dynasties, utterly destroys their authority in matters of legislation. I feel not at all sure that, before this work of mine appears in print, the proposed French constitution may not be swept away by another revolution, and that an Emperor for life may not be by acclaim substituted for an elective President. I would rather stand in the ancient ways of our own constitution, than follow so fleeting and dismal a meteor as a French institution.

I propose, then, that the constitution of the new PROVINCE should consist of-1. A LEGISLATURE, composed of-1. A Governor, to be appointed by the Crown, for such time as to the Crown seems fit. The Crown may ap point whom (being a subject) it pleases, when it pleases, and for so long as it pleases. 2. A legislative Council to be elected for five years by the freeholders of the country, each county returning one member. And, 3. A House of Assembly, elected for three years by the freeholders, each county sending two.* [I shall immediately discuss some points connected with the powers of the legislature.]

2. Next of an ADMINISTRATIVE body called the Executive Council, to be appointed entirely by the Governor, and selected, like our own administration,

*I do not dwell here on the constituency, or the mere forms of voting, &c.; but the constituency ought to be as wide as possible, and the elections should occur at times predetermined by the constitutional law. The ordinance above quoted will, I suppose, somewhat surprise those who look to America for democratic examples. The property qualification, both for electors and representatives, being by that law stringently enforced.

from such persons as can command a majority in the two Houses of the Legislature.

3. Of a JUDICATURE. The judges to be appointed by the Crown, acting by means of the Governor. The number of the judges must be decided, in the case of each Province, by its necessities. The legislature must for themselves decide upon this question.

It is not necessary for me to give a precise and complete enumeration of the powers to be possessed by the Legislature of the Province. Some observations, however, are needed on a few separate and peculiar questions:-On the Civil List-On the Land Fund-and Trade. I will briefly remark on these three subjects, and in the order I have named them here.

1. The Civil List has always proved a stumbling block for Colonial Secretaries, simply because they insist upon following false analogies. In England, when the Sovereign mounts the throne, a civil list is voted by parliament for the life of the Sovereign. The colonies have constantly demurred and hesitated when the proposal has been made to them to follow the example of England, and in the same way provide a civil list for the life of the new Sovereign. The objection of the colonists has not yet been answered; it is this:—they say, there is no danger in passing the civil list in England for a Sovereign's life, as it forms so very small an item of the whole expenditure of England, and because full power and control are retained by parliament, not merely by the annually-voted expenditure, but by the Mutiny Bill, which is renewed from year to year. Parliament, by refusing that bill, or by refusing to pay

the army, can compel obedience to its wishes. But we, say the colonists, if we pay our civil list, can have no guarantee for our having a parliament for years; and if the governor chooses to set us at defiance, we have no longer any effective check upon him.

This argument I think valid. On the other hand, there is certainly an evil in making the judges dependent on a popular assembly from year to year for their salaries and subsistence. There is a road out of this difficulty. We may adopt the plan of the Belgian legislature—a very grave, sedate, and rational legislature-and vote the civil list, including therein the salaries of the judges and the governor, for ten years. If there are any other officers who need to be included in the civil list, they may be easily placed there. I do not, however, see reason why any should be so placed, except the judges and the governor.

2. So soon as the PROVINCE is constituted, all power of the Secretary of State over the wild lands of the colony ought to cease. The account at the Bank of England is closed, and the money belonging to the SETTLEMENT should be paid into the Exchequer of the PROVINCE; the agent of the SETTLEMENT no longer exists, and all subsequent regulations concerning the land, the sales, and the agent, must now emanate from the Legislature and Government of the Province.

The governor still possesses the power, as representing the Sovereign, and, in her name, of assenting to, of reserving for approval, or of refusing, any measure or bill passed by the two legislative houses. This power, to be exercised by the governor appointed by the Crown, is the link connecting the colony and the mother country.

The above statement as to the land within the colony, and the control of the colonial legislature over it, and its whole revenue and expenditure, will, I have no doubt, appear to the casual reader a very fair, and not unexpected proposition. But they who are conversant with the Colonies and with the Colonial Office, well know the sort of bitter opposition with which it would be met, if the Act of Parliament I have so often spoken of were now a Bill before parliament. The fierce, pertinacious opposition of the Colonial Office, when this proposal was made on behalf of the Canadas, or rather on behalf of Lower Canada, I well know. The House of Assembly demanded, and wisely demanded, the control, not merely of the nett produce of the Land Fund-the produce which the authorities chose to pay into the provincial exchequer -but they asked for the accounts of the gross sums obtained they claimed to have a voice respecting every farthing which the Land Fund supplied, and a control over the expenses of collection. But they were met by the old tale of analogies,—the wild lands and other public estates were Crown lands-they were like the hereditary property of the King in England, and could not be touched without an invasion of the prerogative. A rebellion broke out before this foolish opposition ceased. It ceased as to Canada, because the Colonial Office was afraid to continue it. The hidden rulers of that mysterious precinct were frightened into compliance. But in those cases where no fear exists, control over the wild lands will be firmly retained. This mischievous power is the bane of our colonies. The persons who exercise it may be, and I dare say are, very well intentioned—I say nothing of their motives. They are, however, too far off-too

much occupied with other matters-to be able properly, or even fairly, to deal with interests like these. We are all of us accustomed to hear very sharp criticisms upon the system of centralization which pervades every part of the government of France. Napoleon at Moscow, and in the Kremlin, regulating the opera at Paris, may be a more ludicrous exaggeration of this system, but he certainly is not a more complete or mischievous instance of it than a clerk of the Colonial Office in Downing-street deciding upon the steps to be taken for the survey and sale of lands in South Australia, New Zealand, Port Philip, Natal, in the townships of Lower Canada, or away on some far distant river that may fall into Erie or Ontario. Yet such, by the theory, is his power. The probability is, that in any case of the sort, he would be profoundly ignorant of the very name of the place,* and without one atom of knowledge which could guide his decision upon the matter respecting which he would

* A celebrated Chancellor of the Exchequer, now no more, once asked a friend of mine, when discussing with him the subject of the timber trade, if Montreal was not the capital of Upper Canada. My astonished friend, who had before the interview very exalted ideas as to what a Chancellor of the Exchequer was, came to me breathless to relate the story. I myself was malicious enough to ask a young gentleman, sent to a Committee of the House of Commons by the Colonial Office, in order to instruct us benighted legislators, the question, "What are the King's posts, sir." The committee was inquiring into the grievances of Canada, and the question related to that country. The King's posts are, in fact, certain distant establishments far beyond the limits of civilization, kept up for purposes of intercourse with the Indians. The answer was, "Oh, they are the mail, in fact, and carry letters!!" Yet this gentleman would have considered himself a much more competent