When he was told that the affignats were at a difcount of eighty per cent. he ceafed to think upon the fubject; from the moment that they were eighty per cent. difcount, it was no longer of confequence to fpeculate upon them. All theories of mere arithmeticians on the fubject were from that inftant at an end; when a paper currency was at eighty per cent. difcount, it would be faid, upon the mere calculations of theory, to be tantamount to extinction. But when they looked to experience and practice, when they referred to the example of America, a reflecting statesman would hefitate before he pronounced upon the fubject, and before he prefumed to delude his country, by building on fuch an hypothefis. And accordingly, as if the inftance of America had not been fufficient to correct the fallacy of mere calculation on fuch a fubject, France had given another leffon on the point-France, that was reduced to fuch a state of weakness, as, from her deplorable fituation, to be held out as an eafy prey-France, who, in the month of June laft, was faid to be gafping in her last agonies, and when, on account of her deplorable fituation, it was faid to be impolitic for us to give her peace, France has, fince the date of her expiring agony, made the most brilliant campaign, he would venture to fay, that the hiftory of mankind almoft exhibited, in which her arms had every where been triumphant, and where, by the mere force of conqueft, fhe had reduced almost every one of our allies to fue for peace, and fecure their fafety by negociation.

Such was the iffue of their calculations upon her diftrefs! He was afraid, he faid, of fuch agonics; and furely no men of common fenfe, after fuch an iffue of this kind of reafoning, would again calculate upon fuccefs from the depreciation of their paper. But it was not their paper only which was adduced as a proof of their diftrefs; they were utterly deftitute of provifions it feemed, and as an argument for continuing the war, they were told that the French Government had been obliged to unload the fhips at Breft in order to fupply Paris with bread. This was faid to have been their condition; be it fo. What must be their feeling of the cause in which they had engaged, that, under fuch a preffure of fcarcity, could rouze them to fuch exertions? Thofe who held out last year this argument of their distress as a ground of hope, and who put into His Majefty's Speech the memorable expreffion, that the internal fituation of the enemy fhould make us indulge a hope that they were haftening to fuch a ftate of order and regular government, as might be capable of maintaining the accustomed relations of peace and amity with other powers, would now explain

upon what better grounds they held out the lefs precife and lefs intelligible hope of the prefent Specch, They then faid that the dif trees were likely to produce a return of a state of order and regular government, fo as to enable us to treat with them with confidence and fecurity. What do they fay now? It was moft material to attend to the words which they had put in His Majefly's mouth. "The diffraction and anarchy which have fo long prevailed in that. country have led to a crifis." When I heard thefe words, faid Mr. Fox, I took it for granted that we were to be told the exact nature of the crifis, and the good which our Minitters were about to extract from it. But mark the words: "have led to a crifis of which it is, as yet, impoffible to forefee the iffue." Here is a piece of information for the Parliament and people of Great Britain! It goes on, however:-" but which muft in all human probability produce”—Ay, now we come, I hope, to the defirable point— produce peace, I hope-no fuch thing! -"produce confequences highly important to the interefts of Europe!" Good God! Mr. Speaker, faid Mr. Fox, is this a proof of the improvement of our fituation fince last year! Does this hold out to the impoverished, oppreffed, and ftarving people of England a nearer profpect of the termination of this unfortunate war? Laft year their diftrefs was likely to produce fuch an order of things as would give us a fecure peace; and now all that we are to look for from the diftraction and anarchy that reign in France, are confequences that may be important to the interefts of Europe! What period of the eventful hiftory of this wonderful revolution has not been productive of confequences materially important to Europe? Of what change that has taken place might not the fame thing be faid? When the revolution, as it is called, of the 31st of May took place, might it not have been faid, that a crifis was approached that might have produced confequences important to the interefts of Europe? When Roberspierre's tyranny was extinguished, might not the fame thing have been faid? Upon the infurrections that have happened, from time to time, and particularly on the late infurrection, in fhort, on every great event that has arifen in France, the fame equivocal words might have been ufed by His Majefty's Minifters. What then were the people of England to understand from thefe words now? What profpect did they hold forth that His Majefty's Ministers were to feize on the first favourable moment in which they might negociate beneficially for peace? If they were to argue from their paft conduct, they furely could draw no favorable conclufion, nor any rational ground of hope from thefe unintelligible words. In December 1792, Mr. Fox faid, he had made a motion, to which he certainly could not, without a degree of cgotifm, recur, Lecaufe

he could not recur to it without pride and fatisfaction to himself; he afked whether a negociation might not have been entered upon at that moment with a greater probability of fecuring a beneficial peace to England than now. He had fometime in every feffion fince that period, renewed, in one way or another, the fame motion; and he defired to know whether our perverfe continuance in the proud denial of its being the proper moment to negociate, had bettered our condition; or, opened to us the profpect of a more honourable termination of the war? On the contrary, had we not from year to year entangled ourselves deeper, and rendered the practicability of peace upon fafe and honourable terms more hopeless? But there was one point of view in which our prefent fituation had been viewed by an honourable gentleman, very much connected with Minifters, and who, he hoped, fpoke on the prefent occafion authoritatively. The honourable gentleman (Mr. Jenkinson) had faid, that he was now willing to admit that all prospect of restoring the emigrants to their eftates, and the Bourbon family to the throne of France was hopeless; that it was a matter of prudence to calculate the value of an object, together with the chance of procuring it, and not to pursue any object, however defirable, beyond the rational hope of obtaining it. If the difafters of the war had produced this conviction in the minds of His Majesty's Ministers, he who thought that wifdom was the first of human acquifitions, and that prudence in the Governors of a state was not merely a most valuable, but a moft neceffary virtue, would be willing to allow that our fituation was improved. It was improved, because our Minifters were brought at length to a conviction of their error; because they had returned to their fenfes. But, good God, what a ferics of calamity and difafter was required to produce this restoration of their reafon? What a state of degradation must that House and the country be come to, that it should be held out as a matter of exultation, and as a proof of our fituation being improved, that Minifters had been at length corrected, not by the indignation and energy of the people, but by the confequences of their own imbecility and guilt. What a contrast did this exhibit between the prefent and the ancient ftate of England, when the power of control which belonged to the vigorous underftanding, and the manly fpirit of Englishmen was extinct, and the people were fupinely content to wait until obftinate fury fhould, by its natural courfe, correct itself. Oh, miferable England, to what a ftate are you fallen, when fuch is the wretched confolation in which you indulge! The expedition to Quiberon was one of the grand fources of producing this conviction in Minifters. He knew not by whom that expedition

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was planned; he knew not in whofe defperate bofom the idea of the horrid expedition was engendered, but it was a feene over which the heart of every manly Briton fhed tears of blood; and which had done more mischief to the British character, had funk it lower in the eyes of obfervant Europe, and would ftain it more in the eftimation of pofterity, than all the rest of the operations of this war, frantic, base, and inhuman as many of its projects had been. Good God, to think that fo many brave and honourable men, among whom there were gentlemen of the pureft feelings, and of the most honourable principles, fhould be led to maffacre in the way in which they were; that one of the moft gallant among them fhould be denied the flender confolation which he requested in his expiring moments of having his letter made public, was fuch an act of favage barbarity as would leave an eternal stain upon England, if Parliament and the people did not teftify their indignation by fixing a strong mark of cenfure upon its authors! Yet even this leffon, even the dreadful iffue of this abominable fcheme did not produce the effect upon the minds of His Majefty's Ministers which might have been expected; another expedition was framed, in which the emigrants were to be employed in a defcent upon the coaft of France. The fecond expedition was concerted, perhaps, with fomewhat lefs indiferetion, and fomewhat lefs barbarity, than the firft; but it seemed to have its origin in the fame principles, and to owe its birth to the fame parent. It was owing only to its utter failure that it had not been equally difaftrous; for, if the expedition to L'Ifle Dieu had been carried into effect in the fame manner as the firft, the unfortunate perfons must have been equally abandoned. And yet, though not attended with the fame fatal cffects as the first, the expedition had been attended with misfortune. Our fleet had been expofed to great rifque on a dangerous coaft; and even now we muft either land the ftores upon L'Isle Dieu, for the maintenance of the unhappy perfons ftill there, or abandon them to the certain, though lingering, death of famine, or to the more merciful doom of the guillotine. It was impossible to animadvert upon the conduct of Minifters in thefe expeditions without being aftonished at the infanity with which they were planned. It muft now be a matter of fecret congratulation to themselves that every one of their projects had failed, their fuccefs would have made it impoffible for them to have maintained the argument which they had held that day. What did they do? They fent an officer to fummon Belle Ifle in the name of Louis XVIII. the rightful King of France, and thus they made their officer declare a falfehood, a direct falfehood, as great a falfehood as if he were traitor enough to

declare that Cardinal York was the rightful King of Great Britain. But what must have been the confequence if, upon this fummons, Belle Ifle or Noirmoutier had yielded? We must have landed and taken poffeffion of them in the name of Louis XVIII. and the unfortunate Prince, juft landed in the place under our aufpices, would have been identified with our caufe, and we should have been pledged to the restoration of this legal monarch in his rights. Could we then have had the bleffing which was this day held up, of abandoning a course, which could no longer be purfued with rational hopes? We should then have been reduced to the melancholy alternative of abandoning the Prince and his followers with infamy, or of profecuting his caufe under the most desperate circumstances. Fortunately for Minifters, however, their project had failed, and they were thus relieved by the want of fuccefs from the folly of their act. It was by this fort of reafoning alone that he could refolve the strange paradox of the feconder of the motion, who had faid that the very failure of the war had produced good confequences. If it were applied to our expeditions to the coast of France, it perhaps might hold. true, as the confequence was a conviction in the breafts of Minifters that it was impracticable to purfue the restoration of Louis any more. He faid that it was with pain that he took up the time of the Houfe, with any obfervations upon this kind of reafoning. He was confident that the natural plain fenfe and understandings of Englifhmen, who had always been diftinguished for their love of direct and plain dealing, would foon be difgufted, and reject with indignation and naufea a caufe that required fuch refinement of reasoning to fupport it. An honourable gentleman had faid, that the opinions of the French were certainly fpecious in themselves, and calculated to intoxicate the minds of the lower ranks of men; but that, in their own nature, they would fooner or later generate fuch a tyranny as that which Roberfpierre exhibited, which again, in its own nature, would correct the impreffion which the fpecious opinions had originally made. The war then, with all its difafters, had been fo far ufeful, that it had accelerated the conviction which Roberspierre's, tvranny would of itself have more flowly produced. The war was a fort of yeast that fermented this tyranny; and thus, in this idle train of reasoning, was the Houfe prefented with another theory in excufe of the war. If men were to play with fuch theories as matter of amusement, he should certainly not contend about them. He should then be extremely willing to leave them as a very good theme for fchool-boys, as the honourable feconder of the motion had faid, but it was a dreadful thing when fuch theories were taken up by