with another tradesman or merchant; can it be contended that the merchant or tradesman thus molested is entitled to recover compensation? Indeed, that the general principle contended for by the plaintiff's counsel in Allen v. Flood does not form part of the common law almost necessarily follows from the judgment in Lumley v. Gye, for if it did, it would (as was observed by Lord Davey and Lord Watson) have certainly been known to the very eminent judges by whom that case was decided. Yet no mention of it is to be found in any of their elaborate judgments, although it would evidently have afforded an easy solution of the important question which that case involved. No doubt a legal system may exist, or might be constructed, in which the law of tort was founded on the principle, that intentionally to cause damage to another person, is in the absence of reasonable cause, an actionable tort, it being left to the judge to decide whether there is or is not a reasonable cause. It is, however, impossible, since the decision in Allen v. Flood, to maintain that such a principle is recognised in our existing legal system; for it would be evidently inconsistent with the legal proposition which, to use Lord Lindley's words, was so fully and authoritatively established by that case; and which his Lordship stated in the following words : "An act otherwise lawful although harmful does not become actionable by being done from a bad motive and with intent to annoy or harm another." Nor is it less evident that to introduce such a fundamental principle would be in the highest degree unwise and inexpedient, inasmuch as it would make the whole law of torts vague and uncertain, until a great quantity of new judge-made law had determined in what cases there is and in what cases there is not reasonable cause or justification. The House of Lords recently decided that it has no power to over-rule one of its own decisions, but as there are numerous dicta throwing doubt on what was, unless I am mistaken, decided in Allen v. Flood, I think it should be expressly enacted, as is proposed in Sir C. Dilke's Bill that "A person shall not be liable for doing any act not in itself an actionable tort, only on the ground that it is an interference with another person's trade, business or employment." (c) Denaby & Cadeby Main Collieries Ltd., v. The Yorkshire Miners Association and others, (d) Lyons v. Wilkins (headnotes) 1896, 1. Ch. 811, and 1899, Ch. 225 |