as a reserve and a guard to the left of the town. At four o'clock, General Willcox determined to send it into the fight, with the hope that it might create a diversion in favor of our troops that had been hotly engaged through the greater part of the day, and possibly find a weak place in the enemy's line. The Division, forming in two lines under the fire of the enemy, marched bravely forward, advancing over the plain, crossing the railroad, a dry canal trench and some marshy ground, and with considerable exertion gained a position on the left of General Couch's line, within less than a hundred feet of the enemy's strongest position. Here a severe fire of musketry was added to the artillery, whose shot and shell had already thinned the ranks of the Division and the first line composed of Colonel Hawkins's brigade, was forced back under a storm of fire in front and flank. The second line, Colonel Harland's brigade, advanced in the midst of a storm of shell and shrapnel, to within a short distance from the railroad, and established pickets. The night had now settled down, and nothing further could be done. But in the short time of Colonel Harland's advance, the brigade had met with a severe loss in the death of Lieutenant Colonel J. B. Curtis of the 4th Rhode Island, who fell, while bravely cheering on his men. Lieutenant Colonel Curtis was a most intrepid officer and had already shown abundant signs of great promise. He had distinguished himself at Antietam and was valiantly discharging his duty when he fell. His loss was severely felt in the regiment to which he belonged and throughout the entire brigade.

On the right of our line, the battle was indeed sanguinary. The stone wall that lined the telegraph road was like the wall of a fortification. The ground sloped away from it with such an inclination as to enable the enemy's artillery and musketry to make it a field of carnage. But to the work of storming this position, the troops advanced with a determination that deserved The enemy's reports of the battle acknowledged that the "Yankees" fought that day with a bravery that had never before been witnessed to an equal degree. General Sumner's

success.

The

Grand Division showed the highest soldierly qualities. General Couch's corps which bore the brunt of the bloody engagement, behaved in a most handsome and gallant manner. troops moved out of the city and up the plank and telegraph roads. General French's division was in advance, followed promptly by the division of General Hancock. Both divisions marched bravely up to the enemy's works and undertook to carry them by assault. But the stone wall proved too strong for the valor of our troops. Never did a hotter fire greet an advancing party. The plain in front of the enemy was a sheet of flame. Our men replied with spirit. Our artillery was taken up to within one hundred and fifty yards of the enemy and was faithfully served. Some breaches were made in the wall. But it was all to little purpose. No troops in the world could stand in the midst of such destructive fire. Our line wavered, stopped, recoiled, fell back. It was again formed and again it advanced, only to meet with the same terrible resistance. It was now three hours past noon. The morning had passed away with only the result of General Franklin's partial success-lost because not followed up. General Sumner, who was on this side of the river at the Lacy House, longed to cross and lead his troops in person. To have died on that field of battle would have satisfied the brave old soldier's ambition. General Burnside was not willing to consent to such needless exposure. But the time had come to support General Couch, who was persistently carrying on the unequal conflict. General Hooker, crossing the river, ordered General Butterfield to advance his corps. General Couch's command was formed in front of the enemy, with General Howard's division on the right, General Hancock's in the centre and General French's on the left. Of General Butterfield's corps, General Griffin's division relieved General Howard's; General Humphrey's relieved General Hancock's; General Sykes's relieved General French's, and held the position, throwing pickets out in advance as the day declined. General Whipple's division crossed the river early and remained through the day occupying the

:

city and guarding the bridges. The fresh troops of the fifth corps, under the personal direction of General Hooker, attempted the assault with equal bravery to their predecessors on the same field, but with no better success. The sun was sink

ing in the west. The day was closing, and, as the twilight fell, a few scattered shot proclaimed that the battle was drawing to a close. The Ninth Corps continued for some time after dark to engage the enemy. But on the right of the line the deadly struggle ceased, as the shadows deepened on river, town and plain. All became silent except the groans of the wounded and dying, and the sharp report of the picket firing as the extreme outposts came in contact with each other. General Burnside returned to his tent, disappointed by the result, but firmly resolved to renew the battle on the subsequent day.

When the Commanding General left headquarters on the morning of the 14th, he had made every preparation to recommence the action by storming the heights. He knew in such an emergency the Ninth Corps would not fail him, and he accordingly selected the troops whom he had before led to victory, to make the attack. He had decided even to direct the assault in person. A column of eighteen regiments was formed, and every thing was ready for the movement, when the three Grand Division Commanders earnestly appealed to him to abandon the attempt. He could not refuse to listen to their persuasions and arguments. General Sumner was a most brave and experienced soldier. General Hooker was unsurpassed for daring. General Franklin was cool and steady. After mature deliberation and a careful revision of the whole matter, General Burnside suffered himself to be convinced that the attack was not feasible. The orders were countermanded, and the day passed without incident. There was considerable spiteful skirmishing at different points along the lines. But General Lee kept his troops under cover of his intrenchments, and General Burnside had concluded to remain quietly in his lines. The severely wounded were cared for and transported across the river. The slightly wounded found relief in the

regimental hospitals. The 15th passed in the same manner. A portion of the dead were buried. The night came on cold and stormy, and, concealed from the enemy by the darkness, General Burnside silently withdrew his army without loss across the Rappahannock. The bridges were taken up, and on the 16th the weary soldiers found rest in their former camps. The casualties in this battle were severe, but not disproportionate to the number of men exposed to fire. The subsequent operations of the Army of the Potomac were accompanied by greater losses, especially at Chancellorsville, and in General Grant's campaign of 1864. During the movements of the four days which General Burnside's army passed in Fredericksburg, one thousand three hundred and thirty-nine officers and men were reported killed, nine thousand and sixty wounded, and one thousand five hundred and thirty missing and prisoners. Of the wounded but one thousand six hundred and thirty were treated in general hospital, and of those reported missing, a large number were stragglers and skulkers who rejoined the army soon after the battle.* The loss of the enemy was reported at five thousand three hundred and nine killed, wounded and missing. It was smaller than our own, as he fought mostly behind his works or in the shelter of the woods.

It is not altogether useless now to discuss the causes of this unfortunate disaster. That the battle was well planned, there can be no question. That the plan was either misunderstood, or but feebly carried out by those officers to whom its execution on the left wing was entrusted, is equally without question. General Burnside is a man of quick perceptions and of great activity of mind. It is possible that he may have supposed that his subordinate officers comprehended the movements which he designed as well as he did himself, and so he

*Dr. Letterman, Medical Director of the army, declares that "while the battle was in progress and after it was over, nearly one thousand men (no one of whom had a wound of any consequence, and many were uninjured) jumped in the cars and climbed on the top, at the depot near Fredericksburg and went o Aquia Creek, where they knew no hospitals were established." Medical Recollections, p. 88.

may have neglected to explain their character and scope as fully as their importance demanded. It is characteristic of such minds to project themselves, as it were, upon the minds of others, and to take many things for granted which require an elaborate unfolding. General Burnside supposed that he had made it perfectly clear to General Franklin, both in conversation and by his orders, that the heights near Captain Hamilton's were to be occupied, "if possible," and that that was to be done at once"-early in the morning--by "a well supported" attack, and moreover, that the whole command upon the left was to kept "in readiness to move at once, as soon as the fog" should lift. Had General Franklin possessed the quickness of appreciation for which his chief had generously given him the credit, and had he strongly resolved upon a successful obedience to the command which he had received, the result would have been more creditable to our arms. General Franklin must have known that a most important movement was expected of him. Else why had a hundred thousand men been sent across the river, and a very large portion of them placed under his command? The heights near Captain Hamilton's were the key to the enemy's position. Had they been occupied successfully, the rebel army would have been cut in twain and handsomely routed. The road to Richmond would have been opened, for, at that time, no intrenchments and defensive works existed. General Meade had the coveted point in his possession, but lost it because he was not supported, while fifty thousand men were standing idle within two miles of him in his rear. It was an additional illustration to those in which the war of the rebellion was fruitful, of the loss of great advantages through a want of coöperation or a miscomprehension of the importance of the occasion on the part of subordinate officers.

General Meade was very confident at the time that victory would have rested with our arms had his attack upon General Lee's right wing been properly supported. Not only did he