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CHAP. II.

OF CIVIL RIGHTS.

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HITHERTO
ITHERTO we have spoken only, and that
but in part, of the natural rights of man. We
have now to confider the civil rights of man, and
to fhew how the one originates out of the other.

Man did not enter into fociety to become worfe than he was before; nor to have lefs rights than he had before, but to have thofe rights afcertained, and better fecured. His natural rights are, the foundation of all his civil rights. But in order to pursue this diftin&tion with more precifion, it will be neceffary to mark the different qualities of natural and civil rights; a few words will explain this.

Natural rights are thofe which appertain to man in right of his exftience. Of this kind are all the intellectual rights, or rights of the mind; and also, all those rights of acting, as an individual, for his own comfort and happiness, which are not injurious to the natural rights of others.

Civil rights are those which appertain to man, in right of his being a member of fociety. Every civil right has, for its foundation, fome natural right pre-exifting in the individual, but to which his individual power is not, in all cafes, fufficiently competent.

competent. Of this kind are all those which relate to fecurity and protection.

From this short view, it will be easy to diftinguish between that clafs of natural rights which man retains after entering into fociety, and thofe which he throws into common stock as a member of fociety. The natural rights which he retains are, all thofe in which the power to execute is as perfect, in the individual, as the right itself. Among this clafs, as is before mentioned, are, all the intellectual rights, or rights of the mind. Confequently, religion is one of thofe rights.

The natural rights which are not retained, are, all thofe in which, though the right is perfect in the individual, the power to execute them is defective. They answer not his purpose. A man, by natural right, has a right to judge in his own caufe; and fo far as the right of the mind is concerned, he never surrenders it—but what availeth it him to judge, if he has not power to redrefs? He therefore depofits this right in the common stock of fọciety, and takes the arm of fociety, of which he is a part, in preference, and in addition, to his own. Society grants him nothing. Every man is a proprietor in fociety, and draws on the capital as a matter of right,

From these premises, two or three certain conclufions will follow :

Firft, That every civil right grows out of a na

tural

tural right, or, in other words, is a natnral right exchanged.

Secondly, That civil power, properly confidered as fuch, is made up of the aggregate of that class of the natural rights of man, which becomes defective in the individual, in point of power, and anfwers not his purpose; but when collected to a focus, becomes competent to the purposes of every

one.

And, Thirdly, That the power produced from the aggregate of natural rights-imperfect in power in the individual-cannot be applied to invade the natural rights which are retained in the individual, and in which the power to execute is as perfect as the Right itself.

We have now, in a few words, traced man from a natural individual to a member of fociety, and fhewn the quality of the natural rights retained, and of those which are exchanged for civil rights. Let us now apply those principles to govern

ments.

In cafting our eyes over the world, it is extremely easy to distinguish the governments which have arifen out of fociety, or out of the focial compact, from those which have not; and, to place this in a clearer light than what a fingle glance may afford, it will be proper to take a review of the feveral fources from which governments have

arifen, and on which they have been founded :They may be comprehended under three heads. First, Superftition.

Secondly, Power.

And, Thirdly, The common intereft of fociety, and the common rights of man.

The firft, was a government of Priest-craft-the fecond, of Conquerors-and the third, of Reason., When a fet of artful men pretended, through the medium of oracles, to hold intercourfe with the Deity, the world was completely under the government of superstition: the oracles were confulted, and whatever they were made to fay, became the law and this fort of government lasted as long as fuperftition lafted.

:

After thefe, a race of conquerors arofe, whofe governments were founded in power, and the fword affumed the name of a fceptre. Governments, thus eftablished, laft as long as the power to fupport them lafts; and, that they might avail themfelves of every engine in their favour, they united fraud to force, and fet up an idol, which they called divine right, and which, in imitation of the Pope, who affects to be fpiritual and temporal, and, in contradiction to the founder of the chriftian religion, twisted itself into an fhape, called Church and State.

idol of another

The key of Saint

Peter, and the key of the Treafury, became quar

tered

tered on one another; and the wondering cheated multitude worshipped the invention.

We have now to review the governments which arife out of society, in contra-distinction to those which arofe out of fuperftition or conquest.

It has been thought a confiderable advance to wards establishing the principles of freedom, to fay, that government is a compact between thofe who govern, and thofe who are governed; but this cannot be true, because it is putting the effect before the caufe; for, as man must have existed before governments exifted, there neceffarily was a time when governments did not exist, and, confequently, there could not exift, originally, any governors to form fuch a compact with. The fact, therefore, must be, that the individuals themselves, each in their own perfonal and fovereign right, entered into a compact with each other, to produce a government :—and this is the only mode in which governments have a right to arife, and the only principle on which they have a right to exist.

To poffefs ourselves of a clear idea of what government is, or ought to be, we muft trace it to its origin. In doing this, we fhall eafily discover, that governments have arifen out of the people, or over the people.

But it will be firft neceffary to define what is meant by a conftitution: it is not fufficient that we

adopt

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