the Trade Union, against the Trade Union, its trustees, and Lindsey, its secretary, for unlawfully and maliciously conspiring together to molest and injure him in his business by coercing his employers by threats and intimidations from employing him. The plaintiff as a member had complained to the branch authorities of sick pay having been improperly paid to another member. The branch referred the complaint to the Central Executive, who dismissed it and fined the plaintiff 5s. as the cost of the inquiry. The plaintiff refused to pay, and as the fine together with other arrears due from him made up an amount of debt which by the rules justified expulsion, the Executive expelled him. What followed was disputed. The evidence for the plaintiff was aimed at showing that Lindsey, the secretary, arranged with the Executiv to go to Lester, the manager of a shipbuilding yard, that he did go, and threatened Lester, and that Lester consequently abstained from employing the plaintiff. For the defendants it was admitted that Lindsey did interview Lester, but it was denied that he did so to coerce and all the rest of plaintiff's evidence was contradicted. The Judge summed up to the effect that if the case was that Lester thought it better not to have non-Union men assisting with men who belonged to the Union the defendants could not be held liable, but if the Jury thought there was an understanding between Lindsey and Lester that McElrea should be kept out, that would amount to coercing by threats and intimidation to prevent McElrea from getting employment. In order to find an act of coercion by Lindsey, the Jury must find that what was said to Lester had an effect upon his mind and coerced him to cease employing McElrea. The plaintiff could not succeed in his action of conspiracy unless the Jury found that the executive council or branch council had agreed with Lindsey that he should use his power on behalf of the Society to prevent McElrea from obtaining work. The case for the plaintiff was extremely slender, no evidence having been given of any resolution having been passed by the executive council, and no member of that body having come forward to speak to anything having been done with a view to prevent McElrea from obtaining employment. The Judge left the following questions to the Jury:—

(1) Did Lindsay and the Society conspire to molest or injure McElrea by coercing his employer by means of threats or intimidation to cease from employing him? (2) If so did McElrea suffer any damage? (3) If McElrea suffered damage, to what amount was he entitled ?

The Jury answered questions (1) and (2) in the affirmative and assessed the damages at £125. On appeal, the Court, consisting of the Master of the Rolls and Mathew and Cozens-Hardy, L.J.J. gave judgment for the defendants. The Master of the Rolls said that the alleged cause of action in the case was Conspiracy, which involved joint action on the part of two or more persons. In order that the plaintiff might maintain his count for Conspiracy, it was necessary for him to show that the Unions were parties to acts done on their behalf by the other defendant. In his opinion that part of the case broke down. There was no evidence implicating the Union itself as distinct from the individual members of it, in this matter, and the rules of the Union forbade the making of such implication. But the count for Conspiracy was also against an individual, viz., the Secretary, Mr. Lindsey. He thought that what the law called malice was an ingredient which must exist in this cause of action. The burden of proving the existence of it was on the plaintiff and in his opinion there was some evidence of malice in this case fit to be considered by the Jury, and so far as that was concerned the case was properly left to the Jury. But the plaintiff had to prove not only that Lindsey was actuated by malice, but also that he employed coercion with the result that the person coerced refused to continue the plaintiff in his employment. There were two conditions, first, the means, viz., coercion, and secondly the result, viz., the influence effected by the coercion producing loss of employment. Unfortunately for the plaintiff he was obliged to go into the enemy's camp to procure evidence He called as a witness Mr. I ester, the man who was alleged to have been coerced. He was the foreman in the yard where the plaintiff was employed, and it was clear that he was alive to the difficulties which arose when non-Union men were introduced among Union men. He said, in his evidence, that as the men n the yard were Society men, he was afraid friction might arise if non-society men were introduced. In his opinion the plaintiff failed to prove coercion, and the evidence called by him negatived the influence which coercion was to effect. The defendants therefore were entitled to judgment.

1905. Airey v. Weighill. Action against a Trade Union for conspiring to prevent employment. The plaintiff was a stonemason who was formerly a member of the Friendly Society of Operative Stone Masons. On becoming a foreman he ceased to be a member of that Society and became a member of a foremen's Union. In order to induce him to continue to be a member of the Operative Stone Masons' Society the operatives at an establishment in Sunderland where he was appointed foreman struck, they being at liberty to do so on giving an hour's notice. In consequence the plaintiff was discharged. He then brought his action, making as defendants (1) the trustees of the Central Operative Society; (2) the president and secretary of the Sunderland Branch; and (3) certain of the workmen who had struck, amongst whom was the president of the branch. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants who had struck had unlawfully, wrongfully, and maliciously procured or induced the employer not to continue to employ the plaintiff, and in the alternative that the same defendants had, with intent to injure the plaintiff, unlawfully, wrongfully, and maliciously together, and also with others conspired to procure and induce the employer not to continue to employ the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff had thereby suffered damage. The plaintiff claimed damages against the defendants, who were the trustees of the Central Society and the defendants who were president and secretary of the branch on behalf of themselves and all other members of the Society, and against the defendants who were president and secretary of the branch on their own behalf, and the defendants who had struck. He also claimed an injunction to restrain the Society or its agents from interfering with any persons with a view to causing them to break their contract with the plaintiff or to cease to employ him or to abstain from entering into contracts with him, and from otherwise molesting or interfering in any manner with the plaintiff following his calling. Evidence was given that on 21st March the lodge unanimously resolved that there should not be a strike, but that on the next day the men struck by the order of Rawson, the president of the lodge, and Armitage, the shop steward. The questions put to the Jury and their answers were :—

(1) Did Rawson and Armitage order the men to send in their notices to Mr.Shaftoe (the employer, to compel him to get rid of the plaintiff ?—A. Yes.

(2) Did they act as it is admitted they did act-to press the plaintiff to pay 2s. 6d. to their Society and to get him dismissed from his work if he did not join ?—A. Yes.

(3) Did they act in pursuance of orders from the lodge or with the approval of the lodge ?-A. Yes with the approval of the lodge, in view of the fact that from 15 to 17 members, in addition to the president, out of the 40 present at the meeting on March 21st acted in direct opposition to the unanimous vote of the lodge on that date.

The Jury added that the men did not act with a malicious intent to injure the plaintiff apart from forcing him to join the Society. The Jury found for the plaintiff and assessed the damages at £8. The defendant's Union then applied to the Court of Appeal for judgment in their favour or a new trial. The Master of the Rolls construed the third Answer of the Jury to mean that there had been no order of the lodge to strike, but that the strike had been with their approval, this reason of the Jury being that they

did not believe the evidence for the defendants that there had been a bona fide resolution of the lodge not to strike.

The Court of Appeal pronounced against the plaintiff. The fund out of which strike pay was paid was part of the funds of the Society, and the rules must of necessity safeguard the funds of the Society against unauthorised acts of the lodges. In the absence of an express rule the Court would not presume that a lodge had the right to draw upon the funds of the Society for the purpose of supporting strikes. The burden to show a rule conferring the right was on the plaintiff and he had not discharged this burden. Again, even if the lodge had the power it would have been necessary in order to make the Union funds responsible for the acts of the lodge for the plaintiff to show they had exercised it by a resolution of the lodge authorising the strike. This also the plaintiff had failed to do.

Accordingly, without entering into the question whether in any case the acts done would have been a cause of action the Court ordered judgment to be entered for the defendants.

1904. Cullen v. Elwin, and others. Application by plaintiff to obtain funds to which he claimed to be entitled under rules of Trade Union. The plaintiff, a member of the Nottingham Branch of the Amalgamated Society of Tailors and Tailoresses, which was a registered Trade Union, had been in receipt of a superannuation allowance. The rate under which the allowance had been granted was then altered without his consent and the Society refused to pay him any further. The applicant accordingly sued the Society. Held by the Court of Appeal in accordance with Rigby v. Connol and Swaine v. Wilson that the application was for a direct enforcement of one of the agreements mentioned in Section 4 of Trade Unions Act, 1871, and that, the main purposes of the Society being in restraint of Trade, the Court was preclude from giving any assistance..

1905. Ward, Lock & Co., Ltd. v. Operative Printers' Assistants' Society and another. Action against Trade Union for conspiring to induce breach of contract and to molest. The plaintiffs carried on a printing business in which they employed non-Unionists. Some of the employees joined the Union, and plaintiffs, knowing or supposing that they could only remain on the condition of receiving the standard rate of wages recognised by the Union, dismissed them. The secretary of the Society protested, and, according to the evidence for the plaintiffs, said he would, by offering higher wages, draw off any men who might be engaged in the place of those who had been discharged. The Union then picketed the works, and some of the fresh workmen who were taken on broke their contracts and left, or wasted time, or spoilt materials. The plaintiffs brought their action against the Trade Union and its secretary for conspiring to induce their workmen to break their contracts, and applied for an injunct on to restrain the defendants from picketing the premises for the purposes of preventing persons from working for the plaintiffs. Mr. Justice Darling left the following questions to the Jury :

(1) Did the defendants or either of them watch or beset or cause to be watched or beset the premises of the plaintiffs or the approaches thereto so as to cause a nuisance to the plaintiffs?

(2) Did they do so for the purpose of compelling the plaintiffs or any person or persons in their employ to abstain from doing or to do any act which they or he had a legal right to do or abstain from doing?

(3) Did the defendants or either of them cause or procure any of the persons following (A., B., C., etc.) to commit a breach of contract?

(4) Did the defendants or either of them so cause or procure men in the plaintiffs' employ to retard the plaintiffs' work or spoil or injure the plaintiffs' work or material?

(5) Did the defendants conspire and combine with the persons to procure the commission cf the unlawful act set out in the previous question?

The Jury answered all the questions in the affirmative and assessed the damages at £650.

NOTE BY MR. ARTHUR

ARTHUR COHEN, CONCURRED IN BY MR. SIDNEY WEBB, TO SIR GODFREY LUSHINGTON'S

REPORT.

I entirely agree with the account given by Sir Godfrey Lushington of the history of the law of conspiracy. In my opinion it is consistent with all the statements contained in the Majority Report, and indeed_goes very strongly to confirm the recommendations therein contained. It was the vagueness and uncertainty of the law of conspiracy which gave rise to the legislation of 1875, and the full account given by Sir Godfrey Lushington of the more recent dicta judgments and decisions show in a most striking manner that the law of criminal conspiracy is at the present moment even more vague and uncertain than it was in 1875.

It is to be observed that the Act of 1875 leaves the law as to sedition, offences against the Sovereign and the State, unlawful assemblies, riots and breaches of the peace wholly untouched, and further, that according to our recommendation any person who, with a view to coerce another, acts in such a manner as to cause reasonable apprehension in the mind of another person that violence which used against him, his wife or family, or that injury will be done to his property, will be guilty of a criminal offence, and that therefore persons who conspire to do such acts will be guilty of criminal conspiracy. If any further provisions be required to check the evils resulting from oppressive combinations, whether of agitators, workmen, capitalists, or employers, an adequate and proper remedy cannot, in my opinion, be found in recent data or decisions which leave it wholly undetermined what constitutes an oppressive combination or a reasonable justification; it can be obtained only by legislative provisions carefully framed for that purpose.

REPORT BY SIR WILLIAM T. LEWIS, BART.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR MAJESTY,

I have the misfortune to dissent from the Recommendations which my colleagues have made in the Majority Report, and I therefore ask leave to make the following Report:

1. Owing to the dissatisfaction on the part of the Trade Unions of workmen with the law as at present declared, we were appointed to inquire into the subject of Trade Disputes and Trade Combinations, and as to the law affecting them.

2. The Trade Unions of workmen unanimously refused to give evidence before us as to the causes of their dissatisfaction with the existing law.

The representatives of the employers on the other hand gave evidence which supported the law as at present declared, though in many instances they considered that the law as to "picketing " required strengthening for the better protection of the workmen and their families.

3. The Royal Commission to inquire into the working of the Master and Servant Act, 1867, and the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1871, found itself in a similarly unfortunate position. The Commission, however, took the evidence from the employers which was readily given, although the representatives of the employed, then as now, refused to come forward to state their grievances.

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The following extract from their Report issued in 1875 is instructive:— Considering that the discussion on the merits of the Master and Servant Act had been mainly brought about by the objections made against it by the representatives of the working men, and their complaints as to its operation, we deemed it highly desirable to have any facts brought to our attention on which such objections and complaints might be founded. We addressed ourselves to the secretary of the London Trade Union Congress Parliamentary Committee as representing the interests of the employed, as also to certain associations of employers of labour who had volunteered to give evidence of the working of the Act, inviting them to furnish us with evidence in relation to the Act, and to any complaints they were prepared to advance either to its principle or to its administration.

"In reply to such application, very full information as to the working of the Act and as to the necessity for it has been afforded to us by many of the employers to whom we addressed ourselves; but we regret to say that, in consequence of the decided opposition to the inquiry made by the representatives of the employed, with some few exceptions, we have been unable to obtain the same or similar information from the employed or their representatives. The secretary of the 'London Trade Union Congress Parliamentary Committee, which represents a very great number of the employed, in reply to the application addressed to him requesting him either himself to give, or to assist us to obtain, evidence of the working of the Act, declined to assist the Commission in its labours in any way, and only forwarded to us a copy of a resolution passed by that Committee to the same effect."

4. By the terms of our reference, our inquiry was not only into the law affecting trade disputes, etc., but also into the subject.

5. My colleagues, who all have the advantage of being lawyers, have dealt most ably with the law affecting trade disputes. Most of our witnesses, however, have dealt with the subject and conditions of trade disputes and only incidentally with the law affecting them, and this evidence has appealed very strongly to me, confirmed as it is by my own many years' personal experience of trade disputes.*

6. It is with deep regret that I find from the Majority Report and the Recommendations therein that the evidence of our witnesses has not been so conclusive to my colleagues who sign that Report as it appeared to me. I am

* This personal experience, I may say commenced with a practical engineering apprenticeship as a working apprentice, then as an assistant engineer for nine years, and then as manager of collieries and engineering works, and for about thirty years as a large employer of labour, in addition to being general manager of railways, docks, collieries, estates, and manufacturing works, and during twenty-five years of that time as Chairman of Associations which controlled the wages and arrangements of about 100,000 workmen, during which time I have personally had to deal with a large number of disputes, strikes and locks-out in various trades.