Made him obferve the subject, and the plot, 275 The manners, paffions, unities; what not? All which, exact to rule, were brought about, Were but a combat in the lifts left out. "What! leave the Combat out?" exclaims the Knight; Yes, or we must renounce the Stagirite. "Not fo by Heav'n" (he answers in a rage) 280 Knights, fquires, and steeds, must enter on the stage." So vaft a throng the stage can ne'er contain. "Then build a new, or act it in a plain." Thus Critics, of lefs judgment than caprice, 285 Curious not knowing, not exact but nice, COMMENTARY. VER. 285. Thus Critics of lefs judgment than caprice, 2. He concludes his obfervation on thofe two forts of judges by parts, with this general reflexion.-The curious not knowing are the first fort, who judge by parts, and with a microscopic fight (as he fays elsewhere) examine bit by bit: The not exact but nice, are the fecond, who judge by a favourite part, and talk of a whole to cover their fondness for a part; as Philofophers do of principles, in order to obtrude notions and opinions in their stead. NOTES. VER. 285. Thus Critics of lefs judgment than caprice, Curious not knowing, not exact but nice.] In thefe two lines the poet finely defcribes the way in which bad writers are wont to imitate the qualities of good ones. As true Judgment Form fhort Ideas; and offend in arts (As most in manners) by a love to parts. COMMENTARY. But the fate common to both is, to be governed by caprice and not by Judgment, and confequently, to form fhort ideas, or to have ideas fhort of truth: Tho' the latter fort, thro' a fondness to their favourite part, imagine that it comprehends the whole in epitome: As the famous Hero of La Mancha, mentioned juft before, used to maintain, that Knight Errantry comprised within itself the quinteffence of all Science, civil, military, and religious. VER. 289. Some to conceit alone, etc.] We come now to that fecond fort of bounded capacity, which betrays itself in it's judgment on the manner of the work criticised. And this our Author profecutes from 288 to 384. These are again fubdivided into divers claffes. Ibid. Some to conceit alone, etc.] The firft [from 288 to 305.] are those who confine their attention folely to Conceit or Wit. And here again the Critic by parts, offends doubly in the manner," just as he did in the matter: For he not only confines his atten NOTES. generally draws men out of popular opinions, fo he who cannot get from the croud by the affiftance of this guide, willingly follows Caprice, which will be fure to lead him into fingularities. Again, true Knowledge is the art of treafuring up only that which, from its ufe in life, is worthy of being lodged in the memory. But Curiofity confifts in a vain attention to every thing out of the way, and which, for its ufeleffnefs the world. leaft regards. Laftly, Exactnefs is the juft proportion of parts to one another, and their harmony in a whole: But he who has not extent of capacity for the exercife of this quality, contents. himself with Nicety, which is a bufying one's felf about points, and fyllables. Poets like painters, thus, unfkill'd to trace And hide with ornaments their want of art. 295 What oft was thought, but ne'er fo well express'd; COMMENTARY. tion to a part, when it should be extended to the whole; but he likewife judges falfely of that part. And this, as the other, is unavoidable, the parts in the manner bearing the fame close relation to the whole, that the parts in the matter do; to which whole the ideas of this Critic have never yet extended. Hence it is, that our author, speaking here of those who confine their attention folely to Conceit or Wit, defcribes the two fpecies of true and falfe Wit: because they not only mistake a wrong difpofition of true Wit for a right, but likewise false Wit for true: He defcribes falfe Wit firft, from 288 to 297. Some to Conceit alone, etc. Where the reader may obferve our Author's skill in representing, in a defcription of false Wit, the false difpofition of the true, as the Critic by parts is apt to fall into both these errors. He next defcribes true Wit, from 296 to 305. True Wit is Nature to advantage drefs'd, etc. And here again the reader may obferve the same beauty, not only an explanation of true Wit, but likwife of the right difpofition of it; which the poet illuftrates, as he did the wrong, by ideas taken from the art of Painting. NOTES. VER. 297. True Wit is Nature to advantage dress'd, etc.] This definition is very exact. Mr. Locke had defined Wit to confift"in the affemblage of ideas, and putting thofe together, "with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any re"femblance or congruity, whereby to make up pleasant pictures " and agreeable vifions in the fancy." But that great Philofo Something, whofe truth convinc'd at fight we find, For works may have more wit than does 'em good, As bodies perish thro' excess of blood. Others for Language all their care exprefs, 305 And value books, as women men, for Dress: COMMENTARY. VER. 305. Others for Language, etc.] He proceeds fecondly to thofe narrow-minded Critics, whofe whole concern turns upon Language, and fhews [from 304 to 337.] that this quality, where it holds the principal place, deferves no commendation; 1. Becaufe it excludes qualities more effential. And when the abounding Verbiage has excluded the fenfe, the writer has nothing to do but to gild over the defect, by giving his words all the falfe colouring in his power. 2. He fhews, that the Critic who bufies himself with this quality alone, is altogether unable to make a right Judgment of it; because true Expreffion is only the dress of Thought; and fo must be perpetually varied according to the fubject, and man NOTES. pher, in feparating Wit from Judgment, as he does in this place, has given us (and he could therefore give us no other) only an account of Wit in general: In which falfe Wit, tho' not every species of it, is included. Aftriking Image therefore of Nature is, as Mr. Locke obferves, certainly Wit: But this image may ftrike on feveral other accounts, as well as for its truth and beauty; and the Philofopher has explained the manner how. But it never becomes that Wit which is the ornament of true Poefy, whose end is to reprefent Nature, but when it dreffes that Nature to advantage, and prefents her to us in the brightest and most amiable light. And to know when the Fancy has done its office truly, the poet fubjoins this admirable Their praise is still,---the Style is excellent: COMMENTARY. ner of thinking. But thofe who never concern themselves with the Senfe, can form no judgment of the correspondence be tween that and the Language: Expreffion is the drefs of thought, and still Appears more decent as more fuitable, etc. Now as these Critics are ignorant of this correfpondence, their whole judgment in Language is reduced to the examination of fingle words; and often, such as are most to his tafte, are those that fmack most of Antiquity: On which our author has therefore bestowed a little raillery; concluding with a short and proper direction concerning the ufe of words, fo far as regards their novelty and ancientry. NOTES. Teft, viz. When we perceive that it gives us back the image of our mind. When it does that, we may be fure it plays no tricks with us: For this image is the creature of the Judgment; and whenever Wit correfponds with Judgment, we may fafely pronounce it to be true. "Naturam intueamur, hanc fequamur: id facillime accipi"unt animi quod agnofcunt." Quintil. lib. viii. c. 3. VER. 311. Falfe eloquence, like the prifmatic glass, etc.] This fimile is beautiful. For the falfe colouring, given to objects by the prifmatic glafs, is owing to its untwisting, by its obliquities, thofe threads of light, which Nature had put together in order to spread over its works an ingenuous and fimple candor, that |