of a Pretender, whose family was deser- vernment to put an end to them, whenvedly become odious for their tyranny, and ever it should be most for the purpose of by their repeated endeavours to subvert government so to do; and that consethe constitution, to change the religion of quently government might harass indivithe country, and to bury the liberties of duals at present, as much as they could do the people under the fabric of arbitrary then. One of the arguments upon which power, which it had been their constant he principally rested was, that annual parwish to introduce and to erect. George liaments would lessen the influence of the 1 was a prince beloved by both Houses crown, declaring, that if any of his conof Parliament, and looked up to as their stituents were to ask him what our preguardian and protector; it was very nasent misfortunes were ascribable to? He tural under these circumstances to take should say, the first cause was the inevery precaution to keep out a third per- fluence of the crown, the second, the inson, a pretender to the throne, and to fluence of the crown, and the third, the maintain the House of Brunswick in pos- influence of the crown; to that, and that session of it. With this view it was, that only, in his mind, could it be owing, the three branches of the legislature had that an unpopular and unsuccessful miagreed to take such measures as were nistry, whose measures had ruined their most likely to exclude the Pretender, and country, kept their offices. He ridiculed what measure could be more promising or Mr. Onslow's opinion as stated by lord more likely, than to pass the Septennial Nugent, and said, that noble lord's whole Bill? Thereby keeping together that par- speech was a sample of that contemptuous liament who were so well disposed towards conduct, which ministry assumed whenGeorge 1, and who doubtless had no idea ever they thought themselves secure; their that a day could ever come when the li- way constantly was to be afraid, when berties of the people would be in danger they first heard of any thing that looked from the House of Brunswick, who never like danger approaching them, and as soon could suppose that the influence of the as they began to think themselves safe, to crown would be so increased in the reign turn the object of their former terror into of a prince of that House, that it should derision. So it was with the petitions of be voted by the House of Commons, to the people; at first nothing could be more be increased, increasing, and that it ought humble than the language of ministers to be diminished. They had therefore respecting them; they had promised every acted wisely, and he had ever admired and thing, but now having again their majorevered such men. It was from this admi-rity, they affected to laugh at, and to deration and this reverence that he had uni- ride that, which they had most seriously formly voted against shortening the dura- dreaded. tion of parliament. But what was the case now? The people of England, in whom the sole right of the duration of parliament lay, called upon that House to shorten it. The people of England made this requisition, a requisition they alone could make, and which, like every other requisition that came from the same quarter, he should ever hold himself bound to comply with, and to obey.-Mr. Fox answered lord Nugent's question about the sheriffs, and said, undoubtedly if the Bill now moved for passed, an Act must necessarily pass to make that alteration. He also turned off the objection urged by Mr. Pitt, relative to the frequency of elections, and the enormous expence which would unavoidably follow to private families, and honest and independent men, if parliaments were chosen either annually or triennially; shewing, that even now parliaments had no certain time of duration, for that it was in the power of go Lord North began with ironically observing, that as the hon. gentleman who spoke last had constantly gone with him in voting against every motion similar to the present, which had been made from year to year, for some years past, and as no man was more fully acquainted with the principle on which it was objectionable, nor had any man been so able a defender of that principle, he was in hopes on this occasion to have had the honour of being assisted for once by the powerful and brilliant talents which distinguished the hon. gentleman, and that it would have been unnecessary for any other person to attempt to convince the House how mistaken those gentlemen, both within doors and without, were, who imagined, that if annual or triennial parliaments were restored, the influence of the crown would be diminished. His lordship having opened his speech in this manner, proceeded in a most masterly stile of argument, to shew ficers were to be almost immediately followed by the election of members of parliament, and enforcing other strong objections to the motion, his lordship concluded with praising the healthiness of the constitution, as it stood, declaring, that every attempt to improve it, put him in mind of the epitaph on the tombstone of the famous Italian valetudinarian ;-Stava bene, voleva stare meglio-sto quì. "I was well, I would be better-and here I am." Colonel Barré supported the motion in a short speech, introducing lord North's commission of account Bill, and other temporary topics of oppositional severity, and concluding it with the words "liberavi animam meam." Mr. T. Townshend declared, he had not made up his mind to the idea of shortening the duration of parliament; the motion, however, was of so much magnitude, that it was at least worth while to give it full discussion; he was therefore for letting the Bill be brought in, and going to a committee; not that he meant to say, he should support it when it came there, but as it was the wish of the people, he thought it deserved at least so much respect. the dangerous tendency of the attempt to shorten the duration of parliaments, should such an attempt be carried into execution. He said, his ideas on the subject were not newly taken up, neither had he acquired them since he had any ministerial office or connexion; that the first time he had ever presumed to solicit the attention of that House, was to an argument against a motion similar to the present: that the matter he alluded to, occurred many years since, and that his opinion had been considerably strengthened by experience. He quoted the sentiments of a great man, whose name he could not immediately recollect, but who, speaking of triennial parliaments, had said, that their consequence would be triennial treaties, triennial alliances, and a triennial peace; that, in fact, so far from accommodating public business, they would derange and impede its progress. His lordship took up Mr. Sawbridge's historical account of parliaments, and shewed that our ancestors had clearly in view, that parliaments should sit annually, and said, that by degrees, that end had been drawing nearer and nearer, and was now attained. That the nature of our constitution, as it stood at present, required it. He further said, if parliaments were to be chosen for less than seven years, no gentleman could possibly think of attempting to begin any great public measure, because he could not be certain that he should continue in parliament long enough to bring it to perfection. He declared that every innovation ought to be watched with a jealous eye, because when once the spirit of innovation was abroad, it was impossible to say where it would stop. He should, had he no other reason, object to the present motion, because it was evident from what the hon. gentleman who spoke last had said, it was to be necessarily followed by several other innovations. The noble lord near him had mentioned the appointment of the sheriffs, a matter vested in the crown for centuries; the hon. gentleman had said with the most perfect ease, as if the matter were really trifling and indifferent "that the mode of appointing sheriffs must be altered, if the present motion was agreed to, and the Bill passed." This, he said, he did not approve, neither should he lightly assent to any alteration of the constitution. After pointedly animadverting on the difficulties that would arise in case the elections of returning of Mr. Rigby ridiculed the new converts, as he termed Mr. Fox and those gentlemen who had now for the first time spoken favourably of a motion which they had voted against uniformly before. He argued strenuously against innovation, especially where the House was not made acquainted with the goal to which innovation was to be carried. He took notice of an hon. gentleman's having spoke against the motion, and then walked out of the House [alluding to Mr. Pitt, who had left the House accompanied by his father-in-law, Mr. Pinckney Wilkinson,] and said, he liked what was substantial, and should ever prefer a vote to a speech. He also, in strong language, shewed the inconvenience that would follow an alteration of the duration of parliament, and stated his reasons at length for being against the motion. Lord John Cavendish spoke against the principle of shortening the duration of parliaments, but wished the Bill to go into a committee. Mr. Byng was decidedly for the motion; and in reply to what lord North had said respecting triennial parliaments producing triennial alliances, asked where the noble lord's alliances were? Mr. Burke rose and said :* It is always to be lamented when men are driven to search into the foundations of the commonwealth. It is certainly necessary to resort to the theory of your government, whenever you propose any alteration in the frame of it, whether that alteration means the revival of some former antiquated and forsaken constitution of antiquated and forsaken constitution of See Burke's Works, Vol. 10, p. 72, 8vo. edit. 1812. The above Speech was found amongst Mr. Burke's papers without date. The following short report of the Speech, taken from the Political Magazine for May 1780, settles the point : ple itself; and to abandon something of the extent of the advantage you proposed by it, in order to prevent also the inconveniences, which have arisen from the instrument of all the good you had in view. state, or the introduction of some new improvement in the commonwealth. The object of our deliberation is, to promote the good purposes, for which elections have been instituted, and to prevent their inconveniencies. If we thought frequent elections attended with no inconvenience, or with but a trifling inconvenience, the tution would sweep us like a torrent towards strong overruling principle of the constithem. But your remedy is to be suited to your disease-your present disease, and That man thinks to your whole disease. much too highly, and therefore he thinks weakly and delusively of any contrivance of human wisdom, who believes that it “Mr. Burke, in a most able, ingenious, and can make any sort of approach to perfecThere is not, there never was, a elaborate speech, argued against the motion, tion. shewing by the clearest argument, that if it principle of government under heaven, were carried, and triennial parliaments were that does not, in the very pursuit of the introduced, the influence of the crown would good it proposes, naturally and inevitably be most fatally increased; if annual parlia- lead into some inconvenience, which makes ments were the sort agreed upon, he asserted it absolutely necessary to counterwork and that there would be no contest, and consequently, that in fact, there would be no elec-weaken the application of that first princition. He declared, the question relative to the shortening the duration, could not be said to have originated in the wishes of the people, for it had never yet been properly before them; if it had, and they had fairly discussed it, in every point of view, he did not doubt but they would have seen the danger of it, and determined wisely against it; qui cautè deliberant, facile pronunciant. He said, however unpopular his speech might render him, it was his duty as an honest man, to deliver his sentiments on so great a subject, that his constituents might fairly know, what sort of a person it was, who offered himself as a candidate for their votes at the next election. He then proceeded to a most ample investigation of the whole subject, exhibiting with all that power of pencil which he possesses, and with all that glow of colouring, which no man can more beautifully display, that the consequence of shortening the duration of parliament, would tend to increase corruption, to ruin individuals, and to extend the influence of the crown. He reprobated the attempt of trying a triennial parliament, as dangerous in the extreme. If the experiment failed, we could not go back to septennial parliaments, without destroying the weight and importance which the interference of the people at large ought always to carry with it. He gave a detail of the triennial parliaments in the reign of William the 3rd, and shewed, that though they were little better than biennial parliaments, there was more corruption in them, than any our history recorded to have sat. He instanced the case of the East India Company's bribery of the members, mentioning the Speaker's being obliged to put the question on his own. expulsion, and the affair of sir Philip Musgrave." now To govern according to the sense and agreeably to the interests of the people is a great and glorious object of government. This object cannot be obtained but through the medium of popular election; and popular election is a mighty evil. It is such, and so great an evil, that though there are few nations, whose monarchs were not originally elective, very few are elected. They are the distempers of elections, that have destroyed all free states. To cure these distempers is difficult, if not impossible; the only thing therefore left to save the commonwealth is to prevent their return too frequently. The objects in view are, to have parliaments as frequent as they can be without distracting them in the prosecution of public business; on one hand, to secure their dependence upon the people, on the other to give them that quiet in their minds, and that ease in their fortunes, as to enable them to perform the most arduous and most painful duty in the world with spirit, with efficiency, with independency, and with experience, as real public counsellors, not as the canvassers at a perpetual election. It is wise to compass as many good ends as possibly you can, and seeing there are inconveniences on both sides, with benefits on both, to give up a part of the benefit to soften the inconvenience. The perfect cure is impracticable, because the disorder is dear to those, from whom alone the cure can possibly be derived. The utmost to be done is to palliate, to mitigate, to respite, to put off the evil day of the constitution to its latest possible hour, and may it be a very late one! This Bill, I fear, would precipitate one of two consequences, I know not which most likely, or which most dangerous; either that the crown by its constant stated power, influence, and revenue, would wear out all opposition in elections, or that a violent and furious popular spirit would arise. I must see, to satisfy me, the remedies; I must see, from their operation in the cure of the old evil, and in the cure of those new evils, which are inseparable from all remedies, how they balance each other, and what is the total result. The excellence of mathematics and metaphysics is to have but one thing before you; but he forms the best judgment in all moral disquisitions, who has the greatest number and variety of considerations in one view before him, and can take them in with the best possible consideration of the middle results of all. We of the opposition, who are not friends to the Bill, give this pledge at least of our integrity and sincerity to the people, that in our situation of systematic opposition to the present ministers, in which all our hope of rendering it effectual depends upon popular interest and favour, we will not flatter them by a surrender of our uninfluenced judgment and opinion; we give a security, that if ever we should be in another situation, no flattery to any other sort of power and influence would induce us to act against the true interests of the people. All are agreed that parliaments should not be perpetual; the only question is, what is the most convenient time for their duration? On which there are three opinions. We are agreed, too, that the term ought not to be chosen most likely in its operation to spread corruption, and to augment the already overgrown influence of the crown. On these principles I mean to debate the question. It is easy to pretend a zeal for liberty. Those, who think themselves not likely to be encumbered with the performance of their promises, either from their known inability, or total indifference about the performance, never fail to entertain the most lofty ideas. They are certainly the most specious, and they cost them neither reflection to frame, nor pains to modify, nor management to support. The task is of another nature to those, who mean to promise nothing, that it is not in their intention, or may possibly be in their power, to perform; to those, who are bound and principled no more to delude the understandings than to violate the liberty of their fellow subjects. Faithful watchmen we ought to be over the rights and privileges of the people. But our duty, if we are qualified for it as we ought, is to give them information, and not to receive it from them; we are not to go to school to them to learn the principles of law and government. In doing so, we should not dutifully serve, but we should basely and scandalously betray, the people, who are not capable of this service by nature, nor in any instance called to it by the constitution. I reverently look up to the opinion of the people, and with an awe, that is almost superstitious. I should be ashamed to show my face before them, if I changed my ground, as they cried up or cried down men, or things, or opinions; if I wavered and shifted about with every change, and joined in it, or opposed, as best answered any low interest or passion; if I held them up hopes, which I knew I never intended, or promised what I well knew I could not perform. Of all these things they are perfect sovereign_judges, without appeal; but as to the detail of particular measures, or to any general schemes of policy, they have neither enough of speculation in the closet, nor of experience in business, to decide upon it. They can well see whether we are tools of a court, or their honest servants. Of that they can well judge; and I wish that they always exercised their judgment; but of the particular merits of a measure I have other standards. * * That the frequency of elections proposed by this Bill has a tendency to increase the power and consideration of the electors, not lessen corruptibility, I do most readily allow; so far it is desirable; this is what it has, I will tell you now what it has not: 1st. It has no sort of tendency to increase their integrity and public spirit, unless an increase of power has an operation upon voters in elections, that it has in no other situation in the world, and upon no other part of mankind. 2d. This Bill has no tendency to limit the quantity of influence in the crown, to render its operation more difficult, or to counteract that operation, which it cannot prevent, in any way whatsoever. It has its full weight, its full range, and its uncontrolled operation on the electors exactly as it had before. 3d. Nor, thirdly, does it abate the interest or inclination of ministers to apply that influence to the electors: on the contrary, it renders it much more necessary to them, if they seek to have a majority in parliament, to increase the means of that influence, and redouble their diligence, and to sharpen dexterity in the application. The whole effect of the Bill is therefore the removing the application of some part of the influence from the elected to the electors, and further to strengthen and ex tend a court interest already great and powerful in boroughs; here to fix their magazines and places of arms, and thus to make them the principal, not the secondary, theatre of their manoeuvres for securing a determined majority in parliament. I believe nobody will deny that the electors are corruptible. They are men; it is saying nothing worse of them; many of them are but ill informed in their minds, many feeble in their circumstances, easily over-reached, easily seduced. If they are many, the wages of corruption are the lower; and would to God it were not rather a contemptible and hypocritical adulation than a charitable sentiment, to say that there is already no debauchery, no corruption, no bribery, no perjury, no blind fury, and interested faction among the electors in many parts of this kingdom; nor is it surprising, or at all blameable, in that class of private men, when they see their neighbours aggrandized, and themselves poor and virtuous without that eclat or dignity, which attends men in higher situations. But admit it were true that the great mass of the electors were too vast an object for court influence to grasp, or extend to, and that in despair they must abandon it; he must be very ignorant of the state of every popular interest, who does not know that in all the corporations, all the open boroughs, indeed in every district of the kingdom, there is some leading man, some agitator, some wealthy merchant, or considerable manufacturer, some active attorney, some popular preacher, some moneylender, &c. &c. who is followed by the whole flock. This is the style of all free countries. -Multùm in Fabiâ valet hic, valet ille Velinâ; many, nor so little powerful, nor so incorruptible, but that a minister may, as he does frequently, find means of gaining them, and through them all their followers. To establish, therefore, a very general influence among electors will no more be found an impracticable project, than to gain an undue influence over members of parliament. Therefore I am apprehensive that this Bill, though it shifts the place of the disorder, does by no means relieve the constitution. I went through almost every contested election in the beginning of this parliament, and acted as a manager in very many of them; by which, though as at a school of pretty severe and rugged discipline, I came to have some degree of instruction concerning the means, by which parliamentary interests are in general procured and supported. Theory, I know, would suppose, that every general election is to the representative a day of judgment, in which he ap pears before his constituents to account for the use of the talent, with which they intrusted him, and of the improvement he has made of it for the public advantage. It would be so, if every corruptible representative were to find an enlightened and But the pracincorruptible constituent. tice and knowledge of the world will not |