thing; but the demand need not be made in words, it may be made by conduct. Where defendants seized prosecutor, and one of them said, 'Not a word, or I will blow your brains out,' and the other repeated the words, and appeared to be searching for some offensive weapon in his pocket, but on some resistance both ran away without anything more being said, the court said that an actual demand was not necessary, and that this was a fact for the jury, in all the circumstances of the case. Jackson, Lea. 267; East P. C. 419, 1783. Cf. Remnant, 5 T. R. 169, 1793.

A highwayman was indicted for an assault, with an intent to rob; he made no demand of any sort; but held a pistol in his hand towards a coachman on his box; Willes C.J. said, 'A man who is dumb may make a demand of money, as if he stop a person on the highway with a pistol, and put his hand or hat into the carriage or the like; but in this case, as the prisoner only held a pistol at the coachman, but said to him nothing but 'Stop,' that was no demand of his money as the Act requires.' Parfait, Lea. 19; East P. C. 416, 1740. The latter justly remarks, that the fact of stopping another on the highway, by presenting a pistol at his breast, is, if unexplained by other circumstances, sufficient evidence of a demand to go to a jury. The unfortunate sufferer understands the language but too well; and why must courts of justice be supposed ignorant of that which common experience makes notorious to all men?'

Language-tone, &c.] The demand need not be explicit and the threat may be veiled; defendant represented in effect to his exemployer, a naturalised German, that he could save him from prosecution (after war broke out) if he gave him a sum of money to 'square' detectives; the pretence was admittedly false; a civil claim of defendant against prosecutor was held to be no defence. Studer, 85 L. J. K. B. 1017; 25 Cox C. C. 312; 114 L. T. 424; 11 Cr. A. R. 307, 1915.

Request] A mere request, such as asking charity, without imposing any conditions,' does not come within the meaning of the word demand. Robinson, Lea. 749; East P. C. 1111, 1796.

He

Defendant wrote an anonymous letter to prosecutor, offering to reveal a conspiracy against the latter's person and property, and to bring the offenders to justice on his being paid a certain sum. was indicted for sending a letter demanding money, with menaces. Bolland B. doubted whether the letter contained either a demand or a menace, and reserved the point for the judges, who held that the conviction was wrong. Pickford, 4 C. & P. 227, 1830. Cf. T. Smith, 1849, below.

Threatened charge against third person] Where defendant threatened to accuse prosecutor's son of a crime unless prosecutor or the boy's master would buy a mare of him, and did, in fact, bring the charge, which was dismissed, it was held to be a threat with intent to extort within a rpd. s. Redman, 35 L. J. M. C. 89; L. R. 1 C. C. R. 12; 10 Cox C. C. 159, 1865.

The threat] See Grounds of Fear under Robbery. Indictment for sending the following letter, threatening to kill,' &c.

'Feb. 9, 1776.-Sir-I am sorry to find a gentleman like you would be guilty of taking M'Allester's life away for the sake of two or three

guineas, but it will not be forgot by one who is but just come home to revenge his cause. This you may depend upon; whenever I meet you I will lay my life for him in this cause. I follow the road, though I have been out of London; but on receiving a letter from M'Allester, before he died, for to seek revenge, I am come to town.— I remain a true friend to M'Allester, J. W.'

The circumstances are not explained. Hotham B. left it to the jury to consider whether this letter contained in its terms an actual threatening to kill, &c., directing them to acquit if they thought the words might import anything less. The judges were of opinion that a conviction was right. Girdwood, Lea. 142; East P. C. 1121, 1776. Indictment for sending the following passage, inter alia, in a letter:'I am very sorry to acquaint you, that we are determined to set your mill on fire, and likewise to do all the public injury we are able to do you, in all your farms. . . This was in the handwriting of one of defendants, and was thrown by another into prosecutor's yard, whence it was taken by a servant and delivered to him. The prosecutor had had a share in a mill three years before this letter was written, but had no mill at that time; but he did have a farm with several buildings upon it. It was agreed by the judges, that as prosecutor at the time had no such mill as was threatened, that part of the letter must be disregarded. Of the rest, L. Kenyon C.J. and Buller J. were of opinion that the letter must be understood as also importing a threat to burn prosecutor's farmhouse, buildings, &c., but the other judges not thinking that a necessary construction, the conviction was held wrong. Jepson and Springett, East P. C. 1115; Lea. 756, n., 1798.

One count charged sending a letter, threatening to kill and murder; and a second, threatening to burn and destroy a house, stacks, &c. The writing was as follows:-'Starve Gut Butcher, if you don't go on better great will be the consequence; what do you think you must alter (or) must be set on fire,' &c., &c., some of the remainder being equally unintelligible. The jury negatived the threat to kill, &c., but found that the letter threatened to fire houses, &c. L. Denman C.J. had some doubt whether the question ought to have been left to the jury, and whether the letter could be, in point of law, a threatening letter to the effect found, but the judges held the conviction good after verdict. Tyler, 1 Moo. C. C. 428, 1835.

For an offence under s. 29 (1) (i), above, it is not essential that the menace should be of injury to person or property, or to accuse of a crime. A threat to accuse of misconduct, immoral, though not criminal, is enough, e.g. a threat to tell prosecutor's wife and friends of his doings' with another woman. Tomlinson, 1895. Cf. Robertson and Robinson, 1837, below.

Degree of virulence] See Standard of Fear under Robbery.

In Smith, 1 Den. C. C. 510; 19 L. J. M. C. 80; 4 Cox C. C. 42, 1849, the mischief impending was unnamed (burning?), and the writer professed that for a certain sum he could avert it (and that it would ruin a bank). There Wilde C.J. said: 'Whether a threat be criminal or no cannot be taken to depend on the nerves of the individual threatened, but on the general nature of the evil with which he is threatened.' It was not intended to impugn Pickford, above; each case must be judged on its circumstances. If this sets up a different standard to that in Tomlinson, below, the latter is to be preferred.

At common law L. Ellenborough C.J. thought that a threat to denounce a vendor liable to a penalty for selling medicines without a stamp was one which a normal person ought to have resisted.' Southerton; cf. Woodward, 1707. The cases were reviewed in Boyle, &c., below.

Perhaps it is more difficult to gauge legitimate fears where the threatener is not present, as here, than in the case where he is; but in both the only sound general rule seems to be that the jury must decide in each instance. In Tomlinson, 1895, 1 Q. B. 706; 64 L. J. M. C. 97; 18 Cox C. C. 75: C. C. R., where Wills J. said of ‘the doctrine that the threat must be of a nature to operate on a man of reasonably sound or ordinarily firm mind,' it ought to receive a liberal construction in practice; otherwise grave injustice may be done, for persons who are thus practised upon are not, as a rule, of average firmness; but the threat must not be one that ought to influence nobody.' See Knewland, 1796.

Accusations] It was held, that the threatening to accuse need not be a threat to accuse before a judicial tribunal; to accuse' means to charge before any third person. Robinson, 2 Moo. & R. 14, 1837; cf. Tomlinson, 1895. This must be of the nature of those specified in the A. Where the meaning is ambiguous, it is for the jury to decide. It is essential to particularise the specific charge to which the accusation or threat refers. Middleditch, 1 Den. O. C. 92; 2 Cox C. C. 313, 1845: c. q., because it was alleged that defendant had accused of solicitation to sodomy, but the evidence (seven judges thought, though five dissented) did not show such a charge (but only one of indecent assault?).

Truth of accusation- reasonable cause'] This is immaterial, and evidence of such truth will not be admitted: Hamilton, 1 C. & K. 212, 1843, because reasonable and probable' [now in s. 29] refers to demanding the money, not to the accusation, and the threatener may have reasonable cause to make a demand, e.g. a woman betrayed and abandoned. Miard, 1 Cox C. C. 22, 1844. It is doubtful whether an honest belief in such a cause' would be a defence: J. Chalmers, 10 Cox C. C. 450; 15 W. R. 773; 16 L. T. 363, 1867: C. C. R. The prosecutor may be cross-examined whether he is guilty: per Willes J., Menage, 3 F. & F. 310, 1862; Cracknell, 10 Cox C. C. 408, 1866; but the matter cannot be carried further. In Richards, 11 Cox C. C. 43, 1868, defendant went to prosecutor, whom he accused of having given a disease to his son, his son in fact having such a disease, and having informed defendant of it; he at that time only demanded payment of the doctor's bill of 258.; but some time afterwards he went again and threatened to give him into custody unless he would compromise it by payment of 100l. Blackburn J. said the truth of the accusation was not material for the jury, if, by that accusation defendant intended to extort money, but that it was material in considering with what intent he made the accusation. If, believing it, he made the accusation at first without any intent to extort money he would not be guilty; but if afterwards he endeavoured to compromise the matter by taking money, that would not render him guilty of obtaining money by threats (though it might of compounding a felony). The report is very short, and defendant was acquitted, so that it is possible that the learned judge thought that

the demand for the 100. might be wholly unconnected with the accusation. See E. Dymond, 1920, in Addenda.

Larceny A. 1916, s. 30] In this s. the proper limit' is marked by the intent to steal'; accordingly, the threatened violence must be of a nature to produce in a reasonable man some degree of alarm or bodily fear. The degree of such alarm may vary in different cases. The essential matter is that it be of a nature and extent to unsettle the mind of the person on whom it operates, and take away from his acts that element of free voluntary action, which alone constitutes consent. . . . The menace may be made with such gesture and demeanour, or with such unnecessarily violent acts, or under such circumstances of intimidation as to have that effect, and this should be decided by the jury': per Wilde B., Walton, 1863. In Boyle, &c., 1914, defendants, through an agent, threatened the chairman of a company to attack it in a trade paper, so as to depreciate the shares, unless a certain sum was given them; this menace to injure property' was held to be within a s. now replaced by s. 30.

It is no objection that the money was actually obtained or that it was obtained by a threat to accuse of a fictitious charge. Robertson, L. & C. 483; 34 L. J. M. C. 35; 10 Cox C. C. 9, 1864, where a policeman got money by threatening to arrest prosecutor for speaking to a woman in the street. Cf. Tomlinson, 1895.

Infamous crime] See under Robbery; the phrase is no longer statutory (except in 33-4 V. 77, 10). The terror of this particular accusation has always been an exception to the rule that fear for one's character alone is not enough to support this charge: per the judges in Knewland, Lea. at 730.

Threatening to procure witnesses to support an accusation already made is not within the rpd. st. 'It is one thing to accuse, but another to procure witnesses in support of a charge already made.' This was at most a threat to support a charge by evidence: per Bayley J., Gill, 1 Lew. C. C. 305, 1827.

Evidence] Declarations subsequently made by defendant-as conduct-are admissible to explain the meaning of an ambiguous letter. Indictment for sending a letter threatening to accuse of an infamous crime. Prosecutor, meeting defendant, asked him what he meant by sending that letter, and by the material words therein, 'transactions five nights following. The answer was that prosecutor knew what he meant. This the latter denied, and the former afterwards said, 'I mean, by taking indecent liberties with my person.' This evidence was received; the judges, who were informed that without this (parol) evidence defendant could not have been convicted, unanimously resolved that it had been rightly received: Tucker, 1 Moo. C. C. 134, 1826. On the same principle, perhaps, a witness may say what he understood by a letter: Hendy, 4 Cox C. C. 243, 1850.

In order to show knowledge of the contents of a letter in one indictment, other later letters also indicted were rightly put in: A. Graham, 3 Cr. A. R. 252, 1909, perhaps following Cooper, 3 Cox C. C. 547, 1849, where Cresswell J. allowed evidence that perhaps amounted to a previous similar threat of accusation by defendant, and left it to the jury whether the previous words did amount to that: followed in Braynell, 4 Cox C. C. 402, 1850.

Trade threats] See Trade.

Title Deeds.

Of legal proceedings by brothel-keepers] See Brothel, &c.

1057

Indictment] See under Robbery and Accusations, above. There is a form (No. 11) appended to the Indictments A. 1915 (but under a now rpd.).

S.

TICKET-OF-LEAVE MEN, OFFENCES BY.

See Suspects:

TITLE DEEDS, LARCENY, &c. OF.

See 6-7 G. 5, 50, 7 (1), under Larceny, p. 627, and Concealment. For forgery, see 3-4 G. 5, 27, 2 (2), b, and 2 (1), b.

Production] When a grand jury complained that a witness would not produce certain deeds-not including one of demise, the forgery of which was indicted-'material' for them to see, Park J., with the concurrence of Parke J., thought that if these deeds form a part of the evidence of' the witness's title to her own estate, you cannot compel' the production; but otherwise, if not: Hunter, 1829; see Phips. 196. The alleged forged deed being in defendant's possession, the grand jury heard secondary evidence of its contents. At the trial the impugned deed being traced to defendant's attorney, and not being produced after notice, secondary evidence was given.

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