different authorities as to the manner of charging compound interest is based upon the common belief which questions the propriety and justice of interest upon unpaid interest. It is often contended by moralists that there is a distinction between principal money and interest money; the former fruitful, the latter, barren; the one is a proper foundation of a contract, the other not; the profit of one is legal, while that of the other illegal and unrighteous to the debtor class who, through misfortune or calamity, may be unable to satisfy their debt at maturity. But to the lawyer it does not mean that the taking of compound interest is never justified; it simply means that it must be charged according to law. Although courts of both England and the United States have always been quoted from the earliest times to the allowance of compound interest on the ground of public policy, yet this rule has always been subjected to certain limitations and exceptions. (Young ». Hill, 67 N. Y. 162.)

For the sake of convenience, compound interest may be divided into compound interest by agreement and compound interest by judgment. Again, compound interest by agreement may be subdivided into those agreed upon contemporaneously with the execution of the loan and those agreed upon at the time of the maturity of the loan contract or subsequent thereto. As to the first, that is, agreement to pay compound interest at the time of the execution of the contract, it has been held by a great majority of cases to be usurious and unenforceable being done in bad faith, oppressive and actuated by corrupt motives.

On the other hand, it seems to be universally admitted that after interest becomes due, the parties may make a valid agreement whereby, in consideration of the lender's forbearance to compel payment, the borrower may bind himself to pay interest thereon; the debtor should no more retain the interest due, without paying interest upon it, then he should retain the principal without compensation for it. Not only that, the debtor is at least, morally obliged to make good his default by paying interest on interest due because the creditor is entitled to receive it, inasmuch as he is entitled to receive the capital.

An agreement to pay interest, either simple or compound, may be implied or express; implied are those originating from usuage or from an established course of dealing between the parties. (Young v. Hill, 67 N. Y. 162.)

It is likewise undisputed that it is perfectly competent for the creditor to recover interest from the date of the judicial demand, for interest on interest is allowed only after judicial demand, although the obligation is silent about it. (Salvador v. Palencia, 25 Phil. 661.) Again, it has been held that in the absence of an express agreement between the parties, judgment will not be rendered for interest upon interest, save in those cases under Article 1109 of the Civil Code which permits the recovery of compound interest from the date of judicial demand. (Sunico v. Ramirez, 14 Phil. 501.) Our Supreme Court in interpreting Sec. 510 of Act 190, relating to interest on judgments, enunciated the doctrine that it does not apply to a case where the obligation sued on bears interest; in such a case, a judgment which provides for

interest from the date of the maturity of the obligation until payment is proper. (Pepperel v. Taylor, 5 Phil. 536.) The American doctrine regarding this point is practically the same as the above, for it is to the effect that compound interest is not recoverable unless there has been settlement between the parties, or a judgment, whereby the aggregate amount of principal, or whenever there is a special agreement to do so, in such form as to be valid. (Conn. r. Jackson, 1 Johns Ch. (N.Y.) 13.)

The acceptance of a simple interest upon a debt, will constitute a waiver of a claim for compound interest thereon. (Henry r. Flagg, 13 Metc. Mass. 64.) (To be continue:1)

PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL

Published monthly, August to April inclusive, during the academic year, by the alumni and students of the College of Law, University of the Philippines

FACULTY ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Jorge Bocobo, Dean of the College of Law.

Quintin Paredes, Professorial Lecturer on Criminal Law.

Enrique Altavas, Lecturer on Land Registration and Mortgages.

AUGUST, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTEEN

NOTE AND COMMENT

FILIPINO ATTORNEYS MAY PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR CHINA

(By D. de L.)

The Rules Governing Admission of Attorneys to practice in the United States Court for China, as revised to March 1, 1918, contain provisions which will enable Filipino practicing lawyers as well as prospective Filipino lawyers to be admitted to practice in American Courts in China. As regards Filipinos, their admission may either be upon credentials or upon examination. The pertinent rules are here reprinted for the interest of those who may some day think of practicing law in the United States Court for China.

RULE 1. UPON CREDENTIALS.-Any person who has been regularly admitted to practice in the Federal Supreme Court or the highest Court of any American State, Territory or possession, and who produces a certificate of such admission together with satisfactory testimonials of good moral character and of professional standing, may be admitted to practice in American Courts in China upon such credentials; but the Judge of the United States Court for China may in his discretion direct or conduct a further test.

RULE 2. UPON EXAMINATION.-Any citizen of, or person owing allegiance to, the United States, twenty-one years of age, and of good moral character, who shall have pursued the study of law for at least two years in a law school, or under the direction of an attorney, of approved standing, may be admitted to practice in said Courts upon examination showing him to be qualified in character, knowledge and ability to pursue the profession of law.

RULE 4. APPLICATION.- Regular admission to practice shall be granted only upon written application, filed with the Clerk of the United States Court for China, in which the applicant shall state under oath his name, age, citizenship, and residence, place where and dates between which he studied law; and which shall be accompanied by testimonials of character and by a filing fee of $10, U. S. currency. If the application shall be for admission as an attorney originally admitted in another court, it shall also state the name of such court, the date of admission thereto and where and between what dates the applicant practiced law. If the application shall be for original admission to practise it shall state in what law school or with what attorney the applicant studied law and what law books he has read.

RULE 6. OATH AND ENROLLMENT.—*

RULE 7. CERTIFICATE.—Upon payment of an additional fee of $5 U. S. currency, the said Clerk shall issue a certificate of such admission; but no such fee shall be required of one who presents a certificate of his admission from some other Court.

RULE 8. EFFECT.—Admission to practise in the United States Court for China shall entitle the applicant to practise in all American Consular Courts in China; but nothing herein shall prevent a party from appearing in his own behalf in any of said courts nor from being represented by a duly authorized agent in said Consular Courts.

RECENT CASES

(Decided by the United States Supreme Court.)

(Reported by D. de L.)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES; RESTRICTIONS ON SHEEP GRAZING.-—Privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States are not denied by the provisions of Idaho Rev. Codes, 1908, Sec. 6872, prohibiting the grazing of sheep on the Federal public domain upon a range previously occupied by cattle. (Per Brandeis, J., in Omaechevarria ». State of Idaho, decided March 18, 1918, and reported in U. S. Adv. Ops., April 15, 1918, p. 378.)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; INDEFINITENESS OF CRIMINAL STATUTE.-There is no such indefiniteness in the provisions of Idaho Rev. Codes, 1908, Sec. 6872, making criminal the grazing of sheep on the Federal public domain on ranges previously occupied by cattle or usually occupied by cattle raisers, as to render such statute repugnant to the constitutional guaranty of due process of law, although it fails to provide for the ascertainment of the boundaries of a range or for determining what length of time is necessary to constitute a

prior occupation a usual one within the meaning of the statute-especially since it is provided by Sec. 6314, that in any crime or public offense there must exist a union or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence. (Id.)

UNITED STATES; IMMUNITY FROM SUIT; SUIT AGAINST OFFICER. -A suit to enjoin the First Assistant Postmaster General from annulling, in order to inaugurate the experimental combined screened wagon and city collection and delivery service contemplated by the Act of March 9, 1914, (38 Stat. at L. 300, Chap. 33), a contract between plaintiff and the Postmaster General, acting for the United States, to furnish automobiles for the collection and delivery of mail in the City of Washington, and from interfering between plaintiff and the United States in the proper performance and execution of the contract by the plaintiff, is essentially and substantially a suit against the United States, and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia courts. (Per Pitney, J., in Wells v. Roper, decided March 18, 1918, and reported in U. S. Adv. Ops., April 15, 1918, p. 382.)

SHIPPING; CHARTERER AS BAILEE; SUING SHIPOWNER FOR LOSS OF CARGO.-The charterer of a vessel, holding itself out to the public as a common carrier, soliciting and receiving merchandise for transportation, contracting by acceptance of such merchandise to be answerable for the transportation, chartering the vessels to carry what it receive, employing stevedores to put it aboard, fixing and receiving the freight, signing or having the bills of lading signed in its office, and determining the vessel on which the cargo should go as against the cargo owners or shipowners, did not disappear from its contract to carry the goods when the bills of lading were signed, but would have been answerable for a loss to the owners of the goods, or to the insurers when they became subrogated to the owners' rights, if they had elected to sue it, and such liability over entitles it to sue the shipowner in its own name for a loss of the cargo through the unseaworthiness of the vessel. (Per Holmes, J., in Pendleton v. Line, decided March 25, 1918, and reported in U. S. Adv. Ops., April 15, 1918, p. 397.)

SHIPPING; LIMITING LIABILITY; PERSONAL CONTRACT; SEAWORTHINESS.-A part owner of a vessel who signed his firm's name to a charter party containing an express warranty of seaworthiness is personally bound thereby, and, when sued for the loss of the cargo, occasioned by the unseaworthiness of the vessel, cannot-however blameless he may have been-claim the benefit of the Act of June 26, 1884, (23 Stat. at L. 57, Chap. 121, Comp. Stat., 1916, Sec. 8082), Sec. 18, limiting the individual liability of a shipowner for any or all debts or liabilities, except wages and liabilities incurred prior to such enactment, to his share in the vessel, and the aggregate liabilities of all the owners of the vessels on account of the same to the value of the vessel and pending freight. (Id.)

CONFLICT OF LAWS; INSURANCE; POLICY LOAN AGREEMENT.— A policy loan agreement between a citizen of Missouri and a New York life insurance company, signed in Missouri and forwarded, together with the policy (a Msouri