During the Birmingham riots defendants threatened circumstantially to burn prosecutor's house, unless he gave them money, &c., which he did. The jury found that prosecutor did not deliver his money from any [immediate] apprehension of danger to his life or person, but from an apprehension, that if he refused, his house would at some future time be pulled down (as many others had been); cf. Reane, above. But he had expressed great apprehension about his wife, who was in the house, and as East asks, 'If the threat of burning down a man's dwelling-house by a mob do not in itself convey a threat of personal danger to the occupiers? A majority of the judges held this to be robbery. Astley, ib. 729; Brown, ib. 731, 1780; Spencer, 1783.

A servant maid was inveigled by one defendant, a tout,' into a mock-auction, the door was shut, and she was 'hustled' and not allowed to leave till she had bid; after repeated refusals she bid sixpence more,' and a lot was knocked down to her by the other defendant at fourteen shillings, &c. She had not that sum, and was forcibly prevented from leaving, and some attempt was made to seize her bundle (as a pledge). Ultimately a mock-constable was produced, who threatened there and then to take her to Bow Street and thence to Newgate (as one defendant ordered '), unless he got a shilling for his trouble, which she gave him. He thereupon pretended that the auctioneer released her, and he and she went away. She herself said that the only fear she was under was that of being arrested, &c. The jury found defendants guilty of combination' to obtain her money, that the shilling was given for fear of arrest, &c., and that she did not know at the time the extent of the violence that might be committed upon her.' The judges were of opinion that the circumstances did not amount to robbery (but to conspiracy, for which defendants were afterwards indicted). Ashurst J. said that the species of threat here, in the opinion of the judges, is not sufficient to raise such a degree of terror in the mind as to constitute the crime of robbery, for it was only a threat to put her into the hands of the law, and an innocent person need not in such circumstances be apprehensive of any danger. She might have known that having done no wrong, the law, if she had been carried to prison, would have taken her under its protection, and set her free. The terror arising from such a source cannot, therefore, be considered of a degree sufficient to induce a person to part with his money. It is the case of a simple duress"; the tout,' the force which' the 'tout' used was merely that of pushing her into the sale-room, and detaining her until she gave the shilling; but as terror is, no less than force, a component part of robbery, the crime cannot be complete without it.' Knewland and Wood, Lea. 721; East P. C. 732, 1796. Cf. Tomlinson, 1895.

The reasoning (though not the result) in this case has been criticised (1st ed. of this work), and it has been contrasted with Gascoigne, above, where, however, some greater degree of personal violence was used, and the money was taken from the prosecutrix's pocket by defendant himself; but it is clearly immaterial whether the offender takes the money with his own hand, or whether it is delivered to him, in consequence of his menaces.

6

Forced sale] There may be a putting in fear under colour,' e.g. of a purchase. If a person, by force or threats, compel another to give him goods, and by way of colour' oblige him to take, or offer

less than the value, this is robbery. As where a man took wheat worth 88., and forced the owner to take 13d. for it, threatening to kill her if she refused, it was held by all the judges to be clearly robbery. Simons, East, ib. 712, 1773. Where defendant in a great mob came to prosecutor, who had some corn, and one of them said if he would not sell they were going to take it away, and defendant said they would give him 30s. a load, and if he would not accept that they would take the corn away, on which prosecutor sold it for 308., though it was worth 388., this was held to be robbery. Spencer, ib., 1783.

Fair price paid] In some cases the amount paid may show that the taking was not felonious; though there may be force or putting in fear otherwise sufficient, it is only a trespass. A traveller met

a fisherman with fish, who refused to sell him any; and he, by force and putting in fear, took away some of his fish, and threw him money much above the value of it; and judgment was respited, because of the doubt whether the intent was felonious.' The Fisherman's Case. East, ib. 661-2, 1586; cf. Hawk. P. C. 1, 34, 14. 'Such, however. seem properly to be questions for the jury to say whether, from such a circumstance the intention was not fraudulent, and so not felonious,' though, in law, the mere fact that the value is offered, does not prevent the taking being felonious, though it is 'pregnant evidence to the contrary. East.

(c) The law coincides with that of Threats to accuse. In Knewland, above, Ashurst J. distinctly says that threats to accuse of sodomy form an exception to the terrors of injury to character (which do not constitute robbery) by reason of its peculiar abominableness. There Heath J. said Donnally and Hickman, below, only go thus far-that to obtain money from a person by accusing him of that which, if proved, would carry with it an infamous punishment, is sufficient to support an indictment for robbery; but it has never been decided that a mere charge of [illegal?] imprisonment and extortion of money is sufficient.' Lea. 729.

Donnally threatened to take' prosecutor before a magistrate' for attempted unnatural crime,' unless he gave him money. Prosecutor swore that he was exceedingly alarmed on two occasions, and under that alarm gave the money; that he was not aware what were the consequences of such a charge; but apprehended that it might cost him his life, and so the jury found. The twelve judges having given their opinions seriatim, unanimously resolved that defendant was rightly convicted of robbery.

In Donnally, therefore, there was apprehension of loss of life as well as of character, but in Hickman, Lea. 278; East P. C. 728, 1783, prosecutor's own account was that he only feared the stain on his character-not personal danger. Nevertheless, all the judges held it robbery. Their resolution was that the case did not materially differ from that of Donnally, for that the true definition of robbery is the stealing or taking from the person, or in the presence of another, property of any amount, with such a degree of force or terror as to induce the party unwillingly to part with his property; and whether the terror arises from real or expected violence to the person, or from a sense of injury to the character, the law makes no kind of difference; for to most men the idea of losing their fame and reputation is equally, if not more, terrific than the dread of

personal injury. The principal ingredient in robbery is a man's being forced to part with his property; and the judges are unanimously of opinion that upon the principles of law, and the authority of former decisions, a threat to accuse a man of having committed the greatest of all crimes is, as in the present case, a sufficient force to constitute the crime of robbery by putting in fear.' Hickman was followed by all the judges in Egerton, 1819, where prosecutor gave exactly the same account of his state of mind: in both the blackmailing charge was sodomy, as it was in Cannon, R. & R. 146, 1808, where prosecutor admitted that he was not in bodily fear, and he did not believe defendants' pretensions to be police officers, but did believe, when they practically forced him into a coach, that they would take him to a watch-house. Ten judges thought this was sufficient forcible constraint'; they were equally divided whether 'mere' apprehension of danger to character was enough, and whether there must not be some force or violence. But as R. & R. say, doubt cannot exist since Egerton.

Defendant went twice to the house where prosecutor was in service, and called him a 'Sodomite,' &c. Prosecutor took him each time

before a magistrate, who discharged him. Then he followed prosecutor and repeated the expressions, till at last prosecutor, tired of his importunities, and being frightened for his reputation, and in fear of losing his situation,' gave him money. He was convicted, a majority of judges holding the case to be within Hickman, but three thought Hickman was not law. Elmstead, 2 Russ. Cri. 1149, 1802. This case is insufficiently reported; L. Ellenborough's view that the principal inducement to part with the money was the fear of a loss of his place, is surely not incompatible with a fear that that loss would follow on the loss of character.

The threat must be to accuse the person robbed. Defendant was indicted for robbing the wife of a man whom he threatened to accuse, but Littledale J. declined to extend the principle, and directed an acquittal. Edward, 1 Moo. & R. 257; 5 Ò. & P. 518, 1833.

Duration of the fear] Where the immediate danger is over, it has been doubted when prosecutor has had time between threat and yielding to seek assistance from the law or friends, whether, if he complies, there has been robbery. Jackson, &c., 1802, was such a case, where prosecutor went and fetched a friend who was present at the payment of money, and advised him not to pay. The judges, by a majority, held that it was not robbery, though the money was taken in the presence of the prosecutor, and the fear of losing his character was on him at the time. Most of the majority thought that, in order to constitute robbery, the money must be parted with from an immediate apprehension of present danger upon the charge being made, and not, as in this case, after the parties had separated, and the prosecutor had time to deliberate upon it. . . &c.; all which carried the appearance more of a composition of a prosecution than it did of a robbery, and seemed more like a calculation whether it were better to lose his money or risk his character. One of the judges, who agreed that it was not robbery, went upon the ground that there was not a continuing fear, such as could operate in constantem virum, from the time when the money was demanded till it was paid. . . . The minority, who held the case to be robbery, thought the question concluded by the finding of the jury that the prosecutor had parted with his money through fear continuing at the time, which fell in with

the definition of robbery long ago adopted and acted upon, and they said that it would be difficult to draw any other line. That this sort of fear so far differed from cases of mere bodily fear, that it was not likely to be dispelled, as in those cases, by having the opportunity of applying to magistrates or others for assistance, for the money was given to prevent the public disclosure of the charge.' The reference to an ancient definition is, perhaps, repeated East P. C. 714, where thieves make a man swear by menace of death' to bring them money: 'the true reason' that this is robbery is given by L. Hale and others; because the fear of that menace still continued upon him at the time he delivered the money.'

At any rate, it was always held that it must appear that the property was delivered, while the victim was under the influence of the fear. Where prosecutor, in order to entrap blackmailers, pretended to parley and negotiate with them, and though he had been alarmed at first, when he actually gave the money, he was under no apprehension at all, the judges were of opinion that it was no robbery, there being no violence nor fear at the time of delivery. Eyre C.J. observed, The principle of robbery was violence. The principle he had acted upon in such cases was to leave the question to the jury whether the defendant had, by certain circumstances, impressed such a terror on the prosecutor as to render him incapable of resisting the demand. There fore, when the prosecutor swore that he was under no apprehension at the time, but gave his money only to convict the prisoner, he negatived the robbery: here there was neither actual nor constructive violence on which ground the judges held the conviction wrong. Reane. The same point was ruled in Fuller, R. & R. 408, 1820, where prosecutor, who had already been blackmailed, made an appointment to meet defendant and have him arrested.

Common law and statute-indictment] See that head and Accusation under Threats. Semble that now, where money is obtained by any statutory threat, the indictment must be on the statute. See Henry, &c., 2 Moo. C. C. 118, 1840, where such threats, having been made a distinct felony, under a rpd. st., one who was convicted of having aided another found guilty of robbery with violence, but who, the jury found, though privy to the design to extort by accusation (of sodomy), was not privy to the violence, was held to have been wrongly convicted, as he should have been indicted under that st. But where the money is obtained by threats to accuse other than those specified in an A., the indictment may be for robbery at common law. Norton, 8 C. & P. 671, 1838. It has been decided, that assaulting and threatening to charge with an infamous crime (which did not come within certain rpd. ss.), with intent thereby to extort money, was an assault with intent to rob, because defendants intended to get the money by the violence of the assault, as well as by the charge, which would be a common law robbery.' Stringer, 2 Moo. C. C. 261; 1 C. & K. 188, 1842, where the judges doubted whether the ground on which Henry, above, was decided was correct.

Truth of the charge] It is no defence to a charge of robbery by such threatening, that prosecutor has in fact been guilty of such a crime; but if the money was given voluntarily, without any previous threat, the indictment could not be supported: Gardner, 1 C. & P. 479, 1824: acquittal.

ROGUE AND VAGABOND, BEING A.

See Living on Immoral Earnings, Prostitution and Vagrancy. By 34-5 V. 112, 15: in 5 G. 4, 83, 4, instead of the words 'highway or place adjacent' is to be read or any highway or any place adjacent to a street or highway.'

By 5 E. 7, 13 (Aliens A. 1905), s. 7 (1), an offence under that A. by an immigrant or alien' renders him a rogue and vagabond within 8. 4.

Indictment was introduced by 2-3 G. 5, 20, 7 (5), and maximum sentence raised to six months' imp. w. h. 1. under the 1898 A. by s. 7 (2).

ROUT.

See Riot.