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of the government will be supplied in a peacea-cles of domestic property. Can you believe ble manner, without irritating the minds of the that ten mer, selected from all parts of the people. But requisitions cannot be rendered State, chosen because they know the situation efficient without a civil war -without great ex- of the people, will be unable to determine so as pense of money, and the blood of our citizens. to make the tax equal on, and convenient for, Are there any other means? Yes, that Con- the people at large ? Does any man believe gress shall apportion the respective quotas pre- that they would lay the tax without the aid viously, and if not complied with by the States, of other information besides their own knowthat then this dreaded power shall be exercised. ledge, when they know that the very object The operation of this has been described
by the for which they are elected is to lay the taxes in gentleman who opened the debate. He can a judicious and convenient manner? If they not be answered. *This great objection to that wish to retain the affections of the people at system remains unanswered. Is there no other large, will they not inform themselves of every argument which ought to have weight with us circumstance that can throw light on the subon this subject? Delay is a strong and pointed ject? Have they but one source of informaobjection to it.
tion? Besides their own experience—their We are told by the gentleman who spoke knowledge of what will suit their constituents last, that direct taxation is unnecessary, because --they will have the benefit of the knowledge we are not involved in war. This admits the and experience of the State legislature. They propriety of recurring to direct taxation if we will see in what manner the legislature of Vir. were engaged in war. It has not been proved ginia collects its taxes. Will they be unable that we have no dangers to apprehend on this to follow their example? The gentlemen who point. What will be the consequence of the shall be delegated to Congress will have every system proposed by the worthy gentleman? source of information that the legislatures of Suppose the States should refuse
the States can have, and can lay the taxes as The worthy gentleman who is so pointedly equally on the people, and with as little oppresopposed to the constitution, proposes remon- sion as they can. If, then, it be admitted that strances. Is it a time for Congress to remon- they can understand how to lay them equally strate or compel a compliance with requisitions, and conveniently, are we to admit that they when the whole wisdom of the Union, and the will not do it, but that in violation of every power of Congress are opposed to a foreign principle that ought to govern men, they will enemy? Another alternative is, that, if the lay them so as to oppress us? What benefit States shall appropriate certain funds for the will they have by it? Will it be promotive of use of Congress, Congress shall not lay direct their re-election? Will it be by wantonly imtaxes. Suppose the funds appropriated by the posing hardships and difficulties on the people States, for the use of Congress, should be inad- at large, that they will promote their own inequate; it will not be determined whether they terest, and secure their re-election? To me it be insufficient till after the time at which the appears incontrovertible that they will settle quota ought to have been paid; and then, after them in such a manner as to be easy for the so long a delay, the means of procuring money, people. Is the sys em so organized as to make which ought to have been employed in the first taxation dangerous? I shall not go to the instance, must be recurred to. May they not various checks of the government, but examine be amused by such ineffectual and temporizing whether the immediate representation of the alternatives from year to year, until America people be well constructed. I conceive its orsball be enslaved? The failure in one State ganization to be sufficiently satisfactory to the will authorize a failure in another. The calcu- warmest friend of freedom. No tax can be lation in some States that others will fail, will laid without the consent of the House of Reproduce general failures. This will, also, be presentatives. If there be no impropriety in attended with all the expenses which we are the mode of electing the representatives, can anxious to avoid. What are the advantages to any danger be apprehended ? They are elected induce us to embrace this system? If they by those who can elect representatives in the mean that requisitions should be complied with, State legislature. How can the votes of the it will be the same as if Congress had the power electors be influenced ? By nothing but the of direct taxation. The same amount will be character and conduct of the man they vote paid by the people.
for. What object can influence them when It is objected, that Congress will not know about choosing him? They have nothing to how to lay taxes, so as to be easy and conven- direct them in the choice but their own good. ient for the people at large. Let us pay strict Have you not as pointed and strong a security attention to this objection. If it appears to be as you can possibly have? It is a mode that totally without foundation, the necessity of seems an impossibility of being corrupted. If levying direct taxes will obviate what the gen- they are to be chosen for their wisdom, tleman says; nor will there be any color for virtue, integrity, what inducement have they refusing to grant the power.
to infringe on our freedom? We are told The objects of direct taxes are well under that they may abuse their power. Are there stood : they are but few; what are they? Lands, strong motives to prompt them to abuse slaves, stock of all kinds, and a few other arti- | it? Will not such abuse militate against
their own interest? Will not they and their will be sufficiently energetic and operative in a friends feel the effects of iniquitous measures? small territory, will be feeble when extended Does the representative remain in office for life? over a wide-extended country. The gentleman Does he transmit his title of representative to tells us there are no checks in this plan. What his son Is he secured from the burden im- has become of his enthusiastic eulogium on the posed on the community?
American spirit ? We should find a check and To procure their re-election, it will be neces- control, when oppressed from that source. In sary for them to confer with the people at large, this country, there is no exclusive personal and convince them, that the taxes laid are for stock of interest. The interest of the commutheir good. If I am able to judge on the sub- nity is blended and inseparably connected with ject, the power of taxation now before us is that of the individual. When he promotes his wisely conceded, and the representatives are own, he promotes that of the community. wisely elected.
When we consult the common good, we conThe honorable gentleman said that a govern- sult our own. When he desires such checks as ment should ever depend on the affections of these, he will find them abundantly here. the people. It must be so. It is the best sup- They are the best checks. What has become port it can have. This government merits the of his eulogium on the Virginia constitution? confidence of the people, and, I make no doubt, Do the checks in this plan appear less excellent will have it. Then he informed us again of the than those of the constitution of Virginia ? If disposition of Spain with respect to the Missis- the checks in the constitution be compared to sippi, and the conduct of the government with the checks in the Virginia constitution, he will regard to it. To the debility of the confedera- find the best security in the former. tion alone may justly be imputed every cause The temple of liberty was complete, said he, of complaint on this subject. Whenever gen- when the people of England said to their king, tlemen will bring forward their objections, Ithat he was their servant. What are we to trust we can prove that no danger to the navi- learn from this ? Shall we embrace such a gation of that river can arise from the adoption system as that? Is not liberty secure with us, of this constitution. I beg those gentlemen where the people hold all powers in their own that may be affected by it, to suspend their hands, and delegate them cautiously, for short judgment till they hear it discussed. Will, periods, to their servants, who are accountable says he, the adoption of this constitution pay for the smallest mal-administration ? Where is our debts? It will compel the States to pay the nation that can boast greater security than their quotas. Without this, Virginia will be we do? We want only a system like the paper unable to pay. Unless all the States pay, she before you, to strengthen and perpetuate this cannot. Though the States will not coin money, security. (as we are told,) yet this government will bring The honorable gentleman has asked if there forth and proportion all the strength of the be any safety or freedom, when we give away Union. That economy and industry are essen- the sword and the purse. Shall the people at tial to our happiness, will be denied by no man. large hold the sword and the purse without the But the present government will not add to our interposition of their representatives? Can the industry. It takes away the incitements to in- whole aggregate community act personally? dustry, by rendering property insecure and un- I apprehend that every gentleman will see the protected. It is the paper on your table that impossibility of this. Must they, then, not trust will promote and encourage industry. New them to others? To whom are they to trust Hampshire and Rhode Island have rejected it, them, but to their representatives, who are ache tells us. New Hampshire, if my informa- countable for their conduct? He represents tion be right, will certainly adopt it. The secrecy as unnecessary, and produces the British report spread in this country, of which I have government as a proof of its inutility. Is there heard, is, that the representatives of that State no secrecy there? When deliberating on the having, on meeting, found they were instructed propriety of declaring war, or on military arto vote against it, returned to their constituents rangements, do they deliberate in the open without determining the question, to convince fields ? No, sir. The British government afthem of their being mistaken, and of the pro- fords secrecy when necessary, and so ought priety of adopting it.
every government. In this plan, secrecy is The extent of the country is urged as another only used when it would be fatal and pernicious objection, as being too great for a republican to publish the schemes of government. We government. This objection has been handed are threatened with the loss of our liberties by from author to author, and has been certainly the possible abuse of power, notwithstanding misunderstood and misapplied. To what does the maxim, that those who give may take away. it owe its source? To observations and criti. It is the people that give power, and can take cisms on governments, where representation it back. What shall restrain them? They are did not exist. As to the legislative power, was the masters who give it, and of whom their it ever supposed inadequate to any extent? servants hold it. Extent of country may render it difficult to He then argues against the system, because it execute the laws, but not to legislate. Extent does not resemble the British government in of country does not extend the power. What I this—that the same power that declares war has
not the means of carrying it on. Are the people reasons which applied against them, could not of England more secure, if the Commons have be urged against it. Do they not hold out one no voice in declaring war? or are we less secure lesson very useful to us? However unlike in by having the Senate joined with the President? other respects they resemble it in its total ineffiIt is an absurdity, says the worthy member, cacy. They warn us to shun their calamities, that the same man should obey two masters, and place in our government those necessary that the same collector should gather taxes for powers, the want of which destroyed them. I the general government and the State legislature. hope we shall avail ourselves of their misAre they not both the servants of the people? fortunes, without experiencing them. There Are not Congress and the State legislature the was something. peculiar in one observation he agents of the people, and are they not to con- made. He said that those who governed the sult the good of the people? May not this be cantons of Switzerland were purchased by effected by giving the same officer the collection foreign powers, which was the cause of their of both taxes? He tells you that it is an ab- uneasiness and trouble. How does this apply surdity to adopt before you amend. Is the to us? If we adopt such a government as object of your adoption to amend solely? The theirs, will it not be subject to the same inconobjects of your adoption are union, safety venience? Will not the same cause produce the against foreign enemies, and protection against same effect? What shall protect us from it? faction-against what has been the destruction What is our security? of all republics. These impel you to its adop He then proceeded to say, the causes of war tion. If you adopt it, what shall restrain you are removed from us; that we are separated by from amending it, if, in trying it, amendments the sea from the powers of Europe, and need shall be found necessary? The government is not be alarmed. Sir, the sea makes them neighnot supported by force, but depending on our free bors to us. Though an immense ocean divides will. When experience shall show us any in- us, we may speedily see them with us. conveniences, we can then correct it. But What dangers may we not apprehend to our until we have experience on the subject, amend-commerce! Does not our naval weakness inments as well as the constitution itself, are to vite an attack on our commerce? May not the try. Let us try it, and keep our hands free to Algerines seize our vessels? Cannot they and change it when necessary. "If it be necessary every other predatory or maritime nation, pilto change government, let us change that gov- lage our ships and destroy our commerce, ernment which has been found to be defective. without subjecting themselves to any inThe difficulty we find in amending the confed-convenience ? He would, he said, give the eration will not be found in amending this con general government all necessary powers. If stitution. Any amendments, in the system any thing be necessary, it must be so to call before you, will not go to a radical change; a forth the strength of the Union when we may plain way is pointed out for the purpose. All be attacked, or when the general purposes of will be interested to change it, and therefore America require it. The worthy gentleman all exert themselves in getting the change. then proceeded to show that our present exiThere is such a diversity of sentiment in human gencies are greater than they will ever be again. minds, that it is impossible we shall ever concur Who can penetrate into futurity? How can in one system till we try it. The power given any man pretend to say that our future exito the general government over the time, place, gencies will be less than our present? The and manner of election, is also strongly objected exigencies of nations have been generally comto. When we come to that clause, we can mensurate to their resources. It would be the prove it is highly necessary, and not dangerous. utmost impolicy to trust to a mere possibility
The worthy member has concluded his ob- of not being attacked, or obliged to exert the servations by many eulogiums on the British strength of the community. He then spoke of constitution. It matters not to us whether it a selection of particular objects by Congress, be a wise one or not. I think that, for America which he says must necessarily be oppressive; at least, the government on your table is very that Congress, for instance, might select taxes, much superior to it. I ask you if your House and that all but landholders would escape. of Representatives would be better than it is, Cannot Congress regulate the taxes so as to be if a hundredth part of the people were to elect equal on all parts of the community? Where a majority of them. If your Senators were is the absurdity of having thirteen revenues ? for life, would they be more agreeable to Will they clash with, or injure, each other? If you? If your President were not accountable not, why cannot Congress make thirteen disto you for his conduct--if it were a constitu- tinct laws, and impose the taxes on the general tional maxim, that he could do no wrong, objects of taxation in each State, so as that all would you be safer than you are now? If you persons of the society shall pay equally, as they can answer, Yes, to these questions, then adopt ought? the British constitution. If not, then, good as He then told you that your continental govthat government may be, this is better. The ernment will call forth the virtue and talents worthy gentleman who was last up, said the of America. This being the case, will they confederacies of ancient and modern times encroach on the power of the State governwere not similar to ours, and that consequently I ments? Will our most virtuous and able citi
zens wantonly attempt to destroy the liberty of that we are as secure there as any where else. the people? Will the most virtuous act the What mischief results from some causes being most wickedly? I differ in opinion from the tried there? Is there not the utmost reason to worthy gentleman. I think the virtue and conclude, that judges wisely appointed, and intalents of the members of the general govern- dependent in their office, will never countement will tend to the security, instead of the nance any unfair trial? What are the subjects destruction, of our liberty. I think that the of its jurisdiction? Let us examine them with power of direct taxation is essential to the ex an expectation that causes will be as candidly istence of the general government, and that it tried there, as elsewhere, and then determine. is safe to grant it. If this power be not neces. The objection which was made by the honorsary, and as safe from abuse as any delegated able member who was first up yesterday, Mr. power can possibly be, then I say that the plan Mason, has been so fully refuted, that it is not before you is unnecessary; for it imports not worth while to notice it. He objected to Conwhat system we have, unless it have the power gress having power to create a number of inof protecting us in time of peace
ferior courts according to the necessity of public
circumstances. I had an apprehension that On the twentieth of June, the first and second those gentlemen who placed no confidence in sections of the third article of the constitution Congress, would object that there might be no
inferior courts. I own that I thought that those being under consideration, Mr. Marshall spoke gentlemen would think there would be no inas follows:
ferior courts, as it depended on the will of Con
gress, but that we should be dragged to the MR. CHAIRMAN: This part of the plan before centre of the Union. But I did not conceive, us, is a great improvement on that system from that the power of increasing the number of which we are now departing. Here are tribu-courts could be objected to by any gentleman, nals appointed for the decision of controver- as it would remove the inconvenience of being sies, which were before, either not at all, or im- dragged to the centre of the United States. I properly provided for. That many benefits will own that the power of creating a number of result from this to the members of the collective courts is, in my estimation, so far from being a society, every one confesses. Unless its organi- defect, that it seems necessary to the perfection zation be defective, and so constructed as to of this system. After having objected to the injure, instead of accommodating the conve- number and mode, he objected to the subject nience of the people, it merits our approbation. matter of their cognizance. After such a candid and fair discussion by those gentlemen who support it, after the very able Here Mr. Marshall read the second section. manner in which they have investigated and examined it, I conceived it would be no longer These, sir, are the points of federal jurisdicconsidered as so very defective, and that those tion to which he objects, with a few exceptions. who opposed it, would be convinced of the im- Let us examine each of them, with a supposipropriety of some of their objections. But I tion that the same impartiality will be observed perceive they still continue the same opposi- there, as in other courts, and then see if any tion. Gentlemen have gone on an idea, that mischief will result from them. With respect the federal courts will not determine the causes, to its cognizance in all cases arising under the which may come before them, with the same constitution and the laws of the United States, fairness and impartiality with which other he says, that the laws of the United States being courts decide. What are the reasons of this paramount to the laws of the particular States, supposition? Do they draw them from the there is no case but what this will extend to. manner in which the judges are chosen, or the Has the government of the United States power tenure of their office? What is it that makes to make laws on every subject? Does he unus trust our judges? Their independence in derstand it so? Can they make laws affecting office and manner of appointment. Are not the mode of transferring property, or contracts, the judges of the federal court chosen with as or claims between citizens of the same State much wisdom as the judges of the State gov- Can they go beyond the delegated powers? If ernments? Are they not equally, if not more they were to make a law not warranted by any independent? If so, shall we not conclude of the powers enumerated, it would be considthat they will decide with equal impartiality ered by the judges as an infringement of the and candor? If there be as much wisdom and constitution which they are to guard. They knowledge in the United States, as in a par- would not consider such a law as coming under ticular State, shall we conclude that that wis- their jurisdiction. They would declare it void. dom and knowledge will not be equally exer- It will annihilate the State courts, says the cised in the selection of the judges ?
honorable gentleman. Does not every gentleThe principle on which they object to the man here know, that the causes in our courts federal jurisdiction, seems to me to be founded are more numerous than they can decide, acon a belief, that a fair trial will not be had in cording to their present construction ? Look at those courts. If this committee will consider the dockets; you will find them crowded with it fully, they will find it has no foundation, and suits, which the life of man will not see deter
mined. If some of these suits be carried to cases. The contrary is well known to you, Mr. other courts, will it be wrong? They will still Chairman, to be the case in this commonwealth. have business enough. Then there is no danger With respect to mills, roads, and other cases, that particular subjects, small in proportion, appeals lie from the inferior to the superior being taken out of the jurisdiction of the State court, as to fact, as well as law. Is it clear judiciaries, will render them useless and of no that there can be no case in common law, in effect. Does the gentleman think that the which an appeal as to fact might be proper and State courts will have no cognizance of cases necessary? Can you not conceive a case where not mentioned here? Are there any words in it would be productive of advantages to the this constitution which exclude the courts of people at large, to submit to that tribunal the the States from those cases which they now final determination, involving facts as well as possess? Does the gentleman imagine this to law? Suppose it should be deemed for the be the case? Will any gentleman believe it? convenience of the citizens, that those things Are not controversies respecting lands, claimed which concerned foreign ministers, should be under the grants of different States, the only tried in the inferior courts : if justice should be controversies between citizens of the same done, the decision would satisfy all. But if an State, which the federal judiciary can take cog- appeal in matters of fact could not be carried nizance of? The case is so clear, that to prove to the superior court, then it would result, that it would be an useless waste of time. The State such cases could not be tried before the inferior courts will not lose the jurisdiction of the causes courts, for fear of injurious and partial dethey now decide. They have a concurrence of cisions. jurisdiction with the federal courts in those But, sir, where is the necessity of discrimicases in which the latter have cognizance. nating between the three cases of chancery, ad
How disgraceful is it that the State courts miralty, and common law? Why not leave it cannot be trusted, says the honorable gentle-to Congress ? Will it enlarge their powers ? man. What is the language of the constitution? Is it necessary for them wantonly to infringe Does it take away their jurisdiction? Is it not your rights? Have you any thing to apprenecessary that the federal courts should have hend, when they can, in no case, abuse their cognizance of cases arising under the constitu- power without rendering themselves hateful to tion and the laws of the United States? What the people at large? When this is the case, is the service or purpose of a judiciary, but to something may be left to the legislature, freely execute the laws in a peaceable, orderly man- chosen by ourselves, from among ourselves, ner, without shedding blood, or creating a con- who are to share the burdens imposed upon the test, or availing yourselves of force? If this community, and who can be changed at our be the case, where can its jurisdiction be more pleasure. Where power may be trusted, and necessary than here?
there is no motive to abuse it, it seems to me To what quarter will you look for protection to be as well to leave it undetermined, as to fix from an infringement on the constitution, if it in the constitution. you will not give the power to the judiciary? With respect to disputes between a State and There is no other body that can afford such a the citizens of another State, its jurisdiction has protection. But the honorable member objects been decried with unusual vehemence. I hope to it, because, says he, the officers of the gov- no gentleman will think that a State will be ernment will be screened from merited punish- called at the bar of the federal court. Is there ment by the federal judiciary. The federal no such case at present? Are there not many sheriff, says he, will go into a poor man's house cases in which the legislature of Virginia is a and beat him, or abuse his family, and the fed-party, and yet the State is not sued ? It is not eral court will protect him. Does any gentle- rational to suppose, that the sovereign power man believe this? Is it necessary that the shall be dragged before a court. The intent is, officers will commit a trespass on the property to enable States to recover claims of individuals or persons of those with whom they are to residing in other States. I contend this contransact business? Will such great insults on struction is warranted by the words. But, say the people of this country be allowable? Were they, there will be partiality in it, if a State a law made to authorize them, it would be void. cannot be defendant—if an individual cannot The injured man would trust to a tribunal in proceed to obtain judgment against a State, his neighborhood. To such a tribunal he would though he may be sued by a State. It is necesapply for redress, and get it. There is no rea- sary to be so, and cannot be avoided. I see a son to fear that he would not meet that justice difficulty in making a State defendant, which there, which his country will be ever willing does not prevent its being plaintiff. If this be to maintain. But on appeal, says the honorable only what cannot be avoided, why object to the gentleman, what chance is there to obtain jus- system on that account? If an individual has tice? This is founded on an idea, that they a just claim against any particular State, is it to will not be impartial. There is no clause in the be presumed, that on application to its legislaconstitution, which bars the individual member ture, he will not obtain satisfaction ? But how injured, from applying to the State courts to could a State recover any claim from a citizen give him redress. He says, that there is no of another State, without the establishment of instance of appeals as to fact in common law | these tribunals.