that the indictment was not supported, there being no intent to steal, however outrageous their conduct was. Knight and Roffey, East P. C. 510, 1781. If the indictment had been for breaking and entering the house, with intent feloniously to rescue goods seized-a felony by 19 G. 2, 34, rpd.-it would have been burglary: ib. On indictment for breaking, &c., with intent to kill and destroy a gelding there being,' it appeared that defendant, in order to prevent the horse from running a race, cut the sinews of his forelegs, from which he died. Pratt C.J. directed an acquittal, the intent being not to commit felony by killing and destroying the horse [as it would be now], but a trespass only to prevent his running, and therefore it was no burglary. But he was afterwards indicted for killing the horse, and capitally convicted. Dobbs, 2 East P. C. 513, 1770. Two poachers went to the house of a gamekeeper, who had taken a dog from them, and believing him to be out of the way, broke the door and entered. Being indicted for this as a burglary, as their intent was to rescue the dog, and not to commit a felony, Vaughan B. directed an acquittal. Anon., Matth. Dig. C. L. 48, 1831; see Holloway, 5 C. & P. 524, 1833.

Evidence] Possession of stolen property three months after the breaking is very weak evidence of that offence: T. Bailey, 13 Cr. A. R. 27, 1917: c. q.

Intent is gathered from all the circumstances of the case. Three persons attacked a house. They broke a window in front and at the back. They put a crow-bar and whittle through a window, but the owner resisting them, they went away. They had ample opportunity to enter and plunder, if they wished. Being indicted for burglary with intent to commit a larceny, it was contended that there was no evidence of the intent; but Parke J. said that it was for the jury to say, from all the circumstances, whether defendant went with the intent alleged or not. Anon., 1 Lew. C. O. 37, 1830. Where the intent was clearly not to steal, but to get a conviction and so discharge from the army, the O. C. A. materially reduced the sentence: G. Williams, 12 Cr. A. R. 11, 1916. The jury may find the intent from mere presence if they do not accept the explanation given or there is none: E. G. Wood,

1911.

Indictment-intent] Where there was an indictment for burglary and stealing goods, and it appeared that there were no goods stolen, but only an intent to steal, it was held by Holt C.J. that this ought to have been so laid, and he directed an acquittal. East P. C. 514, 1700. The intent must be proved as laid. If it is laid that the intent was to commit one sort of felony, and it is proved that the intent was to commit another, it is a fatal variance: ib. But now by s. 5 (1) of the Indictments A. any amendment which can be made without injustice' will be made. And that statute permits these charges to be made in the same indictment.

Property-bailee] The property in the goods which it is alleged were intended to be stolen, must, if stated, be correctly laid, subject now to Indictment R. 6 and to amendment, above. 2 Russ. Ori. 1094. But even before it was enough to prove the intent to steal goods generally. Clarke, 1 O. & K. 421, 1844. See further under Dwellinghouse. A. was charged with breaking into the house of K., and stealing the goods of M. It was proved by M. that K., his brother-in-law, had taken the house, and that M. carried on the trade of a silversmith

Burglary or Larceny.

469

for the benefit of K. and his family, having himself neither a share in the profits nor a salary. M. stated that he had authority to sell any part of the stock, and might take money from the till, but that he should tell K. of it; and that he sometimes bought goods for the shop, and sometimes K. did it; it was held that M. was a bailee, and that the goods in his shop might properly be laid as his property. Bird, 1839; see this point under Larceny.

It seems in all cases sufficient where a felony has been actually committed, to allege the commission without any intent: 1 Hale P. Č. 560; East P. C. 514, above. It is, besides, a general rule, that a man who commits one sort of felony in attempting to commit another, cannot excuse himself upon the ground that he did not intend . . . that particular offence. Yet this, it seems, must be confined to cases where the offence intended is in itself a felony': citing Dobbs, above. See 4 Bl. Comm. 221; Attempts and Intent, above.

Larceny] If the indictment charges a larceny as well, there may be a conviction thereof. Withal. In a similar case the verdict was, not guilty of the burglary, but guilty of stealing above the value of 408. in the dwelling-house.' Hungerford, East P. O. 518, 1790.

Joint indictment] It was formerly thought, that if several were jointly indicted for burglary and larceny, one could not be convicted of larceny only and another of burglary. Turner, 1 Sid. 171, 1675; East P. C. 519. But in a later case, where one pleaded guilty to burglary, and two others were found guilty of the larceny but acquitted of burglary, the judges came by a majority to the opposite conclusion. Butterworth, R. & Ry. 520, 1823; 2 Russ. Cri. 1100.

Although defendant may be convicted of the larceny only (if the charge of burglary is abandoned), yet if the larceny was committed on a day before that laid in the indictment, he cannot be convicted thereof. In Vandercomb, defendants had previously broken in and made preparations for stealing, but on the day they were caught on the premises had not actually taken anything; it was held that evidence of theft of some of the articles charged before three o'clock, the alleged time of entering, could not be given, and that they must be acquitted of larceny on that day. The court said: The charge now proposed to be introduced goes to connect the prisoners with an antecedent felony committed before three o'clock, at which time, it is clear, they had not entered the house. . . It is said that they stole the goods on a former day, and that their being found in the house is evidence of it. But this is surely a distinct transaction; and it might as well be proposed to prove any felony which these prisoners committed in this house seven years ago, as the present.'

Autrefois acquit] The defendants having been acquitted both of burglary and of larceny, were indicted again for burglary with intent, &c., and for stealing other goods (than those in the earlier indictment): to both indictments they pleaded autrefois acquit. On demurrer in the Ex. Ch. all the judges, per Buller J. said: '[The] cases establish the principle that unless the first indictment were such as the prisoner might have been convicted upon by proof of the facts contained in the second indictment, an acquittal on the first indictment can be no bar to the second. Now to apply the principle of these cases to the present case: The first indictment was for burglariously breaking and entering the house of, &c., and stealing the goods mentioned; but it

appeared that the prisoners broke and entered the house with intent to steal, for in fact no larceny was committed, and therefore they could not be convicted on that indictment. But they have not been tried for burglariously breaking, &c. with intent to steal, which is the charge in the present indictment, and therefore they have never been in jeopardy for this offence. For this reason the judges are all of opinion that the plea is bad: ' defendants were then tried and convicted. Turner, Kel. 30, 1664, and Jones and Beaver, ib. 52, 1665, were thus overruled, East P. C. 579.

Found by night armed, &c.] Under s. 28, above, the particular building must be specified in the indictment; and, probably, it should also charge an intent to commit a definite felony. Jarrald, L. & C. 301 9 Cox C. C. 307; 32 L. J. M. C. 258; 1863. This decision was severely criticised by Mr. Greaves: 2 Russ. Cri. 1103 ƒ; and see below.

Possessing implement of housebreaking'] This offence consists in mere possession without lawful excuse. It is not necessary to allege or to prove an intent to commit a felony. Bailey, 1 D. & P. C. C. 244; 6 Cox C. C. 241; 23 L. J. M. C. 13, 1853, under 14-15 V. 19, 1, rpd., substantially the same as s. 28, above, where the jury found no evidence of intent to commit a felony; conviction affirmed. Where only one is in possession of the implements, that is possession by all. Thompson, 11 Cox C. C. 362, 1869.

If a man is armed with any other weapon than one for housebreaking, there must be some other proof of an intent to break house (and, perhaps, into some particular house): Jarrald, above, where the weapon was a loaded gun; Crompton J. seems in some preceding words to differ from Bailey, above, to which, however, he was a party.

Instances] Keys are implements of housebreaking; for though commonly used for lawful purposes, they are capable of being employed in housebreaking, and it is for the jury whether the defendant had them without lawful excuse,' and to use as such implements. Oldham, 2 Den. C. C. R. 472; 21 L. J. M. C. 134; 5 Cox Ĉ. C. 551, 1852. But when defendant was a bricklayer and the implements were a bricklayer's chisel and a screwdriver, the C. C. A. held that he had a 'lawful excuse' for the possession; otherwise, if he had been a farmer; the direction, therefore, that the onus was on him to prove innocent intention was wrong: c. q.: E. Ward, 1915, 3 K. B. 696; 25 Cox C. C. 255; 60 S. J. 27; 11 Cr. A. R. 245. A piece of linen smeared with treacle, found near a stone, may be such implement (the combination being commonly used by housebreakers, though not eiusdem generis with keys,' &c.): Percival, 69 J. P. 320, 1905.

Accessories] See Aiders, &c.

Burial: Candidates.

471

BURIAL, OBSTRUCTING.

Riotous or indecent behaviour at burials] including delivering an address without authority and 'under colour of any religious service or otherwise... endeavouring to bring into contempt or obloquy the Christian religion or the belief or worship of any Church or denomination of Christians or the members or any minister of any such Church or denomination' is made a misdemeanour by 43-4 V. 41, 7.

See also Dead Human Bodies.

CANALS, OFFENCES RELATING TO.
See Index.

CANDIDATES, OFFENCES (I.) AGAINST.

See Elections.

False statements] By 58-9 V. 40, 1: Any person who or the directors of any body or association corporate which, before or during any parliamentary election, shall for the purposes of affecting the return of any candidate at such election, make or publish any false statement of fact in relation to the personal character or conduct of such candidate shall be guilty of an illegal practice within' 46-7 V. 51, which is amended to include this offence as if therein mentioned. Hence by s. 51 it may become indictable. By s. 2, it is a defence to believe on reasonable grounds that the statement is true. By s. 3, the candidate is wholly exonerated for this offence, 'committed by his agent other than his election agent,' unless he or the election agent 'has authorised or consented to such statement or was procured or

or paid for an election court' reports that this election materially assisted' by such statement.

(II.) BY.

See Bribery and Elections.

CARDS, OFFENCES IN CONNECTION WITH.
See under Cheating and Gaming.

CARNAL KNOWLEDGE, ILLICIT,

is most conveniently treated under Defectives, Rape.

CASTING AWAY SHIPS.

See Ships and 24-5 V. 97, 42, under Arson.

CATTLE, OFFENCES WITH REGARD TO.

Larceny] By 6-7 G. 5, 50, 3: 'Every person who steals any horse, cattle or sheep shall be guilty of felony, and on conviction thereof liable to penal servitude for any term not exceeding fourteen years.' See under Animals.

Killing with intent to steal] By s. 4: 'Every person who wilfully kills any animal with intent to steal the carcase, skin, or any part of the animal killed, shall be guilty of felony, and on conviction thereof liable to the same punishment as if he had stolen such animal, provided the offence of stealing the animal so killed would have amounted to felony.' See above.

Killing or maiming] By 24-5 V. 97, 40: Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously kill, maim, or wound any cattle, shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable. . . to be kept in penal servitude for any term not exceeding fourteen years. By s. 41 the same offences on any dog, bird, beast, or other animal, not being cattle, but being either the subject of larceny at common law or being ordinarily kept in a state of confinement or for any domestic purpose' are punished; see under Dog. See Miles v. Hutchings, 20 Cox O. C. 555, 1903.

Parry, 35 L. J. newspaper, 456, 1900, was convicted under this s. of injuring his own horse: sed quære': 2 Russ. Cri. 1826 p: the charge should certainly have been for cruelty.

Ss. 58-9 also apply.

'Cattle'] The word cattle in s. 40 would, doubtless, receive the same interpretation as it bore in the rpd. 9 G. 1, 22, 'under which it was held that an indictment for killing a mare' (or a horse or colt) was good, on the ground that this Act was an extension of 22-3 C. 2, 7, rpd., which speaks (ss. 2, 5) of horses, sheep, or other cattle." Paty, 1 Lea. 72; 2 W. Bl. 721; East P. C. 1074, 1770; followed in the case of a gelding' in Mott, 1 Lea. 73 n., 1783; cf. Tivey, 1 C. & K. 704, 1844; Welch, below. Pigs were held to be within 9 G. 1, 22: Chapple, R. & Ry. 77, 1804; and asses: Whitney, 1 Moo. C. C. 3, 1824. Thus the term appears to include not only horned cattle and sheep': 2 Russ. Cri. 1826. There are many statutory definitions, the latest being in 6 E. 7, 32, the Dogs A. 1906-for that A.-s. 7, viz.: horses, mules, asses, sheep, goats and swine.'

6

Indictment] It was not sufficient in the indictment to allege maiming, &c. certain cattle' generally, without naming the species: Chalkley, R. & R. 258, 1813. Indictment Rules 6 and 9 apply.

The injury- maiming,' wounding'] On an indictment for maliciously maiming or wounding, it need not appear either that the animal was killed, or that the wound inflicted a permanent injury. Defendant had maliciously driven a nail into a horse's foot. The horse