mitted, there were considerable difficulties in the way of an arrangement with respect to the impressing of seamen; but still he did not think them insurmountable: of our right to take British seamen out of American merchant vessels, there could be no doubt; but how did this right arise? The American merchant vessel, met on the high sea by a British ship of war, was extra-territorial, and the latter had an undoubted right to take out of her a British seaman for his majesty's service; but it was also a right on the part of the American, that no American subject should be taken, and that the British right should be exercised as moderately as possible. Between these conflicting rights it might be difficult to make an arrangement; but, surely, it was unwise to shut the door against any arrangement. His lordship took a view of the effects likely to result from the Orders in Council, and contended that it was clear they would produce injury to our manufactures; and, as to the West India interest, which it was boasted would be benefited, how was this to arise if a war took place with the U. States, which, he contended, the Orders in Council were calculated to produce, when it was clearly ascertained, that the West India islands depended upon the U. States for a large proportion of their provisions? In whatever point of view these Orders were considered, they must, he contended, be found highly injurious to the interests of the country. If it was the object of Buonaparte to force America into a war with this country, this measure tended to facilitate that object; the policy should rather have been to have remained quiet, and if Buonaparte had urged the American government to a war with this country, then all the odium would have remained with him, and a large proportion of the population of the U. States would have been with us. When we saw all Europe under the dominion of one man, pressing and urging forward plans inimical to the interests and happiness of mankind, we might have looked to America for that order of things congenial with our own feelings and our own views, and as forming a counterpoise to the power of the ruler of the continent; whilst G. Britain held the balance between the new and the old world, and enjoyed all those ́immense advantages which must result from such a commanding situation. The measures of ministers, however, forbad this pleasing prospect, and threatened us with a war with those, from whose increasing prosperity we might otherwise derive the most solid advantages. His lordship concluded, by reading the following Resolutions, the first of which he moved :—1. "That it appears to this house, that his majesty hath been advised, without any alleged provocation from the U. States of America, to issue Orders in Council, on and subsequent to the 11th of Nov. 1807, for interrupting nearly the whole of the commerce of the said states with the continent of Europe; for limiting such tradeto be carried on in future through British ports only, (with the exception of neutral and allied ports in certain cases); thereby exposing it to such restrictions and duties, and even prohibitions, as the government of G. Britain may think fit to impose upon it; and for confiscating the property of the citizens of the said states, in all cases where the same shall be accompanied by particular documents, certifying the place of its growth or manufacture.-2. That it appears to this house, that previous to the issuing of the said Orders in Council, a negotiation had been carried on between this country and the U. States of America, for the maintenance of peace and friendship between them, and that a treaty had been actually signed respecting some of the most material points in discussion; that a desire had been expressed by the government of the said U. States for the addition of certain other provisions to the said treaty, and that a proposal was made for renewing the negociation for that purpose; but that this offer was abruptly and intemperately rejected by his majesty's ministers.-3. That at the time when the said Orders were issued, his majesty's ministers had recently received from the ministers of the U. States in this kingdom, assurances that the injurious decrees of his majesty's enemies had not, in any one instance, been executed against the commerce or navigation of the U. States: and that from all that had passed subsequent to the issuing of the said decrees, his majesty's ministers had every reason to conclude, that any attempt of the enemy so to execute the same, would be decidedly resisted by the government of the U. States; whereby it must have happened, either that the said decrees would have continued to be wholly mugatory and ineffectual, or that the enemy, by endeavouring to enforce the same, would have driven the U. States into a closer connection with this country.-4. That it ap- the French government against commerce, and which rendered necessary the Orders in Council of November, 1807. The noble lord also contended, that the conduct of the late administration, in throw ing Russia into the arms of France, occasioned the loss of Portugal, which rendered necessary the expedition to Copenhagen. With respect to the Order of the 7th of Jan. he maintained, that its legal construction went far beyond the interpretation put upon it by noble lords on the other side, and it was thought by ministers a preferable mode of conduct to leave the Note of Mr. Madison unanswered, and to wait the result of the treaty. The Orders in Council, his lordship contended, were necessary, in order to main the enemy from enjoying all the advantages of peace, through the medium of an extensive neutral commerce, whilst our own trade was suffering under depression. pears to this house, that the Order issued by his majesty in council, on the 7th of Jan. 1807, was not intended to interrupt neutrals in a commerce of discharge from port to port of the enemies territories; that such was understood to be its legal construction by those who were in his majesty's service at the time the said order was issued; and that an explanation to that effect was given by them to the Danish minister, in an official Note dated on the 17th of March, 1807.-That in a note from the American secretary of state to Mr. Erskine, dated on the 20th of the same month, considerable uneasiness was expressed, under an apprehension of a contrary interpretation of the said Order; and that the above mentioned Note was actually received by his majesty's pre-tain our own commerce, and to prevent sent ministers in the month of April last. Yet no steps have been taken thereon, up to the present hour, for removing the unfounded apprehensions of the American government on a point to which they appear to have attached so much importance. And that by this omission, much unnecessary irritation has been suffered to prevail in America, long after it was in the power of his majesty's ministers to have effectually removed the same; and fresh obstacles to conciliation and friendship have thus wantonly been interposed.-5. The Earl of Darnley followed on the That it is, therefore, the opinion of this same side, and contended, that the Order house, that the said Orders are in them- of the 7th of Jan. was strictly within the selves unjust and impolitic; that the issu-law of nations, whilst the Orders of Nov. ing of them at the time, and under the last were wholly contrary to that law. circumstances, above mentioned, was an The Earl of Lauderdale said, he had act of the utmost improvidence and rash- not intended to have troubled their lordness: and that by abruptly breaking off ships any more on this subject, as it had a friendly negotiation, and withholding a been most ably discussed by his noble satisfactory explanation on a point, on friend; but, what fell from the noble earl which it might have been given with so opposite by way of invective, and to raise much ease and advantage, his majesty's a laugh against the late ministers, induced ministers have acted in diregard of our him to break silence. The noble lord had true policy, which is to cultivate the friend- stated, that the cruel attack on Copenhaship of a nation, whose interests and pros-gen was caused by his majesty's late miperity are so intimately interwoven with our own; and have conducted themselves in a manner the least adapted to enable his majesty to maintain that maritime superiority, on which the greatness, and even the existence, of his empire so much depend." The Earl of Westmoreland contended, that the Order of blockade, issued by the late administration in May, 1806, produced the Berlin decree in Nov. 1806, which gave birth to the Order in Council of the 7th of Jan. 1807, which produced the further and more severe decree of Lord Auckland maintained, that the true interpretation of the Order of the 7th of Jan. was to be found in the Note of lord Howick to Mr. Rist, and contended, that ministers ought to have made that interpretation the basis of a communication on the subject to the American government. nisters: the argument that had been adduced to prove it, was too weak to require an answer, and he would pass the assertion with what it deserved-contempt. But the great question for noble lords to consider was, whether the measure of the late Orders in Council was a good one or not? Lord Mulgrave denied that the interpretation given by noble lords on the other side, to the Order of the 7th of Jan. was consistent with its fair and legal construction. With respect to Russia, the noble lord contended, that the conduct of the having unnecessarily put an end to a contest which, if continued, could only have been attended with additional disasters. The facts of the case had been rendered more notorious than he could have ex late ministers had tended to indispose that the Russians, who had most unjustly been power towards this country; and, with re-charged, by the present ministers, with spect to the Orders in Council of Nov. last, he maintained their necessity, policy, and expediency, and saw no reason to believe, that any intelligence of them could arrive in America, so as to operate at the seat of government, in contributing to produce the embargo. Lord Grenville observed, that were it not that ministers were eager to catch at any thing which could enable them to avoid the particular subject under consideration, and to distract the attention of their lordships, they would never have wandered so much from the point as to enter upon the discussion of the merits of the conduct of the late government towards Russia. They having adverted to that, however, he might be allowed to say a few words by way of reply. Assurances of aid, it was said, had been given to Russia, which were not followed up by corresponding efforts. Where did that appear? Russia might naturally be anxious to obtain, but it was for the government of this country to consider whether it ought to promise or to grant. The whole correspondence was a series of refusals-refusals justified in every view of sound policy by the then situation of affairs. With respect to the refusal of the loan, his lordship stated, that the late government had seen no hopes of such advantages resulting from a ompliance as would counterbalance the additional pressure on the people which it would occasion, if granted in the manner solicited. It was required that it should be raised at 5 per cent. and that it should be guaranteed by parliament. Was there any man who could say that this was a requisite which ought to have been complied with? With regard to the point of co-operation, he said, that whoever considered the state of the contending parties at the time, coolly and dispassionately, must be convinced, that it would have been madness to have sent an army to the continent. It was not money that Russia wanted, nor the comparatively feeble aid which we could have sent her. The re sources of that great empire had not before been well organized: France had from the other corner of Europe met Russia with equal or superior numbers on her own frontiers; France had for 17 years been engaged in war, and there was a difference, therefore, in the experience of the officers and the soldiers. These were the causes of failure on the part of pected them to have been. At one time the contest assumed something like a doubtful appearance; but when examined into, these appearances were found to be completely fallacious. The illustrious officer (lord Hutchinson) on whose opinion, in this case, the late government had been disposed to place a great deal of reliance, had at first suggested that some co-operation might be of use. But when he had visited the scene of action, he then immediately saw that the idea of military aid from us would be of no advantage, and had accordingly said, "for God's sake, don't send a man: they can be of no use here, and most probably not one of them can ever get back again."—In answer to his noble friend, the ministers had entered upon a discussion of the effects of the Order in Council of the 7th of Jan. in pursuance of their plan of avoiding the subject more particularly before them. But the proposition of his noble friend had nothing to do with that, nor with the late Orders in Council generally. It only related to them so far as they affected our relations with America, and to this point his noble friend had confined himself, in arguing, that they would be attended with the most pernicious consequences to this country. The evidence which had been given at the bar, had been called by ministers ingenious speculations. Whether the assertions of ministers, who said that these Orders would be beneficial to our commerce, or the evidence of those practically concerned, who affirmed, that they would be destructive to it, were most to be relied on, he would leave their lordships to decide. But his noble friend had only adverted to that evidence for the sake of a fact, which had been proved beyond the possibility of contradiction; that the intelligence of the Orders in Council had reached America previous to the embargo. Since the fact had been known to one individual, it must have been in the possession of the commercial interest in general, and have reached America through a variety of channels, and this he understood actually to have been the case. The embargo must have been the consequence; for it was impossible, that the decrees of France could ap measures of hostility which she would not pear of such consequence to America, as to induce her to undergo the hardships which she must feel from this measure. It was a matter of substantive charge, too, against ministers, that they had not explained the Order of the 7th of Jan. to the Americans, so far as related to the discharge of cargoes at one port, and taking in others at other ports. They knew the meaning of the Order in this respect, and if they had been desirous of conciliating America, they would have explained it. With regard to the treaty lately negotiated, that was now before the house, and the members of the late government would be ready to enter upon the discussion of its merits, when the subject should be specifically brought under consideration. The manner in which the negotiation on that treaty had been put an end to was most intemperate and absurd. Nothing had been more common than to suspend ratification, in order, if possible, to have Lord Hawkesbury expressed his belief, something added, omitted, or altered. that there was some ground for expectaThe instances of this were innumerable; tion in Russia that she would receive some and he affirmed, that no men of sound assistance from this country, As to the judgment, being at the same time desirous exact nature or amount of that assistance, of conciliation, could have put an end to it was not for him to determine what it the negotiation in the manner ministers might have been; whether an expedition had done. He was glad that now, how- ought to have been sent to this point or ever, the conviction began to prevail the other, or at what precise period of the among the people, and even with the go- year it ought to have been equipped. A vernment, that the neutrality of America noble lord had dwelt with peculiar force was advantageous to this country. Every upon the circumstance of a loan having one knew with what industry ridiculous been refused by this country to be granted opinions had been circulated, that we to Russia. He lamented as sincerely as should lose less by a war with America that noble lord, the burthens to which the than we did by her neutrality, because people of this country were necessarily our commerce was carried on in her ship- subjected; but, though it might not suit ping instead of our own. The very ad- the convenience of the country to advance vantage to us was, that our commerce was six millions as a loan or subsidy to Russia, by means of American shipping carried was the government of this country to on with the enemies colonies and ports, consider itself so far restricted by the prointo which British ships would not be ad- position of an advance to that amount mitted. He would not enter into the par- being made to us, that it was not at ticulars of the calamities which might re- liberty to say what sum it could afford, sult from a war with America in our pre- or what amount of money the nation sent situation; the loss of our trade with would advance towards the support of the the continent; the loss of the supplies to common cause of Europe? This, he conthe West Indies; the loss to our own home tended, ought to have been done; for, on manufactures, &c.; but it was obvious, Russia, and on the assistance that it receivthat it would be a most serious calamity. ed, in order to enable it the more effecStill, he advised no concession inconsistent tually to resist that overwhelming power with the honour of the country, in the which had now almost deluged the contiproper sense of the term. But honour and nent, depended the welfare of almost every dignity consisted not in holding haughty other state. If Russia had received suffilanguage with a friendly power. He cient assistance, the emigration of the agreed with the noble lord who spoke court of Lisbon might have been prelast, that nothing said in that house could vented; and if Russia had been properly have the effect of driving America into supported, it might not have been neces VOL. X. 4 N be Th mo pe the do fic in d' Lord Grenville observed, that were it not that ministers were eager to catch at any int thing which could enable them to avoid con the particular subject under consideration, and to distract the attention of their lordships, they would never have wandered so much from the point as to enter upon the discussion of the merits of the conduct of the late government towards Russ They having adverted to that, how he might be allowed to say a few by way of reply. Assurances of was said, had been given to Ru were not followed up by cr efforts. Where did that ar might naturally be anxio it was for the governme to consider whether it to grant. The whol a series of refusa' every view of sc situation of aff refusal of the the late go such adva ance as tional woul soli br SC at [ which pur where, he an that no such Fle ccasioned in tho on of these aga Roble lord, how was ma sing ers sproved at the effect; but this he ster ct, and in so doing sha A would eventually see tion ted by the facts as they tak er disclosed. They had sur that effect, but a specu- ing an interested merchant at - bar. With respect to the was had been referred to, he had to the the lordships, that the reason it con en so speedily ratified as might was we expected, was, that an alteration | pre A made in it; not a trivial alteration see tion, but a most substantive and by motere deviation from the principles pol which that treaty was originally selv med to: to the final execution of a do- soo ment so altered, some resistance was narally given; but there was good reason He o believe, as indeed he wished, and no doubt every noble lord who heard him wished, that America must shortly have a proper sense of its own interest; and noble fords must see, that this was not to be obtained by a tame acquiescence in every tha fear or alarm with which weak or interest- of ed individuals mich endeavour to impress peo their lordships |