; on

invader's plan because of the peculiar conditions of the case-namely, the proximity of London to so large a portion of our coast, and its undefended condition. These are the circumstances which, taken along with the immense augmentation of the fleets and armies of other powers, and the duties other than home defence which must be performed by our own, render the military problem at once so difficult and so pressing. In foreign states it is only necessary to perceive that certain measures of defence are necessary to render it certain that they will be taken. Invasion is a possibility which presents itself to the mind of every citizen. When a man can remember to have heard his grandmother describe what took place when the foreign troops marched in, it needs little to persuade him of the necessity of keeping them out next time. In England we are haunted by no such recollections. We look on the Continent with its great armies ready to move as a spectator looks on a game of chess in which he has a placid interest but no stake. If great armies exist, eager for war, that is no concern of ours. 'Let the galled jade wince, our withers are unwrung.' This easy confidence has no substantial foundation. It rests on fanciful bases the notion that we still retain that supremacy as a naval power which existed some generations ago; that for long centuries nobody has invaded us and nobody ever will; that people who talk of invasion are alarmists'; that we spend a great deal of money on our army and navy, and therefore it is incredible that they should not be sufficient for their purpose. The reason why a question so momentous can be disposed of in this slipshod fashion is that our people have not been accustomed, as continental peoples are, to look directly at it. As small objects in the foreground conceal the large features of the distance, so the wine and coal duties, the conversion of the Three per Cents., nay the exposure of the unveracity of prominent politicians, the antics of light-headed seekers for notoriety, the howls of some truculent treason-monger at being subjected to a discipline all too light for his offences, and a succession of similar incidents which will be forgotten in a week, fix the attention of the public; while for the comparatively far-off event, on our security from which every social and political calculation must be based, we can only spare a passing glance. Until the last year or two the question of rendering the country safe has never excited any general interest; happily the people are now awakening to a sense of its importance, and it seems more than probable that measures of defence, if the need of them could be made clearly evident, would have a better chance now than ever before of being approved by those who will supply the means for their accomplishment.

A year ago the present writer pointed out in the House of Commons what the principal deficiencies were, gave an estimate of the sum necessary to place this island in a condition to defend itself,

whether from attacks on our ports or from invasion, and suggested that a sum should be raised by loan sufficient to render us secure, and that the work should be begun at once and pushed forward with all possible expedition as something which ought to be viewed as admitting of no delay. This year the Secretary for War has proposed to raise and set apart a sum for completing a portion of our defences. It is far short of what is wanted, or what the country may be expected to give; but that the Ministry should recognise the necessity of setting about the business in a special and earnest way, is a circumstance so full of hope that it ought to be accepted in a cheerful spirit. Now among the many pressing matters which still remain as a task for the future is the defence of London. dealing with this subject it is necessary to distinguish between London as a port and London as a capital.

In

First, considered as a port. London is classed by the War Office as a military port because of the arsenals and dockyard involved in the defence of the Thames, and for the defence of the river provision is now to be made. But it evidently belongs to a different class from the purely military ports, Plymouth and Portsmouth, which derive their importance, not from their trade or wealth, but from their harbours and dockyards. London, in whatever class it may be convenient to place it, remains in the first rank among the commercial ports of the kingdom. Therefore when we read in the Secretary for War's memorandum that, in undertaking any works at these (the commercial ports) beyond the submarine defences, the Government is entitled to expect the co-operation of the localities which are to be so largely benefited by the protection of their trade,' London must be included among these localities with the very first and foremost. It will be expedient, then, to consider what kind of co-operation may be expected from it as a commercial port.

The War Office will undertake, in the case of the commercial ports, to supply not only the submarine mines and the light artillery which must in most cases be associated with them, but also the large guns required to keep cruisers at a distance, and the works in which to place the guns. On the other hand it may be expected that the ports will provide the sites for the works.

But, besides the War Office, the Admiralty must also bear an important part in the defence of these ports. The War Office undertakes the stationary defences; but floating defences are also considered indispensable and these must be determined by the Admiralty, and it is held that these should consist of gun-boats and torpedo boats, which, supported by the batteries on shore, will issue from the ports to meet the enemy's cruisers. In order to prepare for the successful action of these it will be necessary to maintain in each port a force of naval volunteers and also a permanent staff of trained men and officers who will instruct these volunteers, and supply the necessary

element of experience and authority when the time may come for manning these vessels, and employing them against an enemy. It will probably be expected that the ports will contribute as their share of the naval defence both the naval volunteers and the sum necessary to maintain the permanent staff. Neither of these bodies will be numerous-the crew of a gun-boat or torpedo boat may be calculated with the necessary reliefs as fifty men, and the permanent staff would only amount to seven or eight officers and men.

All this is, however, independent of the other pressing question, namely, the defence of London by land against the enterprises of an enemy's army. A point which is generally agreed on is this: that the troops for this duty should be a special and separate body, not subject to be summoned elsewhere on any emergency. And, although it would be no part of its purpose to recruit or reinforce the field army, it would be of essential service to that army by liberating it from the necessity of always interposing to defend the capital. Plans have formerly been set forth for defending London by surrounding it with permanent works, and if it were of reasonable dimensions this plan might be the best. But a consideration of the extent of the radius from the centre to the open country, and the consequent enormous sweep of the circumference, will show that the works. would be so numerous as to require a vast force for their garrisons and an enormous sum for the purchase of sites and for their construction.

In view of these circumstances the present writer set forth a certain plan in this Review in March 1885, and in other ways since. It was offered, not as the best plan imaginable, but as one attainable with such means as were likely to be afforded. It was based on these suppositions: (1) That the only force practically obtainable for the purpose would be Volunteers; (2) That the defence of London should be assigned to troops resident in and near it, specially designated and trained for that purpose, and independent of the field army or of the needs of other localities; (3) That instead of permanent works, an entourage of positions should be defined, and the mode of intrenching and occupying each of them studied by competent officers in all its particulars, and taught, and practised so far as can be done without actual execution on the ground, to the troops assigned for its defence.

In the case of the Volunteer Infantry, the idea at the base of the plan was this. It is in vain to expect from them, with their limited opportunities of instruction, the proficiency as a manoeuvring force which regular troops attain to. Yet if they are to be of use, they must be capable of opposing the regular troops of the invader. This end is to be sought by restricting their instruction (after the elementary training, which should be the simplest possible) to a knowledge of how to prepare, occupy, and defend given portions

of actual ground. In this way not only all parts of the force, but to a great extent its individual members, would become familiar with their places in the line of battle, with the work they would be called on to perform in fortifying it, and with the mode in which they would be expected to defend it; and as the defence is a much. simpler operation, and one which demands much less training and practice, than the attack (to say nothing of the power of manoeuvring on the battle-field) all this ought to be within the capacity of the Volunteer Infantry, besides that essential accomplishment, efficiency in the use of the rifle.

The Volunteer Artillery would have an advantage of another kind, that of being armed with a weapon of much greater power than that which could accompany the landing and advance of an invader. In order to become efficient in its duties, it must be trained to work its own guns of position, and to place and use them in the works assigned to them in the line of battle. These guns should be drawn by teams of strong horses, levied by requisition, according to an organised system of registration, and driven by their own carters. And it would obviously be expedient that on fixed occasions the batteries should be thus horsed for practice, and exercised along with the infantry, so far as practicable, in their destined positions.

The Engineer Volunteers would be instructed in their own localities in the business of preparing the position defined in all its details, intrenchments, batteries, field-works, farms, villages, woods, buildings of all kinds; and must qualify themselves to plan and direct the construction of the works, and the necessary demolitions.

In this way, when invasion was expected, these Guards of London, assembled in convenient camps, would at once proceed to create, in the shortest possible time, on all sides where attack might be anticipated, intrenched positions, strengthened with field works and garnished with powerful artillery; which, when occupied by good riflemen, trained specially in the business of defending those partiticular positions, must needs be very formidable to the assailant. The riflemen would at once take up the places assigned to them, as the shooting line, the feeding line, the local reserves, and the general reserves; the gunners would know the exact distance of every point on the field of battle. In this way the disadvantage of brief time for training would to a great extent be obviated, the natural intelligence of the troops turned to account, and the confidence inspired which the feeling that they knew their business must impart.

In the before-mentioned plan it was estimated that it might be put in practice with 60,000 riflemen, 3,000 artillerymen, and 1,400 engineers directing workmen enrolled for the occasion.

It would become obviously a question, seeing the development to

which machine guns have attained, how far these should be added to the armament of the Volunteer force, for the purpose of meeting the attacks of the invader's infantry.

Now it is not pretended that the plan thus set forth is the best possible. But it has now been before the public for a considerable time it was subjected when first made public to prolonged discussions by officers of all departments of the service-and it is the lowest estimate in point of force which, I believe, has been given. Let us see, then, how far its requirements could be met by the means at our disposal.

The London corps of Volunteer Riflemen available for the purpose muster, in round numbers, 30,000; of Militia 5,000, of Artillery 3,300, of Engineers 1,400.

First, then, as to how to make good the deficiency of riflemen. In all schemes for employing the Volunteers the fact must be allowed for that a great number of them are engaged in carrying on the daily business of the country. It is assumed therefore that, at the utmost, only one half of any corps could be employed at once for any length of time, to be relieved at due interval by the other half. On this ground it is computed that, after providing for garrisons and the defence of their own localities, there would still be from 50,000 to 60,000 Volunteers available for general purposes, taken from districts, such as the Midlands, not exposed to attack, and from others, like Scotland, where the Volunteers are more numerous than is needed. But to employ these in the defence of London would entail two disadvantages: first, that the army in the field and the garrisons would have no available reserve of Volunteers; secondly, that the principle of training men to occupy particular ground must be sacrificed. Thus the first line of the Volunteer force would be left without reinforcements, and the men would be used in a way that would deprive them, in an indefinite degree, of their value.

The Volunteer Artillery of the capital number between 3,000 and 4,000. A large part of these would be absorbed in the defence of the Thames-a perfectly legitimate duty of course for metropolitan troops-and it is at present uncertain what addition should be made for the defence of London. It would seem, therefore, that to put the above scheme, or any one grounded on similar bases, in execution, at least 25,000 riflemen, and a certain number of artillerymen, must be added to the Volunteers or Militia of London. It is assumed that, at a crisis, not half but the whole of these defenders of the capital would be forthcoming; if not, the number must be increased accordingly.

In the matter of artillery, not only the defenders of London, but also our army in the field (which will be by no means too strong for its purpose) should have the aid of guns of position. It goes without saying that to meet an emergency we must use what is at hand, and