below Loudon was thought to be troublesome. General Grant appeared at first to believe that it was desirable to evacuate the position at Knoxville and concentrate General Burnside's forces at Kingston in order that close communication might be made with our troops at Chattanooga. General Burnside was naturally unwilling to relinquish his hold upon the enemy's line of communication through Tennessee, and to abandon the people whom he had delivered to the renewed severities of the enemy's rule. He therefore preferred Knoxville to Kingston as the point of concentration. He also thought that General Grant would be materially aided by the withdrawal of General Longstreet from the main army of the enemy. If this detached force could be occupied in the neighborhood of Knoxville, General Grant would be able to inflict a very severe injury upon the enemy in his front. Knoxville moreover was partially fortified. General Burnside's chief engineer, Captain O. M. Poe, had inaugurated a system of defences at Knoxville as early as the 15th of September. Two earthworks had been erected near the town, and it was thought that these could be strengthened sufficiently to resist an attack and possibly to endure a siege. The communications with Cumberland Gap were secure, by which a retreat might be made in case of disaster. General Burnside laid these considerations before General Grant with the hope of his approval.

It happened that Mr. Chas. A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War was visiting the West at the time to consult with the military authorities upon the character of the situation. He was then at General Grant's headquarters. In company with Colonel Wilson of General Grant's staff Mr. Dana visited Knoxville. The two gentlemen arrived on the 13th, and had an interview with General Burnside at which the questions involved in his operations were fully discussed. After hearing the reasons which General Burnside adduced to support his plans, they immediately telegraphed them in detail to General Grant. The information thus conveyed served to allay what

ever anxiety existed in the mind of the commander of our armies in that quarter.

Meanwhile the enemy was making certain movements which confirmed the opinions that General Burnside had formed, and eventually proved them to be the best that could be followed in the existing circumstances. During the progress of the consultation at Knoxville, intelligence was received from the front which hastened the departure of Mr. Dana and Colonel Wilson. On Saturday morning, November 14th, General Longstreet with twenty thousand men threw his advance across the Tennessee river at Hough's Ferry, six miles below Loudon. By this manœuvre our position on the heights was turned. General Sanders had been previously relieved from the command at this point and was now operating with his cavalry on the south side of the Holston. Brigadier General Julius White with one division of the twenty-third corps was now holding the position, supported by General Potter with the Ninth Corps at Lenoir's. General White, upon learning the enemy's movement, sent the 23d Michigan infantry and a section of artillery to observe the enemy and if possible dispute his crossing. These troops were soon ordered back, and General White withdrew his command to Lenoir's. Intelligence of these movements broke up the council. General Burnside's guests immediately departed. The General himself went to the front, and on hearing the details which General White had to communicate decided to take charge of the movement of his troops in person. Entrusting General Parke with the command of Knoxville, he speedily arranged his plans for holding the enemy in check, until our troops could deliver battle successfully or securely withdraw. The first point was to harass the crossing at Hough's Ferry or, if that had been effected, to attack the advancing party. He ordered General White, supported by General Ferrero's division of the Ninth Corps, to assume the offensive. The odds were greatly against us. But General White, with the spirit of a true soldier, was ready and even eager for the combat. At

four o'clock in the afternoon Colonel Chapin's brigade came in contact with the enemy's van-guard which had crossed the river. These troops were comparatively raw, but they charged upon Longstreet's veterans with the greatest gallantry, and supported by their comrades of the twenty-third corps they fairly forced the enemy's lines, and, pressing vigorously upon him, drove him for two miles back to the river. The night came on thick, rainy and very dark, and put an end to the engagement. The fight reflected great honor upon General White and his officers and men. The enemy had been checked in his advance. General Burnside contemplated another attack on the following morning, but the receipt of a despatch from General Grant was decisive in regard to the withdrawal of the troops. This despatch was received late at night. The officers of General Burnside's staff were gathered at his headquarters and the contents of the despatch naturally became a subject of conversation. "I shall withdraw my command to Knoxville," said General Burnside. "Why so?" said one of the young gentlemen, "you can easily beat the enemy as he is at present situated and drive him across the river. If we start we are lost. He will bring his entire force against us and we shall be defeated and ruined." "That may be true," replied the General; "but it will benefit General Grant if we can draw Longstreet away from his front more than it will injure If General Grant can destroy Bragg it is of no great consequence what becomes of ourselves. Order the troops to be ready to march in the morning."

us.

At daylight the next morning, therefore, General Burnside retired his troops to Lenoir's,-Colonel Morrison's brigade of General Ferrero's division bringing up the rear-drawing off his artillery and trains in safety, with the exception of a single caisson, which became mired and had to be abandoned. The command was put in position at Lenoir's without molestation. Later in the afternoon, the enemy's skirmishers appeared in force, and were promptly scattered by a few welldirected shells from Captain Henshaw's battery of the twenty

third corps. During the night of the 15th, preparations were made for falling back to Campbell's station. The horses of the artillery had become so wearied and worn out, that the draft animals from the baggage train of General White's division were required to drag the guns, and a few wagons with their contents were destroyed.

Between ten o'clock and midnight, the enemy attacked our lines, but was quickly repulsed. Foiled in this, he attempted by a flank march, to anticipate our movements, and to seize the junction of the roads at Campbell's station. It was an admirable place for either attack or defence. Were the enemy able to occupy the coveted point, General Burnside's line of retreat would be cut and his army would be in extreme peril. He fully understood the importance of the movement, and prepared to meet and baffle the designs of the enemy. He knew that the possession of Campbell's station by General Longstreet would render the holding of Knoxville uncertain. But he also knew, that if the enemy could here be held in check, time would be gained for ensuring the safety of the army and the occupancy and fortification of the town.

The battle of Campbell's station was in reality the decisive battle of the campaign, and it was fought on both sides with great skill, courage and persistence. Its method, its progress and its result were all highly creditable to General Burnside and his officers and men. The disparity of forces was great. We had but six thousand; the enemy twice or three times that number. The preliminary movement was of course the occupation of the cross-roads. The main road to Knoxville runs nearly parallel with the Holston river and the railroad, in a north-easterly direction. From the west the approach is by the Kingston road striking the Knoxville road at an angle of about thirty degrees. From the North a narrow country road comes down from Clinton crossing the main road and continuing to the river. From the south-east another road comes up from the river. Campbell's station was thus the point of junction of roads leading from six different directions. Its

importance can easily be understood. General Longstreet hoped to gain the desired point by throwing a body of troops along the Kingston road. General Burnside was on the alert. Just before daylight on the 16th, General Potter put the Ninth Corps in motion-Colonel Hartranft's division in advance, Colonel Humphrey's brigade in the rear. With rapid marching, Colonel Hartranft, always prompt and always reliable, succeeded in the early part of the forenoon, in reaching Campbell's station. He was but a quarter of an hour in advance of the foe. It was an exciting race and our troops won. Colonel Hartranft's command was immediately moved out on the Kingston road and deployed across it, with the left thrown forward to cover the Loudon road, along which our army and trains were moving.

It was just in time. Scarcely had the disposition been made, when the head of the rebel column appeared hastening up the Kingston road. A small body of cavalry that were with Colonel Hartranft, immediately attacked and forced the head of the column back. Our infantry also poured in such a sharp and destructive fire, as to check the enemy's advance and throw his leading regiment into some confusion. General Longstreet had not succeeded in his first movement, and though his flanking column made several attempts to break the lines of the covering brigade, and his pursuing column to press our rear guard under Colonel Humphreys, they met in both instances with nothing but repeated failure. Colonel Hartranft steadfastly held his ground until the remainder of the army and all the trains had safely passed the threatened point. Lieutenant Colonel Loring of General Burnside's staff was sent to select a position for the formation of the troops. The trains were directed upon the road to Knoxville. General Burnside rapidly arranged his line of battle upon the chosen position, a low of hills about half a mile beyond the crosss-roads, slowly withdrawing his troops, regiment by regiment, from the advanced position near the village. The first line was found en echelon-General Ferrero's division on the right, General

range