The President has no more power than the other members of the Council, though he exercises a general supervision, so far as he can, over the work of the other departments. His position is comparable to that of chairman of a board of directors. In addition to the work of his particular department, he also has some formal duties to perform: thus he receives foreign ambassadors; has precedence at public functions, etc.

In their relation to the Legislature, the members of the Federal Council are not bound by party ties ; nor are they always in political agreement among themselves. It is, in fact, the rule that the Council should represent the predominant shades of political opinion. Thus each Minister drafts the Bills belonging to his department, which, though they are introduced with the formal approval of the whole Council, may be opposed in the Federal Assembly by some other member of the Council. If a Bill thus introduced by a member of the Federal Council is defeated in the Legislature, there is no obligation on the Councillor to resign his post. Similarly, if the Federal Council as a whole is opposed by the Legislature it gives way with a good grace. Thus a serious conflict between the Legislature and the Executive is quite out of the question. "It is, in fact, a general maxim of public life in Switzerland that an official gives his advice, but, like a lawyer or an architect, he does not feel obliged to throw up his position because his advice is not followed."

"The Council "-says Mr. Lowell ["Governments and Parties in Continental Europe," vol. II., p. 203]—“reflects the past rather than the existing party colouring of the Assembly. This result is due to the fact that the Council is virtually a permanent body, for, whilst it is chosen afresh every three years, the old members are always re-elected; and, indeed since 1848, only two members who were willing to serve have failed of re-election, one of whom lost his seat in 1854 and the other in 1872, at times when party spirit still ran high. The permanence of tenure becomes astonishing when we consider that from 1848 to June, 1893, there had been only thirty-one Federal Councillors in all, of whom seven were still in office. The average period of service has therefore been over ten years; and in fact fifteen members have held the position for more than that length of time, four of them having served over twenty years, and one over thirty years." The members of the Council, having once been elected by the Federal Assembly, cannot be removed until the expiration of their three years' term. Nor, conversely, has the Federal Council any power to dissolve the Federal Assembly.

As to the means by which the Federal Council makes its power felt, a distinction must be drawn between its control over foreign affairs and over internal administration. "With respect to foreign affairs" says Adams ["The Swiss Confederation," p. 61]-" the Federal Council possesses a real power, being independent of the Cantons. It watches over the interests of the Confederation abroad, and is entrusted generally with all that concerns foreign relations.

"With respect to internal affairs, it watches over the due observance of the provisions of the Constitution and of Federal laws and resolutions and provides for the execution of the decisions of the Federal Assembly, of the judgments of the Federal Tribunal, and of diverse matters where disputes arise between Cantons. It has to examine whether the articles of the various Cantonal Constitutions are in harmony or not with the principles laid down in the Federal Constitution, and it reports upon them to the Federal Assembly; it has also to examine laws passed by the Cantons, in order to judge whether they are in accordance with the Federal Constitution and do not conflict with Federal laws. But herein lies an imperfection which, we are assured, is readily acknowledged by all sound Swiss statesmen. If a Cantonal Government chooses to adopt a measure which the Federal Council, when appealed to, considers to be unconstitutional, and if it declines to submit to that Council's order to cancel or revoke such measure, the latter has no direct way of enforcing its order." But, as Mr. Lowell observes,* "when trouble with a Canton arises from any cause . . . . . the Council withholds the subsidies due to the Canton, and sends troops into it, who accomplish their mission without bloodshed; for they do not pillage, burn or kill, but are peaceably quartered there at the expense of the Canton, and literally eat it into submission. This is certainly a novel way of enforcing obedience to the law, but with the frugal Swiss it is very effective."

To sum up, the distinctive features of the Swiss Federal Council are that it is not elected by the people direct, but by the Federal Assembly; that it cannot be dismissed by, and cannot itself dissolve, the Federal Assembly; that it does not work on the lines of party or responsible government as obtaining in Anglo-Saxon countries; and that its direct executive power is very small when compared with its extensive executive duties and responsibilities. Further, it has one remarkable peculiarity-the duty of deciding upon the question whether the Constitutions and Laws of the Cantons are consistent with the Constitution and Laws of the Union. In this respect it performs functions which, in the Unions of Anglo-Saxon States, are vested in the Federal Tribunal.

*"Governments and Parties in Cont. Eur.," Vol. II., p. 197.

2

[APPENDIX E.]

THE REFERENDUM IN SWITZERLAND.

The Swiss Referendum exists both as regards the Federal Government and as regards that of the several Cantons. In its application to the Federal Government it is in use both as to revisions of the Constitution and as to the passage of ordinary laws.

"A total revision of the Constitution may be brought about in three ways:

I. The National Council and the Council of States may agree to an amendment, as in the case of an ordinary Federal law. The Constitution as drawn up by the two Councils, must then be submitted to the popular vote, and if it is approved by a majority of the people and by a majority of the Cantons, it becomes law.

2. If one Chamber votes for a total revision and the other refuses its assent, the question is then submitted to the electors in each Canton: 'Do you wish the Constitution to be revised-Yes or No?' If the majority of electors vote 'Yes,' in support of a revision, the two Chambers are then dissolved and a new Federal Parliament is elected charged with the work of revising and drafting a new constitution. When this has been prepared, it is submitted to the popular vote, and if it is approved by a majority of the people and by a majority of the Cantons, it becomes law.

3. If 50,000 citizens sign a petition in favour of a total revision of the Constitution, it is the duty of the Executive to submit the question to the electors: 'Do you wish the Constitution to be revised-Yes or No?' If a majority of the electors decide in favour of revision, the Federal Legislature has to carry out the popular wish, and revise the Constitution for submission to the people. If on such submission it is approved by the required double majority, it becomes law.

"There are two methods by which a partial revision or a partial amendment of the Swiss Constitution may be brought about. An amendment may be proposed by the two Federal Chambers, as in the ordinary process of legislation. It must then be submitted to and accepted by a majority of the people and by a majority of the Cantons. A demand for the adoption of a new Article, or the alteration of an old one, may be made in writing by 50,000 Swiss citizens in the same way as a demand for a total revision. If the Federal Legislature agrees with the demand of the petitioners, it proceeds to formulate the required amendment and prepare it for submission to the people. If, on the other hand, it disagrees with the demand the question is submitted to the people: Are you in favour of a revision of the Constitution-Yes or No?' If a majority of the people decide in favour of a revision, it becomes the duty of the Federal Legislature, acting as a draft Committee,

to prepare the required amendment for submission to the people. It is then submitted to the popular vote and if it receives the support of the required statutory majority of people and of Cantons it becomes law. The final referendum is obligatory in every proposal to amend the Constitution. [Deploige: Referendum n Switzerland, pp. 128-131.]"*

In the case of ordinary laws passed by the Federal Legislature, a referendum can be demanded either by 30,000 citizens or be Eight Cantons, unless the Federal Assembly declares the law to be urgent. The Assembly has declared that a referendum cannot be demanded upon the annual budget, treaties, approval of a Cantonal Constitution, decision on a question involving a conflict of authority, subvention voted for the construction of roads or the diking of streams, etc. Laws to which the referendum is applicable do not take effect till ninety days after their passage through the Assembly, so as to give time for the necessary demand.

It will thus be seen that there are two forms of Referendum in Switzerland-the Obligatory form, in which a referendum is ordered by the Constitution in certain cases; and the Optional form, in which the referendum only takes place when demanded in the proper way. The Federal Constitution provides only for the Optional form in the case of the revision of laws passed by the Federal Legislature. The demand which is necessary in the case of the Optional form is known as the Initiative.

In some of the Cantons, however, the Obligatory form of Referendum is applied also to ordinary laws passed by the Cantonal Legislature As a matter of fact, about half the Cantons have the Optional and the other half the Obligatory form for expressing the popular decision on ordinary laws. All have the Obligatory form for revisions of their Constitutions. [Vide, on the whole subject, Deploige: Referendum in Switzerland; and Lowell: Govts and Parties in Continental Europe, Vol. II., Chap. XII.]

* Ann. Const. Aust. Const., p. 995.

† Lowell: Govts. and Parties in Cont. Eur., Vol. II., p. 253.