same; and the application to the conduct of the minister in the other House, equally just. The noble lord agreed with Atkinson for a certain stipulated price per gallon. His lordship enquires of Atkinson what he can afford such a commodity at, describing the quality of the rum he wanted. Atkinson informs the noble lord, and his lordship fixes the price upon the confidence he had in the character and veracity of the contractor. It comes out, however, that the price charged by Atkinson, as in the case of the victualling contract, is considerably above what it is sold for at market. Here, then, the matter was fairly turned round, and the grounds of necessity stated by the noble lords who urged the impositions the Treasury board were liable to, was, in his opinion, totally overthrown. No imposition could be put upon the noble lord. Attempts might be made, but the law had already provided a full and specific remedy; though the money had been paid, though several years had elapsed from the time of payment to the time in which the fraud was discovered, whoever defrauded the state was amenable to the public. All bargains made for the nation were made in contemplation that they were well made, and for the public benefit; they were clearly null and void ab initio, if not founded in equity and justice. This was no new doctrine; it was coeval with the constitution. When in the immediate service of the crown himself, as Solicitor General, he had been frequently consulted by the King's mi been much insisted upon, and several par- | ticular facts stated to shew the necessity of the Bill, and to prove, that although the minister were incorrupt, private contracts were replete with fraud and imposition, and consequently that public contracts were preferable. It had been stated, that a Mr. Atkinson had contracted with a noble lord in the other House, for rum and some other articles, and had, from the ig. norance of the noble lord in the value of the commodity contracted for, or from the noble lord's inattention, charged a most exorbitant and usurious profit, by which the public had been grossly and shamefully defrauded, to the amount of several thousand pounds. It was an universal principle, in all human legislation, never to propose a law when there was an existing remedy adequate to the removal or correction of the evil complained of; and certainly if no remedy existed for the removal of the grievance stated, it would be an unanswerable argument with him for passing the present Bill; but how did that matter stand? A Mr. Atkinson, who, by the bye, was no member of parliament, but a merchant of considerable eminence, comes to the noble lord at the head of the Treasury, and offers to supply him with a large quantity of rum. He is desired to propose his terms; he answers, the same as the contract made by the navy-board for the same article. The noble lord enquires the price paid by the navy-board, and instantly closes with Atkinson; it however comes out afterwards, that the high price paid for the rum by the navy-nisters upon the subject, and had as often board, is given in consideration of other articles, served for a price under the market value. Here the noble lord who made the contract is grossly imposed upon. He fixes an ideal value in reference to a standard, with which from the nature of the transaction, it was not supposed he could be acquainted. But what is the conduct of the noble lord? He pays over the real market value of the rum to Atkinson, and legally and justly retains the remainder for the public benefit. In both lights he acts as a trustee for the public, which he represents in either capacity. He thought the first bargain was an advantageous one; but when, upon enquiry, he found he was imposed upon and deceived, he determined nevertheless that it should continue an advantageous and equitable one for the public. In the other transaction alluded to, the circumstances differed, though the principle was the [VOL. XXI.] given his opinion, such as he had now stated it to be; and he remembered very well that when Attorney General, a governor of one of the West India islands had charged for articles more than their intrinsic value, and for some with which the troops had not been served, and he was instructed to prosecute him; he did so, and every shilling above what was really expended in the public service was recovered in a court of law. Such would and must be the event of the affair alluded to; and not only in that instance, but in every other in which any mark of fraud shall be discovered. Nay, there was not a single contract made since the commencement of the present war, against which any objection could be justly made, in which it was not competent for those who contracted in behalf of the public to make strict inquiries into the terms so entered into; and if they should find any [2 G] overcharge, to demand it back if paid, or to retain it if not already paid over to the contractor; to even institute suits for the recovery of the difference, or justify the retention of it upon the grounds which he had now stated. On the whole, he did not think that the influence complained of did exist, or if it did, that the present Bill contained a proper remedy; because allowing that the influence of the crown was increased and increasing, and ought to be diminished, he was persuaded that the Bill, like all others, would prove inefficient for the purposes for which it was apparently framed: and as to the promoting a more economical expenditure of the public money, it was clearly unnecessary; because the laws in being provided a specific remedy, fully adequate to the prevention of the evils complained of, one of which the present Bill was apparently calculated to remove; if the minister was corrupt, no security could be given by him to the contractor, but that at some future day he would be compelled by law to refund, because the law was always open. The same argument held good if the minister was indolent or ignorant, so that in any or either event no detriment could happen to the state from the corruption or inability of the one, nor the fraudulent attempts of the other. The Duke of Richmond spoke chiefly to the point of influence. If its existence was once acknowledged, the Bill he said called for no other support. He was ready to agree with the noble lords who opposed the Bill, that no measure which parliament could adopt would destroy a possibility of evading it; not only in respect of the present proposed law, but of any other which it was in the utmost ingenuity of man to devise. On the other hand, if the argument was carried directly to the point to which it apparently led, every law, by such a species of reasoning, could be proved to be nugatory and absurd, because in some possible instance or other it might be evaded, or the evil subsist in some other form. Sufficient for the day surely was the evil. The Bill proposed to annihilate a certain species of influence. How far it might answer the purpose, time could only discover; but it was a strange perversion of human reasoning, on the supposition of an existing grievance, to argue, that no remedy ought to be applied, because remedies were applied in other instances, but had failed, or their | operations had been eluded by other evils starting up in the room of those which had been removed. Every noble lord who rose to oppose the Bill had said, that public economy was necessary at all times, and much more so at such a season as the present, when one part of the empire was convulsed by a civil war or rebellion, and when we were engaged, besides, in a very unequal contest with two formidable enemies, united for our destruction; but though the necessity was granted on all hands, not one of their lordships gave the least intimation of his intention to propose any measure to introduce new means, or enforce the old, for promoting economy. A learned lord of great authority, who speaks with particular weight, and is always heard with attention, says there are remedies and provisions already in being for enforcing a frugal expenditure of the public money. But with all the aids which the law has provided, the learned lord does not venture to say that no waste of the public treasure has happened; far from it; he acknowledges that there has, but has forgot to state any instance in which the King's servants have applied that remedy. He says the overplus has been retained in one instance; but surely the learned lord has forgot the manner in which this matter first arose, or has never heard that this shameful fraud, this public robbery, would have slept like all the other contracts, in perpetual silence, but for the active part which a member of the other House (col. Barré) took in that business. He wished those noble lords who opposed the present measure to consider all the circumstances which accompanied it. The people at large had agreed unanimously in one point, namely, relative to the increased influence of the crown, and the necessity of an immediate œconomical reform in the expenditure of public money. Some counties had only instructed their representatives; others had petitioned; a third description, much the most powerful and formidable, had agreed to committees of correspondence, associations, &c. to enforce the prayer of their petitions. Two or three counties had protested, and one in particular had presented a counterpetition; but however discordant or opposite in some instances, or however short one class of petitioners might fall of another, as to the objects of their wishes and expectations, there was one clear, indisputable object which seemed to form a point of union, and so far bound them in duty to themselves, and in support of their own sentiments, to endeavour by every proper means to promote-and that was public œconomy. Some measures were proposed in the other House in consequence of those sentiments thus expressed, which were rejected; and out of all, this was the only one which met with success. Here, then, was at least one instance in which the people were united without doors, and unanimous within, the Bill having passed the other House without debate or division; notwithstanding which, the King's servants and likewise the servants of the people in that House had resolved to defeat a measure which seemed equally agreeable to their friends, as well as opponents, and that without argument, at least any reason assigned, which did not heighten the disrespect and contempt in which they hold the wishes of the people, and the unanimous concurrence of the other House to gratify those wishes. Every noble lord who spoke against the Bill treated the supposed influence of the crown as a chimera which took possession of the brains of some speculative men, er considered them as the suggestions of faction, in order to embarrass government; or, lastly, that the influence described was a legitimate proper influence, and was necessary to the carrying on the affairs of the nation; in short, that it was an influence vested by the constitution in the crown. It was no easy matter to argue the point clearly, and come to an issue upon the matter in controversy, because what might be a full answer to those who entertained one opinion, would be totally irrelative and inapplicable, in reply to another. He did not therefore mean to answer discordant and repugnant opinions. When any proposition was framed on which administration were united, he would meet them fairly; but at present it would be a very idle manner of spending his time in controverting opinions upon which no two persons supposed to be concerned in conducting the affairs of government were agreed. Though he meant to decline so vain and useless a task, he nevertheless thought it necessary to say a few words respecting the petitions, and the avowed opinions of the other House. A very great majority of the petitioners, and a very considerable one he believed of the electors and the mass of the people of England, agreed in two points: that the influence of the crown was danger ously increased, and that a reform was particularly necessary in the expenditure of the civil list revenue. In the course of several debates, in which these two questions naturally became the subject of discussion, the facts alluded to were controverted and denied. The minister in the other House, and some persons of considerable weight in administration and that House, maintained the negative in argument. A very able gentleman, of great talents and professional knowledge (Mr. Dunning) framed two questions in order to take the sense of the House, and learn whether the opinion of their representatives accorded with the sense of their constituents. His first proposition was, whether the influence of the crown had increased, was increasing, and ought to be diminished. The second, whether the representatives of the people were competent to enquire into, and in case of abuse to reform the expenditure of the civil list. Another gentleman (Mr. T. Pitt) had likewise moved, that it was the duty of that House to redress the grievances of the people who sent them there, as stated in the said petitions. The fate of those three propositions was well known. They were resolved each of them true, by a most respectable majority composed of 233 members. A measure directed to diminishing the influence of the crown soon after came before that House; it was lost by a majority who did not approve of the means proposed, though they continued to maintain the principle on which it was supported: so that 233 members of the other House, supported by a clear and decided majority of the people without doors, had, by an act of a public nature, declared opinions, every one of which the noble lords who spoke in the present debate did not admit to be true, or controverted in some one shape or other. This was an alarming circumstance, and created in his mind the most melancholy apprehensions. Take the matter either way, the consequences might prove dreadful. If the other House resolved from private motives, or to answer electioneering purposes, which he hoped was not the case, what they themselves did not believe to be true, where were we? In the worst of all possible situations-the House of Commons, which was the great barrier between government and the people, reduced to this dangerous and critical dilemma, that of adopting measures of which they secretly disapproved, or of flying in the face of their constituents; which difference of opinion, should that happen to be the case, might end in the dissolution of all government, and the overthrow of the constitution. Take it on the other side; suppose the majority of the other House to be sincere, and suppose that measures like the present, founded upon the resolutions alluded to, and which, if not founded upon those resolutions, were, in sense, object, and effect, substantially correspondent and suppose further, for the facts and circumstances justified such a supposition, that the present Bill, and other measures of a similar tendency, should come up supported by the constituent and representative bodies, and receive a negative here, denying the principles on which those measures were formed, and refusing all sort of redress, what an alarming state of things would such a refusal probably produce! He was filled with horror at the idea, and could only say, that those who advised their sovereign not to comply with the wishes of the people, thus constitutionally expressed, would be answerable for all the direful consequences which must, and he foresaw would, follow. Such advisers would reduce his Majesty precisely to that situation, the most to be avoided in any government, but most of all in that of England, that of setting up a different interest in the king from that of his people; a doctrine, in his opinion, amounting to the highest political blasphemy and treason against the prince and people. The contrary was known to be the doctrine of every wise and virtuous statesman. The connection which bound the king and his subjects was preserved by an interchange of good offices, mutual confidence and good will, in a reciprocity of favours and graces; in mutual benefits, and mutual protection and support. When any other means of carrying on government were resorted to, they were founded in weakness; they created jealousy and distrust, and must either crumble to pieces of themselves, or involve their authors and the country in ruin. No man would go farther in the support and maintenance of the constitutional prerogatives of the crown, and the just rights and privileges of the people; but he dreaded sincerely, if something was not done in time, that the best men would be obliged to give way to the current of arbitrary power, or to the next worst event that could possibly happen, to anarchy and confusion, and all the dreadful concomitants of a civil war. Yet alarming as this picture was, it was, he feared, meant to be realized. What had passed that day confirmed his fears, and created fresh apprehensions. The conduct of the minister of the other House, indeed, put the matter beyond a doubt, when thus confirmed by his colleagues in office here. The noble lord had apparently determined to set the king and his people at variance. He had endeavoured to thwart every measure proposed for the advantage or satisfaction of the people, and by all the little arts of ministerial chicanery and parliamentary dexterity, to create divisions among those who opposed him. He had thrown numerous impediments in the way of every measure, and had displayed all the manoeuvres of a person determined to teaze, distract, and confound, and to defeat by management what he had not the candour nor ability openly and directly to oppose. This was acting in a most criminal manner; and however strong it might sound, he would fairly declare that any noble lord that heard him who should continue to support such a man would be equally wicked and criminal himself. After taking a short retrospect of that noble lord's administration, and pointing to the principal measures, all which as he enumerated, he contended more or less tended to bring us into our present situation, and whose obstinacy was now accelerating our ruin, he replied to several of the objections stated to the Bill, and earnestly entreated their lordships to permit it to go to a committee, where it might be improved; for he found himself at perfect liberty to say, that it did not come up entirely to his own ideas, though he most heartily and sincerely approved of the principle. He had turned his attention somewhat to bills of disqualification, and he must acknowledge, that he did not much approve of the mode hitherto adopted to obtain the object. The rights of election and representation were of the very essence of this government; they ought, therefore, to be touched with a very delicate and cautious hand. He thought that nothing should restrain the choice of the electors, or the eligibility of the candidate; though influence, which operated in parliament, ought to be restrained, an acceptance of a place of trust should never be deemed to imply a corrupt act. The people should be all free to elect their own choice, and no law should be adopted that might directly tend to ex clude great and respectable bodies of men, | pears peculiarly necessary to remove from lest such men, being excluded from par- parliament the suspicion that the rash taking in the power of legislation, should adoption, the obstinate continuance, and wish to overturn that constitution which the corrupt supply of military arrange. had proscribed them. Many measures ments, are connected with the support of had been spoken of without doors relative a court majority in parliament. to representation, to shortening the duration of parliament, &c. He was not prepared to give any opinion on the subject, nor would it be decent to prejudge them till they came regularly under his consideration. He feared they were too numerous, and embraced too many objects; for in his opinion the nation ought to unite = upon one great constitutional point, as a basis for what was to follow, and which would reach the root of the evil. Though he approved of the Bill, he had no great expectation from it. It was but a part, and a very small part of what ought, and he foresaw, sooner or later, must be granted. As he said before, he did not approve of the mode of disqualification proposed by the present Bill; that was an additional motive with him for sending it to a committee, where, instead of disqualifying the member, he would remove the disability to the person of the minister, who should not dare to give a contract to any member of the House of Commons. The House divided: Contents, 41; Not-coptents, 61: it was then moved to reject the Bill. The question was put thereupon and carried in the affirmative. Protest against the Rejection of the Contractors' Bill.] The following Protest was entered: "Dissentient' Richmond, Harcourt, Jersey. 66 1. Because the Commons, desirous of re-establishing the reputation and authority of parliament, and of giving satisfaction to the people, at a time when the most cordial and unsuspicious confidence be tween the representative and constituent bodies is essentially necessary, have come to a resolution, "That it is necessary to declare, that the influence of the crown has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished." "This resolution we conceive to be undeniably true, and highly seasonable. Their commencement of the diminution (which they have solemnly engaged to make) by the Bill here rejected, is no less judicious. In the midst of a war, in which nothing (among all its unhappy circumstances) is more remarkable than the pro digality with which it is carried on, it ap 2nd. "Because the people, oppressed with actual impositions, and terrified with the certain prospect of farther and heavier burthens, have a right to be assured, that none should have a power of laying those burthens, who have an interest in increasing them. Neither is it fit that they who are the principal subject of complaint, should sit as the controllers of their own conduct. Contracts can never be fairly made, when the parliamentary service of the contractor is a necessary understood part of the agreement, and must be reckoned into the price. But the most unexceptionable contract being a matter of great advantage to the contractor, it becomes a means of influence even when it is not a principle of abuse. It is the greatest of all the bribes a minister has to bestow; and one day's job may be worth the purchase of the fee of most of the places and pensions that are held in that House. "3dly. Because no reasons have been assigned for the rejection of this Bill, but such as appear to us frivolous or dangerous. It was argued as necessary to abate the phrenzy of virtue, which began to shew itself in the House of Commons. This new species of phrenzy we look upon to be rather a character of soundness than a symptom of insanity and we fairly declare, that as we frequently come into contact with the other House, we heartily wish that that distemper may become contagious. Another reason assigned against this Bill, that it is impossible for vast pecuniary emoluments to have any influence on members of parliament, appears to originate from so perfect a puerility of understanding, or such a contempt of that of the House and the nation, that it is mentioned as a matter to be animadverted upon, not answered. Of the same nature is the argument drawn from supposed improbability of abuses in contracts, because the law has left in the hands of ministers the means of prosecuting at law the supporters of their power, and the accomplices of their own fraud and malversation. These arguments will give little satisfaction to those who look at the House of Lords as a barrier against some possibly sudden and mistaken warmth |