695 HENSHAW, J. This action was to quiet title to fortytwo acres of land in the county of Sonoma. Cordelia Jones during her lifetime conveyed an estate in the land in question to the plaintiff, who was her nephew. Subsequently, she died, and in the probate of her estate this land was distributed to Catherine McGarrigle the mother of this plaintiff, subject to a life estate in plaintiff. Thereafter Catherine McGarrigle conveyed her fee to plaintiff, who instituted this action. Defendant claims by the deed above referred to from Cordelia Jones to the plaintiff, and the construction of that instrument is determinative of this case. It is in language as follows:

"This indenture, made this tenth day of February, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-nine, between Cordelia Jones of Sonoma county, state of California, the party of the first part, and Thomas McGarrigle of the same place, the party of the second part,

"Witnesseth, that the said party of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of love and affection and one dollar money of the United States of America, to her in hand. paid by the said party of the second part, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged has granted, bargained and sold, conveyed and confirmed, and by these presents does grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto the said party of the second part, during his lifetime, all that certain lot, piece or parcel of land situate, lying and being in the township of Santa Rosa, county of Sonoma state of California, and bounded and particularly described as follows, to wit: [Here follows description.]

"It is the purpose of the party of the first part by this deed, that after the death of the said party of the second part, the said described lands shall become and be the property of the Roman Catholic Girls' Orphan Asylum of San Francisco, state of California."

It is upon the italicized portion of this conveyance that appellant relies, but we are of opinion that the trial court correctly construed this clause as containing no operative words 696 of grant, and as failing to convey any present interest in the property. It will be noted that the appellant is nowhere mentioned as a grantee in the deed, and that the language of the clause is but an expression of the grantor's purpose in the future disposition of the property. It left in her a reversion after the life estate to Thomas McGarrigle, which required some future conveyance, or some testamentary disposition, to effectuate its transfer to the orphan asylum. But not only

was there a failure of operative words to convey to the asylum, but no present interest can be said to pass under the language which was employed. It is fundamental that, while possession or enjoyment of an estate may be deferred, a deed to be operative must pass a present interest. This was not done by the instrument in question. The express purpose was giving to it its fullest effect-that the land should become the property of the orphan asylum after the death of McGarrigle, but should not become its property before. Such attempted dispositions have been uniformly held to be inoperative in deeds: Bigley v. Souvey, 45 Mich. 370, 8 N. W. 98; Leaver v. Gauss, 62 Iowa, 314, 17 N. W. 522; Reed v. Hazelton, 37 Kan. 321, 15 Pac. 177; Sperber v. Balster, 66 Ga. 317; Pinkham v. Pinkham, 55 Neb. 729, 76 N. W. 411; Cunningham v. Davis, 62 Miss. 366; Donald v. Nesbitt, 89 Ga. 290, 15 S. E. 367.

The judgment and order appealed from are therefore affirmed. McFarland, J., and Lorigan, J., concurred.

Hearing in Bank denied.

In Order to Constitute an Instrument a deed, it must pass a present interest in the property; but this may occur without the present enjoyment or possession passing: See the monographic note to Wilson v. Carrico, 49 Am. St. Rep. 219-222. A conveyance not to take effect until the death of the grantor is a testamentary instrument: Wilson v. Wilson, 158 Ill. 567, 49 Am. St. Rep. 176. On the distinction between deeds and wills, see the monographic note to Ferris v. Neville, 89 Am. St. Rep. 494-500.

HOLMES v. MARSHALL.

[145 Cal. 777, 79 Pac. 534.]

LIFE INSURANCE-Exemption of from Execution Against the Beneficiary.-Under a statute providing that moneys, benefits, privileges, or immunities accruing or in any manner growing out of any life insurance, if the annual premiums do not exceed five hundred dollars, are exempt from execution, they are exempt from execution or attachment against the beneficiary as well as against the person whose life was insured. (p. 89.)

LIFE INSURANCE, Exemption of from Execution.-Where a policy of life insurance is payable to the administrators of the insured, and being so paid, the proceeds are set aside to his widow by the court having the administration of his estate, they are exempt from execution for her debts. (p. 90.)

EXEMPTION-Proceeds of Life Insurance Deposited in Bank. Where the proceeds of a life insurance which are exempt from execution are deposited in bank by the beneficiary, the right of exemption is not thereby lost. (p. 92.)

ATTACHMENT-Setting Aside Levy on Exempt Property.The court whence a writ of attachment issues may set aside a levy thereof made on exempt property. (p. 92.)

Powers & Holland, for the appellant.

Morton, Hauser & Jones, for the respondents.

777 COOPER, C. This action is upon a promissory note for one thousand dollars, dated October 5, 1899, signed by J. F. Jenkins and his wife, Annie J. Jenkins. J. F. Jenkins died intestate, and respondent Annie J. Jenkins is his surviving widow. After the action had been commenced a writ of attachment 778 was issued and levied upon one thousand and twenty dollars and fifty-seven cents on deposit in the Citizens' National Bank of Los Angeles to the credit of respondent, Annie J. Jenkins.

The court made an order after notice, and, on motion of respondents, setting aside the levy of said writ and dissolving it as to the money so on deposit with said bank. This appeal is from the order so made. The principal question is as to whether or not the said money was subject to the debts of respondent, Annie J. Jenkins, or exempt from execution against her. At the time of his death J. F. Jenkins was the owner and holder of three fully paid up life insurance policies upon his own life, two of which (one for ninety-nine dollars and one for thirteen hundred and eighty-five dollars) were payable to respondent, Annie J. Jenkins, and one of which (for nine hundred and eighty-two dollars and fifty cents) was payable to the estate of deceased, his administrators or executors. The estate of said deceased was duly probated, and the nine hundred and eighty-two dollars and fifty cents insurance collected, which constituted the entire estate, and of which there remained five hundred and thirty-nine dollars and forty-five cents after paying costs and expenses of administration. This was set apart to the surviving widow, Annie J. Jenkins, as exempt from execution under section 1465 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The proceeds of all said policies were deposited by respondent, Annie J. Jenkins, in one account to her credit in said Citizens' National Bank of Los Angeles. She drew against this account from time to time until the date of the levy of the attachment, when there remained the sum of one thousand

and twenty dollars and fifty-seven cents to her credit in said bank.

"All moneys, benefits, privileges or immunities accruing or in any manner growing out of any life insurance, if the annual premiums paid do not exceed five hundred dollars," are exempt from execution: Code Civ. Proc., sec. 690, subd. 18. The main contention of appellant is, that the exemption extends only against the debts of the person whose life was insured and who paid the premiums requisite to procure the insurance and keep it in force, and that such exemption does not continue after his death in favor of the beneficiary. In construing this statute, as in the construction of all statutes, it is the duty of the court to arrive at the intent of the legislature, if it can be done, from the language used in the statute. Statutes exempting property from execution are enacted on the ground of public policy for the benevolent purpose of 779 saving debtors and their families from want by reason of misfortune or improvidence. The general rule now is to construe such statutes liberally, so as to carry out the intention of the legislature, and the humane purpose designed by the lawmakers: 12 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., pp. 75, 76, and cases cited; In re McManus, 87 Cal. 294, 22 Am. St. Rep. 250, and note, 25 Pac. 413, 10 L. R. A. 567; Spence v. Smith, 121 Cal. 536, 66 Am. St. Rep. 62, 53 Pac. 653. Bearing this rule in mind, let us see what the legislature has said as to this matter. It has said that where the annual premiums do not exceed five hundred dollars, the insurance moneys shall be exempt from execution. Here the annual premium did not exceed five hundred dollars, It has said that all moneys accruing or in any manner growing out of any life insurance shall be exempt from execution. The money here accrued and grew out of life insurance upon the life of deceased. After his death, no execution could issue against him. The words "exempt from execution" were clearly intended to apply to the moneys coming from the life insurance to the hands of the beneficiary. It is exempt from execution as to all strangers or parties who have no claim to it without any provision of statute. It was intended to exempt it from the debts of the party to whom it was payable and who procured title to it by the death of the insured. It was not the intention that the insured might die leaving a small insurance and a dependent family and that the urance money should be subject to execution for the debts the wife, even if she is the beneficiary named in the policy.

The words "exempt from execution" mean exempt from any execution. The legislature mentioned no class of executions, and we are not at liberty to judicially insert a class. "Exempt from execution" includes the defendant, Annie J. Jenkins, and applies to plaintiff. We have no decision of this court upon the question, and the decisions of other courts do not furnish much assistance, because the statute under which each decision was made is different from ours. In Kentucky and Minnesota the statutes declare in effect that certain insurance benefits, reliefs, etc., "shall be exempt from execution, and shall not be liable to be seized, taken or appropriated, by any legal or equitable process, to pay any debt or liability of a member." In both these states the fund or 780 relief is held to be exempt from execution, whether against the original member or against any beneficiary who has been paid or is entitled to be paid any benefit falling within the class described in the statute: Schillinger v. Boes, 85 Ky. 357, 3 S. W. 427; Brown v. Balfour, 46 Minn. 68, 48 N. W. 604, 12 L. R. A. 373; First Nat. Bank v. How, 65 Minn. 187, 67 N. W. 994. It seems, at least, doubtful as to whether or not these decisions properly construe the statutes of these states. The decisions in other states, particularly in New York, hold similar language to create an exemption only as to the member or insured.

In New York the language of the statute is, that such funds shall be exempt "from execution, and shall not be liable to be seized, taken or appropriated by any legal or equitable process to pay any debt or liability of such deceased member": Bolt v. Keyhoe, 30 Hun, 619. The Kentucky and Minnesota cases are criticised by Freeman in his work on Executions (third edition, volume 2, section 234b), but the author says in speaking of the language of the statutes in those states: "If these statutes stopped with the words 'exempt from execution,' there would be no doubt of the exemption in favor of the beneficiary, but the additional words in the statute indicate that the legislature had in mind merely the debts or other liabilities of members of the association in question, and hence that, after the benefit was received by a person other than a member it would be subject to the usual laws relating to executions." In our code the statute stops with the words "exempt from execution." Under our statute necessary household and kitchen furniture is exempt from execution, and if the wife succeeds to such furniture it is equally exempt as to her debts. The farming utensils or implements of husbandry of the judgment debtor