Refusing to aid police] On such an indictment it is necessary to prove that, 1st, the constable saw a breach of the peace committed; 2nd, there was a reasonable necessity for calling on defendant; and 3rd, when duly called on, defendant, without any physical impossibility or lawful excuse, refused to do so. Brown, 1841: per Alderson B. It is no defence to such an indictment that from the number of rioters the single aid of the defendant would not have been of any use. Ib.; Pinney, above.

A person so aiding a constable is protected from assault eundo, morando, et reduendo. Phelps, Carr. & M. 180, 1841: per Coltman J. See resolutions 5 and 6, Sissinghurst case.

Neglect in suppressing disturbance is triable at Q. S.

Proof under the Riot A.] When, in the reading of the proclamation in s. 2, the words 'God save the King' were omitted, it was held that there must be an acquittal: Child, 4 C. & P. 442, 1830.

An indictment for remaining assembled one hour after proclamation made, need not charge the original riot to have been in terrorem populi; it is sufficient if it pursue the words of the A., for there is a distinction between an indictment for a riot and one framed on this A.: per Patteson J., Warren James, 5 C. & P. 153, 1831.

When it was not proved that defendant was among the mob during the whole of the hour, but he was proved to have been there at various times during the hour, it was held that it was for the jury on all the circumstances, whether he did substantially continue making part of the assembly for the hour; for, although he might have occasion to separate himself for a minute or two, yet, if in substance he was there during the hour, he would not be thereby excused: ib.

A second or subsequent reading does not do away with the effect of the first, and the hour is to be computed from the time of the first: per Patteson J., Woolcock, 5 C. & P. 516, 1833.

If there be such an assembly that there would have been a riot if the parties had carried their purpose into effect, it would be within the Act, and whether there was a cessation or not is a question for the jury.' Ib. Cf. Young v. Peck.

Prosecution] Not merely an aggrieved person but any one, and therefore the police, may take proceedings, when an outburst might easily develop into a riot,' i.e. owing to the numbers: Young, &c. v. Peck. Cf. Woolcock.

Verdict] On indictment for riot, common assault may be found, if apt words are used: T. O'Brien, 75 J. P. 192; 22 Cox C. C. 374; 27 T. L. R. 204; 6 Cr. A. R. 108, 1911, which states that Sudbury, above, was decided only on the point of numbers.

Absolutely total demolition is not necessary, if the house is no longer a house. Langford, above, where only a chimney was left standing; cf. Adams, below.

Though the indictment be only for beginning to demolish, pull down, &c., yet in order to secure a conviction under s. 11, it must appear that such a beginning was with intent to demolish the whole. The beginning to pull down,' said Parke J.-on identical words, rpd. -means not simply a demolition of a part-but a part with an intent to demolish the whole. . . If the prisoners meant to stop where they did [i.e. breaking windows and doors], and do no more they are not guilty; but if they intended, when they broke the

windows, &c., to go farther, and destroy the house, then they are guilty... If they had the full means of going farther, and were not interrupted, but left off of their own accord, it is evidence. that they meant the work of demolition to stop where it did.' They began by breaking the windows, and having afterwards entered the house, set fire to the furniture; but no part of the house was burnt. Parke J. said: If you think that they originally came there without intent to demolish, and the setting fire to the furniture was an afterthought, but with that intent, then you must acquit, because no part of the house having been burnt, there was no beginning to destroy the house. If they came originally without such intent, but had afterwards set fire to the house, then the offence would be arson. If you have doubts whether they originally came with a purpose to demolish, you may use the setting fire to the furniture under such circumstances, and in such manner as that the necessary consequence, if not for timely interference, would have been the burning of the house, as evidence to show that they had such intent, although they began to demolish in another manner.' Ashton, 1 Lew. C. C. 296, 1830. The same rule was laid down in the two following cases:Defendants about midnight riotously burst open the door of a house, broke some of the furniture and all the windows, and did other damage, after which they went away, though there was nothing to prevent them committing further injury; Littledale J. told the jury that this was not a beginning to demolish,' unless they were satisfied that the ultimate object was to demolish the house; and that if they had carried their intentions into full effect, they would in fact have demolished it. That such was not the case here, for that they had gone away, having manifestly completed their purpose, and done all the injury they meant to do. Thomas, 4 C. & P. 237, 1830; Howell, 1839; and cf. Batt. But if they ceased merely because they were prevented by the police, &c., that would be 'beginning': Howell. See also Adams and ten others, Carr. & M. 299, 1842; cf. Langford, above, where Coleridge J. said: Before you can find the prisoners guilty, you must be of opinion that they meant to leave the house no house at all in fact. If they intended to leave it still a house, though in a state however dilapidated, they are not guilty under this highly penal statute.' Destroying moveable shop-shutters is not a beginning' as they are not part of the freehold: Howell. Injuries to parts of buildings are now provided for by s. 12.

If in felonious demolition-which burning is [Howell]-by rioters, some of them set fire to the house itself, and others carry furniture out of the house, and burn it, it will be for the jury whether the latter were not encouraging and taking part in a general design of destroying the house and furniture; and if so, the jury ought to convict them: per Tindal C.J., Harris and twenty-eight others, Carr. & M. 661, 1842. If a house be demolished by rioters by fire, one of them who is present while the fire is burning may be convicted for the statutory felony, although he is not proved to have been present when the house was originally set on fire. Simpson, &c. and sixteen others, Carr. & M. 669, 1842.

When an election mob pursued a person who took refuge in a public-house, on which they attacked the house, threatening to pull it down unless he was given up, and broke windows, &c., and destroyed much of the furniture, but being unable to find the person, went away, Tindal C.J. ruled, that the case was not within the A. (rpd.), the object not being to destroy the house, but to secure the person.

Price and fifteen others, 5 C. & P. 510, 1833. But in another case Gurney B. ruled that defendants might be convicted of beginning to demolish, though their principal object might be to injure an unpopular employer inside the house, provided it was also their object to demolish the house, on account of its having been used by him. Batt, 6 C. & P. 329, 1834.

Murder] See Index.

Bonâ fide claim of right] excludes riot: Langford, above; but there must be no more violence, &c. than is necessary: Soley and Clifford v. Brandon.

Compensation] See 49-50 V. 38, 2.

Riot is triable at Q. S.

RIVER BANKS, DAMAGING.

See Sea, &c.

ROADS, OFFENCES IN OR ABOUT.

See Highways and Nuisance.

ROBBERY (AND STEALING FROM THE PERSON)

is, says Hawk. P. C. 1, 34, Introdn., 'mixt or complicated larceny ' (1) from the person and (2) which puts in fear. For the elements common with larceny, see that title.

By 6-7 G. 5, 50 (Larceny A. 1916), 23 (1): 'Every person who (a) being armed with any offensive weapon or instrument, or being together with one other person or more, robs, or assaults with intent to rob, any person; (b) robs any person, and at the time of or immediately before or immediately after such robbery uses any personal violence to any person, shall be guilty of felony'; maximum punishment, penal servitude for life; and a male may also be whipped privately once. In some cases flogging should be inflicted instead of a long term: e.g. Swenson, 13 Cr. A. R. 209, 1918, where for seven years' p. s. twenty strokes and twelve months' imp. w. h. 1. were substituted. This offence is not triable at Q. S.; the others are. (2) Every person who robs any person shall be guilty of felony': maximum punishment, penal servitude for fourteen years.

(3) Every person who assaults any person with intent to rob shall be guilty of felony'; maximum punishment, five years' penal servitude. The Garotting' Act, 26-7 V. 44, applies to this s.

Indictment-verdict] There is a form (No. 8) appended to Indictments A.

By s. 44 (1) of the Larceny A. on indictment for robbery, assault with intent to rob may be found, but not, it may therefore be inferred, common assault; this was also expressly held (though with doubt) in Woodhall, 12 Cox C. C. 240, 1872, under the rpd. s. which s. 23 (3) replaces. Boden, to the contrary, was under a quite different s. (rpd.).

Common law] Robbery, 'properly so called,' is thus defined:'A felonious taking of money or goods to any value from the person of another, or in his presence against his will, by violence or putting him in fear' ['which the law considers as constructive violence': 2 Russ. Cri. 1134]. East P. C. 707-8.

The property must be taken while the influence of fear exists; for if the property be taken first, and the menaces or threats be used afterwards, it is not robbery. Prosecutor seeing his purse in defendant's hand demanded it, when the latter, who had just stolen it from his person, answered, Villain, if thou speakest of this purse, I will pluck thy house over thine ears,' &c., and then went away; and because he took it not with violence or put prosecutor in fear, it was ruled to be but stealth, and not robbery, but larceny. Harman, 2 Roll. Rep. 154; 1 Hale P. C. 534; Lea. 198, n., 1620.

In Woodward, 11 Mod. 137, 1707, where several persons got money out of a man by threatening to get a warrant for his arrest and to indict him for perjury, Holt C.J. said that every extortion is an actual

Robbery: Intent: Taking.

1007

trespass, and to make use of a process of law' to 'fright' a man out of his money, indictable.

Felonious intent] in the taking is the same as in larceny. And as there must be a felonious intent with regard to the goods charged, it is not enough that there was at the same time an intent to steal other goods. A. assaulted B. on the highway with a felonious intent, and searched his pockets for money, but finding none, pulled off the bridle of B.'s horse, and threw that and some bread which B. had in pannels about the highway, but did not take anything from B. All the judges resolved this to be no robbery, because nothing was taken from B. 'The better reason seems to be that the particular goods taken were not taken with a felonious intent, for surely there was a sufficient taking and separation of the goods from the person.' Anon., East P. C. 662, 1698.

Constructive intent] If the original assault is not made with the intent of robbing, but the intent arises before the property is taken, it is sufficient. Defendant assaulted a woman, with intent to ravish her, and she, without any demand made by him, offered him money, which he took, but continued his attempt to ravish. A considerable majority of the judges held this to be robbery, on the ground that she, from violence and terror occasioned by the prisoner's behaviour, and to redeem her chastity, offered the money, which it was clear she would not have given voluntarily; and the prisoner, by taking it, derived that advantage to himself from his felonious conduct; though his original attempt were to commit a rape.' Blackham, East P. Č. 711, 1787; but this would hardly be followed now; cf. Edwards, 1843, below.

Claim of right] Though the goods were taken with violence and menaces, yet under a bonâ fide claim it is no robbery, as there is no larceny; see Hall, 3 C. & P. 409, 1828, under this title in Larceny; see also Boden, 1 C. & K. 398, 1844.

The taking] See Asportation; 'something must be taken, for an assault with intent to rob is an offence of a different and inferior nature': East P. C. 707. In order to constitute a taking, there must be a possession of the robber. Therefore, if a man, having a purse tied to his girdle, is assaulted by a thief, and, in the struggle the girdle breaks, and the purse falls to the ground, this is no robbery, because no taking; but if the thief once has it in his hand, though after the girdle breaks he does not touch it, it is a taking and a robbery. 1 Halo P. C. 533, citing Crompton, quoted under Severance, which passage ends: but it is not robbery, for he neither assaulted him nor put him in fear' [Dalton, c. 153: 'these secret and privy takings from my person are no robbery']. See Peat and Lapier. Though it was formerly (about 1700, 2 East P. C. 703) held that a sudden taking or snatching of any property from a person unawares was sufficient to constitute robbery, the contrary doctrine appears to be now established,' viz. that unless there were some struggle to keep the thing, and it were forced from the hand of the owner, it was not robbery, e.g. Gnosil, 1 C. & P. 304, 1824, where defendant jerked a watch out of a man's pocket.

Value] Though the gist of the offence is the force and terror, the thing taken must have some value: 3 Inst. 69: 'be the value thereof