the former found an enemy always ready to give, the latter found an enemy ready only to receive, battle. In war, success is the chief test of power. General Grant's magnificent success is a complete justification of the wisdom of his plans.

What if the Ninth Corps had been sent to North Carolina, and the grand interior line of communication broken between Richmond and the extreme South? A movement against Wilmington, Goldsboro' or Raleigh certainly seemed promising, and when it was finally made, proved most effectual. What if General Burnside had been sent to City Point, and the movement against Petersburg entrusted to him? It is not the design of this work to discuss probabilities. But, judging from the opinion which General Burnside had long before formed respecting the importance of a movement upon Petersburg, it is certain that he would have bent all his energies to achieve a complete success. But there is another question. What if the Ninth Corps had not reënforced the Army of the Potomac at the battle of the Wilderness? The result of the first day's fighting there was anything but promising. What the result of the second day would have been without the presence of the Ninth Corps, of course it is impossible to say. But that the reënforcement was most opportune, that it strengthened the disordered lines of General Grant, that it aided materially in checking the enemy, and gave General Grant confidence in his ability to cope successfully with his resolute antagonist, there can be no question. Whatever disappointment may have been felt by General Burnside or any of his officers, in the relinquishment of a coastwise expedition, was entirely lost in the satisfaction of knowing that the Ninth Corps was affording the Lieutenant General a very great assistance in carrying his plans to a triumphant conclusion.

CHAPTER IV.

IN FRONT OF PETERSBURG.

HE movement to the south side of the James, and the

to the front of Petersburg, has been universally considered as a master piece of military skill. Petersburg was in reality the citadel of Richmond, and would carry with it in its fall the fate of the Rebel Capital. It is curious to observe the series of disappointments to which General Grant was subjected in his operations against this important point. In the first place, General Butler failed to make any impression upon the line of communication between Richmond and Petersburg. Again, while General Grant was holding all the enemy's available force around Richmond, he ordered General Butler to send out a force against Petersburg. General Gillmore was despatched, on the 10th of June, to attack the city from the east, and General Kautz, with a division of cavalry, to make a detour and attack from the south. The works were held only by the local militia and a few troops of Wise's Legion. General Kautz was brilliantly successful, actually entering the city. General Gillmore was ingloriously unsuccessful. He marched up to a point where he could see the spires of the city, observed the defences, turned about and retired to Bermuda Hundred. General Kautz, deprived of his coöperating force, was obliged to loosen his grasp upon the prize, and also retired. Once more, as a preliminary to the movement of the army to the south of Richmond, the eighteenth corps was directed particularly against Petersburg. General Smith's command was put on transports at the White House and arrived at Bermuda

Hundred at midnight on the 14th. General Grant, who was then at that point, immediately ordered him forward to Petersburg. General Lee was still watching the movements of General Meade's army, and the defences of Petersburg were almost without a garrison.

"General Smith," says General Grant in his report, "got off as directed, and confronted the enemy's pickets near Petersburg before daylight next morning, but for some reason that I have never been able to satisfactorily understand, did not get ready to assault his main lines until near sundown. Then, with a part of his command only, he made the assault, and carried the line northeast of Petersburg from the Appomattox river for a distance of over two and a half miles, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery and three hundred prisoners. This was about seven P. M. Between the line thus captured and Petersburg there were no other works, and there was no evidence that the enemy had reënforced Petersburg with a single brigade from any source. The night was clear, the moon shining brightly, and favorable to further operations. General Hancock, with two divisions of the second corps, reached General Smith just after dark, and offered the services of these troops as he (Smith) might wish, waiving rank to the named commander, who he naturally supposed knew best the position of affairs and what to do with the troops. But instead of taking these troops and pushing at once into Petersburg, he requested General Hancock to relieve a part of his line in the captured works, which was done before midnight." On the 16th, General Lee threw in reënforcements, and the golden moment passed. In this movement, a division of colored troops, under Brigadier General Hinks, seem to have won the brightest laurels. They first attacked and carried the enemy's outpost at Bailey's Farm, capturing one piece of artillery in the most gallant manner. On their arrival before Petersburg, they lay in front of the works for nearly five hours, waiting for the word of command. They then, in company with the white troops, and showing equal

bravery, rushed and carried the enemy's line of works, with what glorious success has already been related.

While these operations had been going forward, General Sheridan had proceeded with his cavalry as far to the rear as Gordonsville, having considerable fighting, and destroying the railroads running north from Richmond. With Washington secure and the eighteenth corps well on its way towards Petersburg, General Grant directed General Meade to move his army across the James.

The movement commenced on the night of the 12th. It was skilfully performed. The withdrawal of the troops was made almost without the knowledge of the enemy. Certainly General Lee did not know until he heard the intelligence of General Smith's attack upon Petersburg, to what point the Army of the Potomac was moving. He supposed, up to the last moment, that General Grant, intended attacking Richmond by way of the river roads. General Warren, with his corps assisted in producing this impression by halting on the road through White Oak Swamp, and making a feint upon Richmond from that direction. The march of the army was thus completely covered from the enemy's observation.

The Ninth Corps was withdrawn with great secrecy. Even the retirement of the pickets was wholly unknown to the enemy, who continued for at least an hour after the departure of the Corps to fire artillery upon one of our vacant earthworks. The Corps moved out to Tunstall's Station, where it arrived about daylight on the 13th. The roads were filled with the trains of the army, which by some mistake, had got in the way of the marching columns. Considerable delay ensued, which the men improved by taking a little rest along the roadside. As soon as the way was cleared, the Corps was again put in motion, and, marching by way of Baltimore cross roads and Olive Church, gained a point about three-fourths of a mile from Sloane's Crossing of the Chickahominy about nightfall. The sixth corps was then crossing the river by a ponton bridge and the Ninth went into bivouac for the night. At an early hour

the next morning, the Ninth Corps crossed the Chickahominy and marched on the 14th by way of Varden's, Clopton's, and Tyler's Mills, reaching the James river that evening and taking position on the right of the sixth corps. This position was fortified and the Corps remained there during the 15th. On the evening of the 15th, it crossed the James on a ponton bridge above Fort Powhattan, and immediately pushed on to Petersburg to participate in the operations of Generals Smith and Hancock. The sixth corps had been immediately in advance of the Ninth, but was now diverted to assist in an ineffectual movement upon the enemy's communications between Richmond and Petersburg. The second corps had been carried across by transports and ferry boats at Wilcox's Landing, landed at Windmill Point, and was now in front of Petersburg. The fifth corps followed the Ninth, and was also put en route for Petersburg. In the march of the Ninth a body of engineers under Major Morton of the staff led the van, General Willcox's division headed the main column and General Potter's brought up the rear. The entire movement was made by the whole army without casualty or molestation from the enemy. Atten o'clock on the morning of the 16th, the advance division had arrived at our lines before Petersburg awaiting orders for an assault. An hour or two afterwards the remainder of the command had come up, and at one o'clock in the afternoon, the entire Corps was placed in position upon the extreme left of the line.

The original design of General Meade was to attack the enemy at four o'clock in the afternoon. But some delay occurred and the assault was not made till six o'clock. The attack was delivered by General Barlow's division of General Hancock's corps. General Griffin's brigade, reporting to General Barlow, participated in this movement. The attack was not, however, attended with important results. General Griffin succeeded in securing a few rifle pits, and amid heavy skirmishing, the night came down upon the combatants. General Grant, not satisfied with previous operations, determined to