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of the municipality. In Trebby v. Transcript Pub. Co., 74 Minn. 84, 73 Am. St. Rep. 330, 76 N. W. 961, it was held that the publication of a nonofficial resolution of a city council wholly outside of its duty and containing matter libelous per se was not privileged. In Wallis v. Bazet, 34 La. Ann. 131, it was held that a publication of the proceedings of a town council in the locality where the paper is published could not be regarded as being in itself malicious and libelous. So, also, in a later case—that of Meteye v. Times-Democrat Pub. Co., 47 La. Ann. 824, 17 South. 314-it was held that an accurate and impartial account of the proceedings of a committee of the common council of the city of New Orleans, which met at the instance of the mayor to investigate charges of mismanagement of the Leper Hospital, was qualifiedly privileged.

4. Extent of Right to Use Headlines.—It is generally held that the headlines to an article may be considered as a part of the article itself, and may justify the publication being regarded as libelous when the body of the article is not necessarily so: See the monographic note to McAllister v. Detroit Free Press Co., 15 Am. St. Rep. 347. See, also, Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138, 49 L. ed. a prosecution for criminal libel. Where the court held under the Philippine Island statutes, that striking headlines to a newspaper report of a judicial proceeding, which proclaimed the prosecuting witness as a "traitor, seducer and perjurer," were not privileged even if the report itself was. In Hayes v. Press Co., 127 Pa. St. 642, 14 Am. St. Rep. 874, 18 Atl. 331, 5 L. R. A. 643, it was held that the headline "Hotel Proprietors Embarrassed" was not a privileged index to an account, to the effect that a judgment was rendered against the parties in question on a demand note. But in Lawyers' Co-operative Pub. Co. v. West Pub. Co., 32 App. Div. 585, 52 N. Y. Supp. 1120, it was held that headlines affixed to a report of a judicial proceeding were privileged if they are a fair index of the matter contained in the report, but that in determining whether they are a fair index, the headlines and matter contained in the report must be construed together.

d.

Statements Concerning Officials or Candidates for Office.

1. Public Officials.—With respect to publications concerning public officials, the question always arises whether the alleged libelous statements are merely allowable criticism, or whether they in fact constitute libel. The general principles of law applicable to publications concerning public officials will be found set forth in the monographic note to McAllister v. Detroit Free Press Co., 15 Am. St. Rep. 349 et seq. In Jackson v. Pittsburgh Times, 152 Pa. St. 406, 34 Am. St. Rep. 659, 25 Atl. 613, it was said that a public official is amenable to public criticism in a newspaper without liability for libel when there is probable cause for comment and no proof of express malice, even though the statements published are not true in all respects.

So, also, it is said that a fair and reasonable criticism of the acts of an official, made without malice and not containing an attack on his private character, is privileged: Clifton v. Lange, 108 Iowa, 472, 79 N. W. 276; Evening Post Co. v. Richardson, 113 Ky. 641, 68 S. W. 665. But where the attack consists merely of gibes, taunts and contemptuous language aimed mostly at the personality of the official, it is not a privilege: Buckstaff v. Viall, 84 Wis. 129, 54 N. W. 111. So, also, false and groundless imputations of wicked motives or of misconduct are not privileged: Bee Pub. Co. v. Shields (Neb.), 94 N. W. 1029; Martin v. Paine, 69 Minn. 482, 72 N. W. 450. In Evening Post Co. v. Richardson, 113 Ky. 641, 68 S. W. 665, it was held where the charge of corruption of plaintiff as an election officer was sent to the defendant newspaper by a journalist of great experience, prudence and accuracy, and defendant in good faith believed the information to be true, that these facts furnish a basis for a qualified privilege. In Coffin v. Brown, 94 Md. 190, 89 Am. St. Rep. 422, 50 Atl. 567, 55 L. R. A. 732, a letter containing libelous charges against a supervisor of election appointed by the governor, written in good faith to the chairman of the opposite political party for the purpose of defeating the re-election of the governor, the publication was not privileged as being in execution of a political duty. And in Augusta Evening News v. Radford, 91 Ga. 494, 44 Am. St. Rep. 53, 17 S. E. 612, 20 L. R. A. 533, a willful, malicious and false publication, charging a public official with unbecoming and improper conduct merely to get fees, was held to constitute an unprivileged libel. Likewise in O'Rourke v. Lewiston etc. Pub. Co., 89 Me. 310, 36 Atl. 398, the court observed that newspapers are protected in giving public information as to the conduct of public officials if such information is true or is published honestly and with reasonable cause for believing it to be true. The plaintiff in that case had been charged with cruelty toward an insane pauper. Though the question of privilege does not seem to have urged, it was held in Wofford v. Meeks, 129 Ala. 349, 87 Am. St. Rep. 66, 30 South. 625, 55 L. R. A. 214, that it is libelous to impute to one holding an office that he has been guilty of improper conduct in office or has been actuated by wicked, corrupt or selfish motives. So, also, in Bourreseau v. Detroit etc. Co., 63 Mich. 425, 6 Am. St. Rep. 320, 30 N. W. 376, a publication charging plaintiff with having arrested and handcuffed men without right, and of oppressing the poor and friendless under color of his office of deputy sheriff, was held not privileged.

And in Wood v. Boyle, 177 Pa. St. 620, 55 Am. St. Rep. 747, 35 Atl. 853, a publication attacking a person in his private individual character was held not privileged by the fact that he occupies an official position and is engaged in public business.

2. Candidates for Political or Official Positions.-The general rules in regard to newspaper articles concerning candidates for office seem to be very much the same as those with respect to persons already

in office. It would seem that public officials being merely public servants ought to have their qualifications for the office which they seek discussed in the same manner as a person seeking private employment, with only this difference: that with respect to public employment, the public is entitled to know what is needful in regard to the candidate, whereas in private employment a private individual is entitled to that knowledge. In Wofford v. Meeks, 129 Ala. 349, 87 Am. St. Rep. 66, 30 South. 625, 55 L. R. A. 214, it was said that editors have full liberty to criticise the conduct and motives of public men and measures, but the discussion must be fair and legitimate and not asperse the character of public men or ascribe to them base and corrupt motives.

So, also, it is said when one becomes a candidate for public office he thereby deliberately places his conduct, character and utterances before the public for their discussion and consideration. They may be criticised according to the taste of the speaker or writer, and the law will protect him provided that his statements of or reference to the facts upon which their criticisms are based observe an honest regard for the truth: Belknap v. Ball, 83 Mich. 583, 21 Am. St. Rep. 622, 47 N. W. 674, 11 L. R. A. 72. See, also, monographic note to McAllister v. Detroit Free Press Co., 15 Am. St. Rep. 349, 354. The court in Upton v. Hume, 24 Or. 420, 41 Am. St. Rep. 863, 33 Pac. 810, 21 L. R. A. 493, observed: "The rule we gather from the authorities is that the fitness and qualifications of a candidate for an elective office may be a subject for the freest scrutiny and investigation, either by the proprietor of a newspaper or by a voter or other person having an interest in the matter, and that much latitude must be allowed in the publication, for the information of voters, of charges affecting the fitness of a candidate for the place he seeks, so long as it is done honestly and without malice. Nor will such publication be actionable without proof of express malice, although it may be harsh, unjust and unnecessarily severe, for there are matters of opinion of which the party making the publication has a right to judge for himself. In the case of such a publication the occasion rebuts the inference of malice which the law would otherwise raise from its falsity, and no right of action exists, even though the character of the party has suffered, unless he is able to show the existence of actual malice. But when the publication attacks the private character of a candi date, by falsely imputing to him a crime, it is not privileged by the occasion, either absolutely or qualifiedly, but is actionable per se, the law implying malice; and it is no justification that the publication was made with an honest belief in its truth, in good faith, and for the purpose of influencing voters. Such publications can be justified only by proof of their truth: Commonwealth v. Clapp, 4 Mass. 163, 3 Am. Dec. 212; Curtis v. Mussey, Gray, 261; Aldrich v. Press Printing Co., 9 Minn. 133, 86 Am. Dec. 84; Root v. King, 7 Cow. 613; King v. Root, 4 Wend. 113, 21 Am. Dec. 102; Hamilton v. Eno, 81 N. Y. 116; Commonwealth v. Wardwell, 136 Mass. 164; Barr v.

Moore, 87 Pa. St. 385, 30 Am. Rep. 367; Seeley v. Blair, Wright, 358. If it can be said that the cases of Bays v. Hunt, 60 Iowa, 251, 14 N. W. 785, Mott v. Dawson, 46 Iowa, 533, and State v. Balch, 31 Kan. 465, 2 Pac. 609, when read in the light of the facts, announce a contrary doctrine, they do not seem to us to be supported either by reason or the weight of authority. To permit a defendant who has published of a candidate false and defamatory statements concerning his private acts and character, on being pursued in the courts for 'this grievous wrong, to say in justification that he was actuated by no ill-will or malice toward the plaintiff, but his motives were pure and conduct actuated only by a desire for the public good, would abandon candidates to all of the fierce tempests of defamation which either personal spite or political interest may suggest. The only safe evidence of a man's intentions are his acts, and if he accuses another of crime, he must conclusively be presumed to have intended to injure him."

The same general conclusions were also stated in the very recent case of Star Pub. Co. v. Donahoe (Del.), 58 Atl. 513, wherein all of the principal authorities were exhaustively reviewed. In this connection, see, also, Smith v. Burrus, 106 Mo. 94, 27 Am. St. Rep. 329, 16 S. W. 881, 13 L. R. A. 59. In Boucher v. Clark, 14 S. Dak. 72, 84 N. W. 237, it was held that it was proper for a newspaper to give its readers, who are interested in the fitness of a candidate, such information as it may acquire in good faith, by the exercise of reasonable care, concerning the methods or means employed by the candidate to procure votes, although the publisher may be unable to establish the truth of what is published, provided that he can establish the fact that he acted without actual malice and for the sole purpose of enlightening the electors. And in Myers v. Longstaff, 14 S. Dak. 98, 84 N. W. 233, it was held that an attack on the character of a candidate falsely charging him with a crime not affecting his fitness for the office for which he was running was not privileged.

In Eikhoff v. Gilbert, 124 Mich. 353, 83 N. W. 110, 51 L. R. A. 451, a circular addressed to the voters requesting them to vote against a certain candidate for representative "because in the last legislature he championed measures opposed to the moral interests of the community" without stating the measures supported is not privileged, for it is a statement of a libelous fact and affords no opportunity to judge whether it is a proper deduction. The decision was, however, dissented from by two of the judges.

In Coffin v. Brown, 94 Md. 190, 89 Am. St. Rep. 422, 50 Atl. 567, 55 L. R. A. 732, a libelous statement in a letter to the chairman of a state central committee to the effect that the candidate for governor had appointed plaintiff to office, and charging that plaintiff was a man of no moral character and capable of committing any political crime which he might find profitable, was held not privileged as against plaintiff. And in Coogler v. Rhodes, 38 Fla. 240, 56 Am. St.

Rep. 170, 21 South. 109, it was held where a person is a candidate for appointment to public office at the hands of the governor, one who writes to the governor that it is a notorious fact that the candidate runs the only house of prostitution in the town, and that his mistress has been indicted in the courts, is qualifiedly privileged, though not true, if there was reasonable ground to believe it true and it was published in good faith without personal malice.

e. Statements Relative to Matters of Public Interest.

1. By Persons Individually or Collectively. The privilege of a citizen to comment on matters of public interest or relative to the doings of public officers is limited by the condition that he do so fairly and with honest purpose, and that the line be observed where defamation commences and true criticism ends: Schornberg v. Walker, 132 Cal. 224, 64 Pac. 290.

An investigation by a college board of trustees of public charges affecting the moral fitness and competency of its president is qualifiedly privileged, and a publication in pamphlet form of the proceedings, including a defamatory speech of the president in his own defense, is likewise so privileged if published for the purpose of laying the whole investigation before the public for their judgment: Gattis ▼. Kilgo, 128 N. C. 402, 38 S. E. 931.

2. By Newspapers or Periodicals.

A. Rights of Newspapers in General.-A newspaper is not privileged as such in the dissemination of news, but is liable for what it publishes in the same manner as any other individual: State v. Shepherd, 177 Mo. 205, 99 Am. St. Rep. 624, 76 S. W. 79; McAllister v. Detroit Free Press Co., 76 Mich. 338, 15 Am. St. Rep. 318, and note, 43 N. W. 431. In the very recent case of Morse v. Times-Republican Ptg. Co. (Iowa), 100 N. W. 867, the court said: ""Liberty of the press' has never been held to mean 'that the publisher of a newspaper shall be any less responsible than any other person would be for publishing otherwise the same libelous matter.' The contrary rule has been affirmed by the courts in this country and England with great uniformity: Jones v. Townsend, 21 Fla. 431, 58 Am. Rep. 676; Sheckell v. Jackson, 10 Cush. 25; Aldrich v. Printing Press Co., 9 Minn. (Gil. 123) 138, 86 Am. Dec. 84; Root v. King, 7 Cow. 628; Tillson v. Robbins, 68 Me. 295, 28 Am. Rep. 50; Smart v. Blanchard, 42 N. H. 137; Foster v. Scripps, 39 Mich. 376, 33 Am. Rep. 403; Barr v. Moore, 87 Pa. St. 385, 30 Am. Rep. 367; Eviston v. Cramer, 47 Wis. 659, 3 N. W. 392; Edwards v. San Jose etc. Soc., 99 Cal. 431, 37 Am. St. Rep. 70, 34 Pac. 128; McAllister v. Detroit Free Press Co., 76 Mich. 338, 15 Am. St. Rep. 318, 43 N. W. 431; Upton v. Hume, 24 Or. 420, 41 Am. St. Rep. 863, 33 Pac. 810, 21 L. R. A. 493; Smith v. Tribune Co., 4 Biss. 477, Fed. Cas. No. 13,118; Davis v. Sladden, 17 Or. 259, 21 Pac. 140; Barnes v. Campbell, 59 N. H. 128, 47 Am. Rep. 183; Davis v. Duncan, 7 El. & B. 231; Mallory v. Pioneer Press

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