consideration the Petition of the Protestant Association of London, Westminster, and Southwark, praying the repeal of the late Act in favour of Popery in England. He acquainted the House, that the whole Association proposed to assemble in St. George's-fields, and to accompany their petition to the House in the most humble, decent, and respectful manner. His lordship then presented a Petition from his Majesty's loyal Protestant subjects of High Wycomb, for the repeal of the same Popish Bill. It was ordered to lie on the table. The King's Message for a Vote of Credit.] June 1. Lord North brought the following Message from the King: "G. R. "His Majesty, relying on the expe rienced zeal and affection of his faithful Commons, and considering that in this critical conjuncture, emergencies may arise which may be of the utmost importance, and be attended with the most dangerous consequences, if proper means should be not immediately applied to prevent or defeat them, is desirous that this House will enable him to defray any expences incurred, or to be incurred on account of military or ordnance services for the service of the year 1780, and to take all such measures as the exigency of affairs may require." Lord North moved, that the message be referred to a committee of the whole House. Lord George Gordon declared, that he could not but oppose in every stage any new grant of supplies to the King, till his Majesty and his servants gave complete redress to the grievances of the people, both as to the late innovations in favour of Popery, as well as to the shameful abuses complained of in the expenditure of public money. The House divided without further debate. Ayes 39; Noes 19. The Earl of Shelburne's Motion respecting the Armed Neutrality.] June 1. The order of the day being read, obtain. In conformity to this established rule of proceeding laid down by that high authority, he would very fairly point to the object he had in view. The papers he meant to call for, he assured their lordships, would be totally free from one objection, which had been deemed an incurable one for several years past; they would convey no improper intelligence to our enemies; they would reveal no secrets of state; they would give no offence to our friends, nor cause of alarm to our enemies. The papers he sought were already known to all Europe; they had appeared in all the foreign Gazettes; they were translated and had already been inserted in our own common news-papers. His motion, so far, was free from the least shadow of any objection. It was, however, in their lordships' power to bring them forward in another light, and render them the fit subject of parliamentary attention: for until they were authenticated to the House in the usual form, no parliamentary proceeding could be had upon them. This, he presumed, was but a matter of mere form; and if their lordships should think, with him, that the subject was a proper one for discussion, they would vote for the production of the papers; if not, they would of course give his intended motion a negative. In respect of the other part of the rule laid down by the learned lord now absent, he would, though contrary to the usual mode of conducting business in that House, comply with it; he would tell their lordships, very candidly and explicitly, what his motion pointed to. It was meant to lead to a vote of censure upon administration, and a specific vote, by way of an Address to the crown, for the removal of the first lord of the Admiralty from his present high office, and from a seat in his Majesty's councils. Having fully explained his intentions, and his objects, his lordship proceeded to state the subject matter of his ground of enquiry and accusation. The first, he said was merely introductory; the latter by way of censure. If he should be so fortunate as to carry the present motion for papers, he was determined to follow it up with a vote of censure, and a vote of re The Earl of Shelburne rose, and previously stated the doctrine of a noble lord then absent from his place (the lord chan-moval, such as he had described, unless cellor) on account of illness, that every lord who moved for papers, besides explaining his immediate motives for moving for them, was bound to inform the House of the ultimate object he proposed to administration in one event, or the noble earl at the head of the Admiralty in the other, should be able to shew, that they had acted in a manner merely dictated by necessity, or arising from circumstances which it was not in their power to prevent. Two objects were specially deserving of their lordships' attention; they were, it was true, distinct in themselves, though they were productive of but one effect. He meant the total neglect on the part of ministers, to procure alliances on the continent of Europe, and the disobliging the few friends we had. It was difficult to separate them in some respects; but as far as the observation applied to the motion which he held in his hand he would first state the recent transactions which, he presumed, were the cause of driving us into the melancholy dilemma in which we now stood. His motion, he said, was meant to include copies or extracts of all memorials or representations, delivered or received by his Majesty's ministers, relative to the claims of the several powers of Europe to a free navigation and commerce with our enemies: the instructions given to commodore Fielding, previous to his sailing to intercept admiral Byland; lord Stormont's declaration to count Welderen, the Dutch minister; his Majesty's declaration in the London Gazette, of the 18th of April, declaring his intentions of seizing military stores in neutral bottoms, &c. The empress of Russia's resolution of combining and confederating with all the neutral powers of Europe, and her intentions therein expressed of forming, in concert with them, a code of maritime laws, intended to protect the goods and merchandize of the contracting or confederating parties, should likewise be laid before the House. His lordship then commented upon several passages of those papers which he held in his hand, and read, he said, lest he should misquote them, if he had trusted merely to memory. One part of the Russian declaration, he would call it a manifesto, had a very remarkable expression indeed in it; it said, "that the Baltic was excluded by nature from the intrusion of all the powers of Europe, but such as had dominions situated upon it." What was this but fairly telling England, that every state on the face of the globe, which shall think proper to trade to the Baltic, will be protected in their property against the attacks or ravages of Great Britain, by us and the other two neighbouring powers, Sweden and Denmark, whom we have now called upon to combine with us, for the navigation of the Baltic? It is true there was a sweetener, which accompanied this decla ration, namely, the restoration of a British ship which had been captured by an American privateer; but how dull and senseless, or wilfully blind, ministers must have been, not to perceive that the very act of kindness established the principle of exclusion! What was it but to say, We have returned you a British ship, taken by an American privateer; but attend to the conclusion; if any of your ships of war, or armed vessels, should capture an American vessel within the limits we have thought fit to prescribe, be assured, the rule we have laid down is meant to be a general one, of which America shall be free to profit, as well as Great Britain. The fact in itself was alarming, but its consequences were, indeed, much more so, for it went to an implied acknowledgment of the independency of America. It stated no exception relative to rebels or subjects in arms; it avoided particulars, and only mentioned one, which was to confirm the general doctrine, that the Baltic and northern seas were free to all nations; and that the powers who laid an exclusive claim to the dominion of them, were determined, without any exception whatever, to maintain the freedom of their navigation. Another more alarming passage appeared in the Russian manifesto, " Free bottoms make free goods." Was not this declaration fairly telling the court of Great Britain, We will sell to neutral carriers ; we will carry ourselves, and we will protect each other, in supplying the belligerent powers with every thing they may want, such as carrying their own native commodities and merchandize to and from their several ports and harbours in the West Indies, &c. But this language imported still more, and amounted to an invitation to all the neutral powers in Europe to accede to the contents, and to meet, in order to devise the necessary measures for the composing a code of maritime law, founded upon the basis" of free ships, free goods," unless contrary to the conditions of subsisting treaties. This was at once destroying the law of nations, as it had remained for many centuries; but that was not all; it must terminate in the ruin of Britain, at least in the overthrow of her naval power; for the great advantage Britain possessed was, that she had heretofore enjoyed the advantage of an exclusive trade to her American colonies, which supplied great quantities of naval stores. On the breaking out of a war, Britain, be sides having a supply from America, had the common European market to resort to, namely, Russia and the other northern powers; and being generally superior at sea, she had not only the opportunity of supplying her own demand, but likewise the power of cutting off, in a great measure, the necessary supply from France and Spain; so that our superiority at sea was owing more to that circumstance, than either to the numbers of our seamen, the great extent of our commerce, or even the skill and bravery of our officers and men. The code of maritime law, which, for aught he knew, was already agreed upon, taking away the great advantage which we had over every other nation now in Europe; evidently puts us on a level with our enemies in point of supply, but much below them in the inevitable effects; for if France and Spain could have naval and military stores in any quantities they wanted; if they could transport their property to and from the western world, in free, because neutral bottoms, it was to the last degree ridiculous to say, or believe, that Great Britain could possibly be able to cope with the united force of the House of Bourbon. Being thus deprived of the advantages which had given us the superiority, during the three last wars, over the House of Bourbon, the foundation taken away, the superstructure erected upon that basis must fall to pieces, and then, farewell for ever to the naval power and glory of Great Britain! His lordship next proceeded to state the particular predicament this country stood in respecting Holland. He observed, that soon after the breaking out of the American war, we had, by a most bullying and oppressive conduct, irritated the Dutch, and filled them with resentments, which he believed would not be shortly eradicated. We treated them more like the wretched dependants, or the subjects of petty Italian republics, than a state which filled so respectable a niche in the grand European system. There were then two principal treaties existing; one of which permitted the Dutch to trade with our foreign enemies in time of war or actual hostilities; the other obliged them to assist us in the event of being attacked in Europe. On the breaking out of the troubles in America, we were not at war with any foreign power, either in Europe or elsewhere; consequently, there could be no requisition made to the States Generals for troops or ships; yet what was the conduct of the court of Great Britain? She gave orders to seize all naval stores in Dutch bottoms, and broke the treaty of 1674 without colour or pretence. When hostilities commenced with France, which by the bye, we, not they, commenced, by the taking of the Pallas and Licorne frigates, the same orders were renewed; the treaty of 1674 was daily violated, and scarcely a week passed which did not bring an account of some ship, belonging to Holland, having been captured and brought into our ports. Thus was the treaty of 1674 broke through, without a pretence of the treaty of 1716 being evaded; and even the violent and rash measure of the 3d of January last, was not preceded by the requisition made for the troops and ships finally determined upon by Holland. Besides, the tenor of the treaty did not bind Holland, but upon two contingencies, first, that our enemies were not the aggressors, which, in fact, they were not; secondly, that we were attacked in Europe, which no man, he presumed, would assert. But be that as it might, it was clear that it was we, who had first violated the treaty with Holland, and afterwards, that we attacked the Dutch in an hostile manner, before we could possibly know whether they would have fulfilled the other treaty for the supply of the men and ships. That business was at the time in a train of negociation. Every person in the least conversant in the constitution of the United Provinces, well knew, that their deliberations were necessarily slow, when every province was vested with a negative, and every town and district, almost in each province, with a negative likewise in their provincial assemblies; consequently it was impossible, from the nature of the government, to come to an immediate decision, as in other countries, when the whole of the executive power was lodged in a single hand. He was ready to acknowledge that the Dutch were a people much attached to their own interests; that their power and riches solely originated from commerce; that being the great carriers of Europe, they had every temptation to insist upon the rigid observance of the treaty of 1674, and to evade that for furnishing a supply of troops and ships to Great Britain, for fear of involving themselves in a war with France; but those very powerful motives should have suggested to the cabinet of Great Britain, the idea of a proper management, suitable to the difficulty and but I know it to be a fact, that attempts have been made to bribe the Hollanders with money; and I will tell the noble viscount what perhaps he is ignorant of, that notwithstanding the great expectations he may have formed from the negociations at Rotterdam, and elsewhere, among the merchants, his negociations (I presume his lordship is no stranger to what I mean) will most assuredly miscarry; and that he and all his colleagues in office will find themselves, at long run, as fatally disappointed in this money negociation, as they have been more than once in their attempts to bring over the leaders in America. delicacy of the occasion, and which pru- | informed that this ministerial mode of nedence would have endeavoured to provide gociation had failed. The noble viscount against. They ought to have adminis-(Stormont) may shrug up his shoulders, tered every preventive in their power. It might have been an arduous task; but to what use were ministers paid and employed? Where was the supposed wisdom, management, and address of men in office, if they did not devise means to qualify, to defeat, or soften, what it might not be in their power entirely to remove? On the contrary, what was the conduct of the British cabinet? They oppressed those whom they ought to have treated with a most delicate and cautious hand; they irritated and insulted those whom they should have soothed and managed; and created the most indignant and fixed resentments in the breasts of those whom they should, with persuasiveness, drawn from arguments of common interest, former and present friendships, and future safety, have assuaged. It was true that Holland was infected with party, as well as England. There was a strong French faction there, who were further strengthened by those who had no other object but the present to gain. On the other hand, he would ask ministers, if England had not many weighty and powerful friends there? Most certainly; no man would deny it. Might not, then, a proper address effect a great deal? Might not the favourable dispositions be improved? Might not means be found even to gratify the views, in some measure, of the interested and avaricious, and even the violent be pacified? What could not be openly effected, might it not be brought about by other means? Not by bribery, for he understood that art had not been left unessayed. Ministers had, he believed, tried those means already, but to very little effect. Experience taught them to try the means, which had so successfully answered their fullest expectations here at home; but though the governing object in commercial states was gain; though the Hollanders preferred money to almost every other consideration, they chose their method of obtaining it; they were not yet come to the last and grossest stage of human corruption, that of receiving round bribes for their popular suffrages. Money, he understood, had been distributed, but he believed, and was persuaded, it had been thrown away. It might influence other nations to do any thing; but unless with a few prostitute wretches, who were the growth of every country, he was well His lordship lamented that we had not a single ally in Europe; nay more, that we had not a single friend or well-wisher. He should not be surprised to hear the noble viscount in high office rise and explain away the whole of the Russian declaration, and endeavour to represent it as a scene of nothing but management between the courts of London and Petersburgh; but he would anticipate what the noble lord might say on that head, by resorting to a few facts, not of a doubtful nature, or liable to be controverted, but of the most acknowledged notoriety. He held, he said, the proofs in his hand; he would state them, and he defied any noble lord in office to contradict a syllable of their contents. They were contained in the papers included in his intended motion. There were but two lights in which the Russian manifesto could be properly considered; the first with respect to the belligerent powers, the latter with respect to the neutral. How did the neutral powers receive the Russian declaration? Holland acceded to it; Sweden and Denmark, he was persuaded, had done the same before now; and Portugal would probably be compelled to follow the example, how much soever she might be disinclined, as having little or no interest in it. She was no carrier; her products were no object on either hand. She could dispose of her commodities, and receive those of other nations, without risk or danger. If this state of the question was not fairly laid down, he begged some minister would rise and assure their lordships, if some satisfaction was not given by Great Britain to the neutral powers of Europe, in which her claim of stopping and seizing the goods of neutrals was not relinquished; whether it was not meant to assemble a | congress at the Hague, or some other town in Holland, to be composed of delegates from the several neutral powers in Europe, in order to frame a code of maritime law, which should be binding upon the belligerent powers, both at present and in future. On the other hand, what was the conduct of the belligerent powers? France immediately, on the receipt of the Russian declaration, expressed her fullest approbation; and, as a proof of its justice and policy, not only took off immediately the additional duties laid upon the commodities of such of the United Provinces as had refused to come into her views, but actually issued orders for the restitution of such of the additional duties as had been collected upon the product, manufactures, and commerce of those other provinces which appeared less friendly to her views. The court of Madrid followed the same example, and ordered restitution to the Dutch owners; while England gave up the point only so far as Russia itself was concerned, which was directly cementing the other neutral powers, driving them into the views of the court of Petersburgh, and by that means rendering her the empire of the naval and commercial system of Europe. But, from the fact to proceed to the conclusion, was it not fair to presume that Great Britain was now driven to the necessity of going to war with the rest of Europe, or of submitting to the law contained in this new maritime code? He knew of but one possible way of extricating us from the difficulties we were engaged in, and the danger with which we were threatened, though he could not promise that it would prove successful; that was by immediately going back to the treaty of 1674, by leaving Holland at liberty to act at her discretion; by giving in one instance, and taking in another; pointing out fairly, distinctly, and explicitly, the danger of permitting France to erect a naval power on the ruin of that of Britain; and reminding the Hollanders of the danger of their situation, if so formidable and ambitious an enemy should, to her great land power, make an acquisition of the dominion of the sea. He confessed our situation presented nothing but a choice of difficulties; that it was a measure of humiliation, considering the lengths we had, through the absurdity, obstinacy, and imbecility of our ministers, been led into. It was their lordships' duty to know how we had been led into this fatal situation, as well as to know what every man must acknowledge, that we were in it; and he thought it the duty of their lordships to be acquainted with the names of those pernicious counsellors, who had rashly, madly, and foolishly advised his Majesty to take so impolític, precipitate, and, he feared, so fatal a step, in order that they might be held up to future ages, as a monument to succeeding ministers, how they risked the interests of the country, nay its very existence as a nation, to such wild, impracticable, and destructive experiments. He then contrasted the conduct of former administrations with the present, in respect of alliances; and pointed out several favourable opportunities, which had presented themselves in the space of the last nine or ten years. He stated the favourable disposition of the court of Versailles, in the affair of the Spanish rupture, respecting Falkland's island, at the close of the year 1770, when, if the French king had not personally interfered, a war would have been inevitable. He said, though this country did not acknowledge many obligations to Louis 15, England was, at the period alluded to, much indebted to him. His minister pressed him on the occasion, but the monarch, averse to war, and well inclined towards Great Britain, parted with that minister, and introduced a pacific system, by calling M. D'Aiguillon to the head of his councils. This disposition might have been further improved and strengthened, and a full and permanent amity established, probably between both countries. Another favourable opening soon after offered in the case of the dispute between Russia and the Porte. Upon that occasion, it was true, the court of London did interfere, but procured no benefit thereby to herself. She preserved the balance of maritime power; she prevented the Russian squadron from being destroyed; she gave every friendly assistance she could, without taking an open and decisive part; and made no terms whatever, nor provision for the day of possible distress. Again, upon the partition of Poland, she might have easily turned the scale against the king of Prussia, by entering into a treaty with the emperor; or if the partition was not thought to be proper, in respect of Russia and Austria, who had no claim, though. Prussia had some title to the territories he claimed; Great Britain might have joined |