on a ratification of the treaty ;—an instrument by no means hastily or incautiously framed and concluded by her minister, but to which that country was actually driven by a well grounded fear, that the United States would shortly enter the Floridas by force, justly irritated by an indemnity for spoliations and injuries, so long and so unreasonably withheld. The recent expedition of General Jackson into the territory may have been regarded as the first step in that important, alarming movement. It, also, afforded abundant evidence, that only a very slight resistance could be offered to an entire and rapid occupation of the whole province. The safety of the Floridas had become hopeless, but it was an object of great magnitude to delay the effects, both in Europe and in the Spanish provinces themselves, which an acknowledgment by the United States would infallibly pro

duce.

Spain did not play a profound, nor even a skilful game on this occasion. She is indebted to the apparent and temporary success of it entirely to the determined, pacific policy of the United States, to the friendly and becoming representations of some of the European powers, and to the injuries our commerce would suffer, not certainly from Spain, but from the depredations of privateers of all nations under the haughty flag of Castille and Arragon, converting the shores of the Mediterranean and the West India seas, into the dens and recesses of red rovers and buccaneers. In a memoir, published at Madrid by the minister, M. de Onis, concerning this negotiation, the refusal of the Spanish government is attributed to an apprehension, that England would take advantage of the cession of the Floridas, as a plea to occupy Cuba. There seems to be very little foundation for this assertion, for we possess in an authentic shape the assurances of that government, that her influence had been exerted to induce Spain to ratify, and several of her plenipotentiaries and ministers declared in a solemn manner, that no desire was entertained to disturb the present relations or condition of possessions in that quarter.

While General Vives was in this country, news was re

ceived of the revolution of the government of Spain, and soon after he communicated to the Secretary of State an official copy of the oath of the King to the Constitution, and of an address to his subjects. These events have been so frequent in Europe of late, that they have now lost all novelty, and, hardly, retain any interest. The business no farther affected the United States, than by suspending the functions of the Spanish minister; and this government having resolved to wait the issue of the events in Spain, matters remained in a tranquil, stationary condition, till October 1820, when the Cortes resolved, with few dissenting voices, to advise Ferdinand to ratify the treaty. This was done by the King on the 24th of the month, after an attempt, to obtain from Mr. Forsyth some modification in the 8th article respecting the grants, had failed. The ratifications of this important treaty were, at last, exchanged on the 22d February 1821, by General Vives and the Secretary of State, precisely two years after it was signed. A declaration was attached to it by Spain, setting forth that the grants to Alagon, Punon Rostro and Vargas remained annulled and cancelled.

John James Appleton was left by Mr. Forsyth in care of the affairs of the legation at Madrid. In the spring of 1823, Hugh Nelson of Virginia succeeded as envoy and minister to that embassy. This mission was principally occupied with the distressing, disgraceful subject of piracies in the West India seas, and the practice of granting commissions to privateers at Porto Cabello on the main and at the Spanish islands of Cuba and Porto Rico. The renewal of the war in Venezuela, and the burlesque blockade of twelve hundred miles of coast by a frigate, a brig and schooner, employed, at the same time, in transporting supplies and mili tary stores from Curacoa to Porto Cabello, were the pretences, equally an outrage on neutrality and humanity, under which a swarm of privateers, issued from the main and islands, committing numerous depredations on all neutral commerce, but more especially of this country and Great Britain. It is difficult to say, whether the lawful trade of the world has suffered most injury in those quarters from pro

fessed pirates, or acknowledged privateers. The latter subject led to an extremely angry correspondence between the Spanish minister and the Secretary of State in consequence of the capture of some of those freebooters, by public armed vessels of this country. This minister, the successor of General Vives, was Don Joaquin de Anduaga, who does not appear to have left a favourable impression behind him, especially on account of the harsh manner, in which he treated the business of pirates and privateers.

"In reflecting upon the conduct of this minister during his residence in the United States, it has been impossible to avoid the suspicion, that it has been instigated by a disposition, not more friendly to the existing liberal institutions of his own country, than to the harmonious intercourse, to which they were so well calculated to contribute between the United States and Spain.

"From the time of the reestablishment in Spain of a constitutional government, the sympathies of this country have been warm, earnest and unanimous in favour of her freedom and independence. The principles, which she asserts and maintains, are emphatically ours, and in the conflict, with which she is now threatened, for supporting them, a cordial good understanding with us was as obviously the dictate of her policy, as it was the leading principle of ours. This national sentiment has not been silent or unobserved. It was embodied and expressed in the most public and solemn manner in the message to congress at the commencement of their last session. The conduct of the government has been invariably conformable to it. The recognition of the South American governments, flowing from the same principle, which enlisted all our feelings in the cause of Spain, has been in its effects a mere formality. It has in no wise changed our actual relations either with them or with Spain. All the European powers, even those, which have hitherto most strenuously denied the recognition in form, have treated and will treat the South Americans as independent in fact. By his protest against the formal acknowledgment, Mr. Anduaga had fulfilled his duties to his own government, nor has any one circumstance arisen from that event, which could require of him to recur to it as a subject of difference between us and Spain again. We have not been disposed to complain of his protest, nor

even of his permanent residence at a distance from the seat of government. But the avidity with which he has seized upon every incident, which could cause unpleasant feelings between the two countries, the bitterness, with which his continual notes have endeavoured to exasperate and envenom the misrepresentations of others, which he has so precipitously assumed as undeniable facts, and the language in which he has vented his reproaches upon the fair honourable characters of our naval officers, upon the government and even the people of the union, are indications of a temper, which we can trace to no source, either of friendly feeling towards our country, or of patriotic devotion to his own. It has the aspect of a deliberate purpose to stir up and inflame dissensions between the United States and Spain: to produce and cherish every means of alienation and distrust between them, with ultimate views to the counteraction of these differences upon the internal administration and government of his own nation.

"It is hoped, that he will in no event be permitted to return hither, and in the full and just explanations, which you will now be enabled to give upon every complaint, exhibited by him, while here, the Spanish government will be satisfied with the justice, and convinced of the friendly disposition towards Spain, which have governed all our conduct."

During several years this government was under the necessity of maintaining a squadron of small vessels in the West India seas for the suppression of piracies. This was a vexatious service and, on account of the climate, extremely fatal. Every man of feeling could not but lament the sacrifice of so many valuable lives in a business, where little glory could be earned, though great dangers and difficulties were encountered. We have, however, a sincere gratification in adding, that by the intrepidity and perseverance of the navy, these banditti have finally been extirpated.

In 1822, 3 appropriations were made to enable the executive to send a sufficient force to these seas. Under this authority in February 1823 a squadron of seventeen vessels was despatched upon the service. This duty was effectually performed, and in December of the same year, the Secretary of the Navy stated in an official document, that "Pira

cy as a system had been suppressed in the neighbourhood of the Island of Cuba."-But in the succeeding years, the vessels having been driven from their cruising grounds by a fatal pestilence, or employed on other services, these atrocities and outrages were renewed with fresh and alarming desperation. Spain, appearing entirely incompetent to suppress the pirates, and afford along its own shores a sufficient protection to a lawful neutral commerce, the President recommended, in the beginning of the second session, eighteenth Congress, (1824, 5) the adoption of a more efficient and determined system. Besides an augmentation of small vessels, "the pursuit of the offenders to the settled, as well as unsettled part of the island, reprisals on the property of the inhabitants, and a blockade of the island, from which the pirates issued."—A bill embracing two of these provisions was reported in one of the Houses of Congress.

"That if any of the said pirates should escape from the fresh pursuit of the commanding officers and crews of any armed vessel of the United States, and find refuge in any of the cities or ports of the said island of Cuba, or other islands aforesaid, the President of the United States, on being informed of the fact in a manner satisfactory to him of its authenticity, shall be, and, he is hereby authorized, at his discretion to declare the said port or city to be in a state of blockade, and shall cause the same to be invested by the naval force of the United States, till the said pirates shall have been secured and punished by the authorities of the said island, or until satisfaction shall otherwise have been made; whereupon he shall deem it just and expedient to discontinue the said blockade."

We should not take notice of this section, but as another lamentable departure from the great policy of the country. A blockade is a war measure,- —a right of war, and conferred by the same principle of public law, that authorizes a nation to declare war;—an incident of that condition of things, it operates against neutrals,-perhaps your allies. If the French or English neutral refuses to take warning from our cruiser off Cuba, shall he be sunk, or if he is taken, by what courts shall he be tried? Shall his vessel be confiscated? and what language do we expect France or England to hold on the sub