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the lawful process of the Courts. Examples of the latter class of contempt are :

Intimidation of parties or witnesses (c).

Disobedience to the orders of the Court (d).

The manufacture of false evidence to mislead the Court (e). The publication of comments relating to pending cases which are calculated to prejudice the fair trial of those cases and so interfere with the course of justice (ƒ). An agreement to indemnify bail (g).

(c) Archbold, 1145. By 55 & 56 Vict. c. 64, it is a misdemeanour, punishable by a fine of £100, or imprisonment for three months, to threaten or injure a person on account of his evidence given before a Royal Commission, or a Parliamentary Committee, or on any enquiry held by statutory authority.

(d) See R. v. Robinson, 2 Burr. 799; R. v. Johnson, 4 M. & S. 515; v. also Archbold, p. 6.

(e) R. v. Vreones, [1891] 1 Q. B. 360; 60 L. J. M. C. 62. (f) R. v. Tibbits, [1902] 1 K. B. 77; 71 L. J. K. B. 4. 1159, 1160.

(g) R. v. Porter, [1910] 1 K. B. 369; 79 L. J. K. B. 241.

See also Archbold,

CHAPTER V.

OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC PEACE.

MANY of the crimes mentioned in other chapters involve a breach of the peace. But the offences now to be dealt with are those in which the breach of the peace is the prominent feature. In some-for example, in libel-at first sight the injury done to the individual appears to be the principal point; but a consideration of the way in which the law deals with the offence shows that it is otherwise. Thus, proof of the truth of a libel will not amount to a defence, unless it was for the public benefit that the matter should be published.

RIOTS (h).

There are two minor offences, which, as steps to the graver crime of riot, must first be noticed.

An unlawful assembly is any meeting of three or more persons for purposes forbidden by law or with intent to carry out any common purpose, lawful or unlawful, under such circumstances of alarm, either from the large numbers, or the mode or time of the assembly, as in the opinion of firm and rational men are likely to endanger the peace; although no aggressive act may be actually done (i). All parties joining in and countenancing the proceedings are criminally liable. It is generally considered that the intention must be to do something which, if actually executed, would amount to a riot. But a lawful assembly is not rendered unlawful by reason of the knowledge of those taking part in it that

(h) For riotous destruction of buildings, machinery, &c., v. p. 264.
(i) R. v. Vincent, [1839] 9 C. & P. 91.

opposition will be raised to it, which opposition will in all probability give rise to a breach of the peace by those creating it (k).

A rout is said to be the disturbance of the peace caused by those who, after assembling together to do a thing which, if executed, would amount to a riot, proceed to execute that act, but do not actually execute it. It differs from a riot only in the circumstance that the enterprise is not actually executed. A riot is a tumultuous disturbance of the peace by three or more persons, assembling together of their own authority, with an intent mutually to assist one another against any who shall oppose them in the execution of some enterprise of a private nature, and afterwards actually executing the same, in a violent and turbulent manner, to the terror of the people, and this whether the act intended be of itself lawful or unlawful (1).

An example will more clearly show the difference between these three crimes. A hundred men armed with sticks meet together at night to consult about the destruction of a fence which their landlord has erected: this is an unlawful assembly. They march out together from the place of meeting in the direction of the fence: this amounts to a rout. They arrive at the fence, and, amid great confusion, violently pull it down this is a riot.

In order to constitute a riot five elements are necessary: (i) the presence of not less than three persons; (ii) a common purpose; (iii) execution or inception of the common purpose; (iv) an intent to help one another, by force if necessary, against anyone who may oppose them in the execution of the common purpose; (v) force or violence displayed in such a manner as to alarm at least one person of reasonable firmness. The object must be of a local or private nature; otherwise, as if to redress a public grievance, it may amount to treason (m).

(k) Beatty v. Gillbanks, [1882] 9 Q. B. D. 308; 51 L. J. M. C. 117.

(1) Archbold, 1164.

(m) Field v. Receiver of Metropolitan Police, [1907] 2 K. B. 853; 76 L. J. K. B. 1015; v. p. 36.

The gist of the offence is the unlawful manner of proceeding, that is, with circumstances of force or violence, or in such a way as to create terror in the minds of the public. Therefore, assembling for the purpose of an unlawful object, and actually executing it, though it might be punishable as a conspiracy, is not a riot, if it is done peaceably (n).

These three offences are common law misdemeanours, punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both.

For the case of riots which assume a more formidable aspect, further provision is made by statute (o). If twelve or more persons are unlawfully and riotously assembled to the disturbance of the peace, and being required by proclamation (p), by a justice of the peace, sheriff or under-sheriff, mayor, or other head officer of a town to disperse, they then continue together for an hour after, they are guilty of felony, and liable to penal servitude to the extent of life (q). It is a felony attended by the same punishment to oppose the reading of the proclamation: and this opposition will not excuse those who know that the proclamation would have been read had it not been for this hindrance (r). Prosecutions under this Act must be commenced within twelve months after the commission of the offence (s).

Posse comitatus.-A course of proceeding founded on an old statute (t), still unrepealed, is provided for offences of this character. Any two justices, together with the sheriff or under-sheriff of the county, may may come with the posse comitatus (i.e., a force consisting of all able-bodied men except clergymen), and suppress a riot, rout, or unlawful

(n) Archbold, 1165. Clifford v. Brandon, [1810] 2 Camp, at p. 369. (0) Riot Act, 1 Geo. I. st. 2, c. 5; and 7 Wm. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 91, s. 1. (p) "Reading the Riot Act."

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(q) 1 Geo. I. st. 2, c. 5, s. 1. The form of proclamation is prescribed by the statute: Our sovereign lord the king chargeth and commandeth all persons being assembled immediately to disperse themselves, and peaceably to depart to their habitations, or to their lawful business, upon the pains contained in the Act made in the first year of King George, for preventing tumults and riotous assemblies-God save the King."

(r) Ibid. s. 5.

(s) Ibid. s. 8.

(t) 13 Hen. IV. c. 7.

assembly; may arrest the rioters, and make a record of the circumstances on the spot, which will be sufficient evidence for the conviction of the offenders. Any battery, wounding, or killing that may happen in suppressing the riot is justifiable. The riotous demolishing of buildings, machinery, &c., is punishable by penal servitude for life under a more recent statute (u).

AFFRAY.

A fighting between two or more persons in some public place, to the terror of His Majesty's subjects. If it takes place in private, it will be an assault. It differs from a riot, inasmuch as there must be three persons to constitute the latter. Mere quarrelsome or threatening words do not amount to an affray.

An affray may be suppressed and the parties separated by a private person who is present; and a peace officer is bound to interfere. The offence is a common law misdemeanour, punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both.

CHALLENGE TO FIGHT.

To challenge to fight, either by word or letter, or to be the bearer of such challenge, or to provoke another to send a challenge, is a misdemeanour at common law punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both. It is not necessary that actual fighting should follow. Provocation, however great, is no justification (w), though it may mitigate the sentence of the Court.

SENDING THREATENING LETTERS.

It is obvious that the receipt of a threatening letter is not unlikely to lead to a breach of the peace on the part of the receiver. Therefore to prevent such breach, and at the same time to punish what is an offence against the security of the

(u) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, ss, 11, 12. See post, p. 264.
(w) R. v. Rice, [1803] 3 East, 581.

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