobin faction, whofe old ery of war, eternal war with England, would, no doubt, lead them to put an end to any treaty which might be depending between the two countries: when we fhould be entirely at the mercy of France. He could not pretend to determine what might be the real difpofitions of the first conful, relative to general pacification. It was, however, not a little remarkable, that though, in the first note tranfmitted, by the fecretary of ftate, to France, his majefty exprefsly ftated his intentions of acting only in concert with his allies, not one word fhould be faid, in the second French note, refpecting peace with the allies. We were exprefly invited to Dunkirk, for the purpose of concluding peace between England and France; and no reference whatever was made to any of those allies, in concert with whom, alone, his majesty had fo properly declared his intention of acting. He argued, therefore, that even if we had acceded to the French propofitions, it was highly probable that we might have left in exiftence the continental

war:

we might have enabled France, in a certain degree, to have recruited her forces; and to bring her forces fo recruited, against our allies. We might have left alive the military, habits, fpirits, and occupations, of that military nation: we might have prepared for Buonaparte's fucceffors, (for he

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would not, as the noble fecretary had, at leaft, imprudently done, fuppofe that general to be a faithlefs obferver of treaties) a power more formidable than that now enjoyed by Buonaparte himself; more formidable from its intrinfic ftrength; more formidable from the views and principles of thofe who might be intrufted with the direction of it, but above all, more formidable, from the depreffed and abject ftate in which it would, moft affuredly, under fuch circumftances, find this country.

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The duke of Bedford had faid, the first note, tranfmitted by the fecretary of ftate to France, was not one that was likely to. induce Buonaparte to acknowledge the original aggreflion of France, or to difclaim thofe principles which had contributed fo much to the commencement and continuance of the war. But, in a paragraph in lord Grenville's letter, it had been stated, that no advantage could arife from negociation until it fhould diftinctly appear, that the principles, which originally produced the war, had ceafe to operate. If Buonaparte was really fincere in his profeffions (for lord Borringdon, in the courfe and animation of fpeaking, was reduced from his determination to fay nothing of Buonaparte's fincerity or infincerty)

if Buonaparte was fincere in his profeffions of peace, this would naturally have induced him, if not to make, any new profeffions of principles, at leaft, to confirm those which he had already made, on the eve of his revolution, by his organ, Boulay de la Meurthe. But Talleyrand, in his fecond note, is made, in a great degree, to juftify all the excelles of the former go

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vernment,

vernments, and to plead the caufe of those whofe aggreffions had originally provoked the war. Had Buonaparte been really defirous of peace, is it not probable that he would have taken advantage of the invitation which he had juft read, to announce his dereliction of thofe principles and objects which had hitherto guided the different governments in France, and to confirm thofe profeffions which he had made through Boulay de la Meurthe? This organ, Boulay de la Meurthe, is, however, ordered to renounce them when no negociation is depending: but his organ, Talleyrand, when negociation is depending; when he is invited to renounce them; and when the renunciation of them might remove an obftacle to peace-his organ, Talleyrand, is then ordered to adopt and juftify them. Lord Borringdon afked if that looked like a fincere defire of continuing the peace. Lord Romney had little faith to place in Buonaparte's profeffions. The chief conful might mean by thefe merely to perplex our government, and to render himself popular at home. But, in this cafe, we had laboured that he might gain his end. We certainly fhould have entered into negociation, and feen what terms he would have offered us. We fhould have faid, "We formerly made propofitions of peace to you, let us now hear the nature of yours." From this, no bad confequence could have followed. All military operations were fufpended at any rate, and the preparations might have gone on with equal vigour for next campaign. If the terms offered by Buonaparte fhould have been unreasonable, they might have been rejected with difdain.

The odium of continuing the war would thus have been thrown on Buonaparte, and every Englishman would have contributed with cheerfulness to carry it on.

The earl of Carlife faid, that, by carrying on the war, their lordfhips had obtained every object they had proposed to themselves in beginning it. We had deftroyed that monfter which preyed on the vitals of the conftitution, and threatened its exiftence. We had checked the career of the conquests of France. We had obtained fecurity, and fecurity we fhould continue to enjoy, by continuing the war, and in this way only. He was confident that to enter into a negociation at prefent would be to ruin the country, and would the. fore vote heartily for the addrefs. As to the violent anfwers that had been returned to the overtures of the French government, minifters might not improbably have reasons to juftify thefe, unknown to their lordships. He thought very highly of minifters. They had, by their prudence and steadiness, faved the country, which would inevitably have been ruined, had the oppofition been allowed to carry into execution their impolitic projects.

Lord Holland made the following, among a great variety of ob fervations:-One great point was now afcertained by the correfpondence, which, in a most important degree, changed the relative fituation of the two powers. We could no longer fay, as formerly, that the continuance of the war was to be afcribed to the avowed animofity of the enemy. It was not faid, now, that the enemy would not make or liften to overtures: but, that the English minifters did

not

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