bourne, 1685, a married woman indicted for pretending to be a widow, and as such, executing a bail-bond; and a precedent in the Crown Circuit Companion, 78, 1738, of an indictment for forging a request for a nolle prosequi.

By a contract for the purchase of wheat it was provided that any dispute should be referred to arbitrators. Sealed bags of the samples having been prepared for the arbitrators, defendant removed their contents and placed in them wheat of better character, to deceive the arbitrators and to injure the buyer, and to pass them off as genuine samples. It was held that this was an indictable misdemeanour, though the fraud was not, in fact, practised. Vreones, 1891, 1 Q. B. 360; 60 L. J. M. C. 62; 17 Cox C. C. 267: C. C. R. The court expressly recognised the arbitrators as a tribunal administering public justice one specially sanctioned by courts of law; its decisions enforced... by courts of law.' But where an overseer was charged with a statutory offence by wilfully falsifying lists of voters with intent to mislead the revising barrister, it was held by Charles J. on a consideration of 6-7 V. 18, 51, and other enactments (which provide another remedy), that this was not indictable, and that as such lists are published, and every facility for correction given, and are not laid by the overseer before the revising barrister at all (but before the town clerk), Vreones did not apply. Hall, 1891, 1 Q. B. 747; 60 L. J. M. C. 124; 17 Cox C. C. 278.

are

Attempts] L. Coleridge C.J. and Pollock B. were emphatic, in Vreones, that an attempt to prevent the course of justice is a misdemeanour, the latter saying: 'I am quite clear that the condition precedent that there must be injury to the individual [see East, 860, above] does not apply in the present case. It applies in cases of cheating or defrauding private individuals, because otherwise a mere naked lie might constitute an offence. . . The real offence here is the doing of some act which has a tendency and is intended to prevent the administration of public justice': Q. B. 369.

Selling unwholesome provisions] The selling unwholesome provisions, 4 Bl. Com. 162, or the giving of any person unwholesome victuals not fit for man to eat, lucri causâ, or from malice or deceit, is undoubtedly in itself an indictable offence.' East P. C. 822. Where a Government contractor was indicted for deceitfully, &c. providing French prisoners with unwholesome bread, to the injury of their health, it was objected in arrest of judgment, that the indictment could not be sustained, for it 'did not appear that what was done was in breach of any contract with the public, or of any moral or civil (sic) duty'; but the judges held the conviction right. Treeve, 1796, ib.; in Brailsford, L. Alverstone C.J. stated that the original record of Treeve shows that the decision was not on the ground East gives; but he did not say on what ground it was. The principle meant is, apparently (though it cannot be maintained that every fraud and cheat constitutes an offence against the criminal law, but) the distinction between acts which are merely improper or immoral and those which tend to produce a public mischief has long been recognised.' On a very similar indictment at common law, where many of the loaves were strongly impregnated with alum, then prohibited by rpd. 37 G. 3, 98, 21, the defence was that it had been carefully employed, that a small quantity is not injurious, and that if too much had been put in, it was not with defendant's knowledge. But L. Ellenborough said, 'Who

False Tokens, Weights, &c.

479

ever introduces a substance into bread, which may be injurious to the health of those who consume it, is indictable if the substance be found in the bread in that injurious form, although, if equally spread over the mass, it would have done no harm.' Dixon, 1814.

False accounting, &c., by public officers] See Office-holders. Fraudulent malversations or cheats by public officers are also indictable at common law; thus, overseers of the poor are indictable for refusing to account within the proper time: Commings, 5 Mod. 179, 1696; 1 Bott's Poor Laws, pl. 370, p. 357, 6th ed.; or for rendering false accounts, e.g. by not bringing sums into account. Martin, 2 Camp. 269, 1809; 3 Chitty, C. L. 701. An information was granted against overseers for procuring a pauper to marry a single woman with child of a bastard' to get the latter settled in the husband's parish: Tarrant, 4 Burr. 2106, 1697. On an application to the K. B., against the minister and churchwardens of a parish, for misapplying monies collected for charity, and returning a smaller sum only as collected, the court, refusing an information, referred the prosecutors to an indictment. Ministers, &c., of St. Botolph, 1 W. Bl. 443, 1763.

On indictment for enabling persons to pass their accounts with the pay-office, in such a way as to defraud the government, it was objected that it was only a private matter of account, and not indictable; the court decided otherwise, as it related to the public revenue. bridge, 22 St. Tr. 1; 6 East at 136, 1783.

Bem

False weights, &c.—public tokens] There seems to be no definition of false token,' but Jacob, Law Dict., includes under the phrase 'forged letters or other counterfeit means.' In rpd. 33 H. 8, 1, they are called 'privy tokens and counterfeit letters in other men's names (unto divers persons, their special friends and acquaintances'). In Terrey, Cro. Ch. 564, 1640, under this statute, the false token was 'a false note.' 'A false 'privy token within the statute,' says East P. C. 826, has generally been taken to denote some real visible mark or thing, as a key, a ring, &c. A mere false affirmation or promise is certainly not such': Munoz.

In Macarty, &c., 6 Mod. 301, case 389, 1705, Holt C.J. said, 'here is a false token, the one [defendant] pretending to be a broker, and the other a merchant, or a combination to treat.' Yet,' as East, 825, says, 'what was that but a false affirmation, simply?' So in Munoz, above, the false token was set out to be by falsely affirming that there was a person in the next room that would pay the money due upon it, and by that means getting the note': held not to be sufficient.

Cheating by false weights and measures-the capital instance-' by which the public in general may be imposed upon without any imputation of folly or negligence,' or by any false token having the semblance of public authenticity,' is indictable. East P. C. 820. 'If a person sell by false weights, though only to one person, it is an indictable offence; but if without false weights he sells to many persons a less quantity than he pretends to do, it is not indictable": per Buller J., Young, 1789, at 104. Thus, if a person has measured corn in a bushel, and put something in the bushel to fill it up, or has measured it in a bushel short of the statute measure, it may be indictable; but not where he sold a sack falsely affirming it to contain a Winchester bushel,' for this is no more than telling a lie.' Pinkney, or Pickley, 2 Barnard. 244, 1733; East P. C. 818, 820; 1 Sess. Ca. 198. The K. B. declined to accept the view that the sack

was a false token. 'Judge Page likened' the case to that 'of a tradesman's telling his chap there are so many ells in such a piece of cloth; the buyer may easily measure the cloth and see whether there are so many; and, if he will not, it is his own folly.' See Wheatley, below. Knowingly exposing to sale and selling wrought gold under the sterling alloy as and for gold of the true standard weight (indictable in goldsmiths by statutes then in force), is a private imposition only in a common person (a pawnbroker): Bower, 1 Cowp. 323, 1775: judgment arrested. Selling coals under measure is not indictable, but selling them by false measure is: citing Lewis, below. East, ib., who asks, Qu. if false stamps or marks be used such as are required by statute on plate of a certain alloy?' 'I conceive,' he says, 1 P. C. 194, that offenders of this description fraudulently affixing public and authentic marks on goods of a value inferior to such tokens are liable at common law for a cheat.'

By 52-3 V. 21, 33 (3), the Weights and Measures A. 1889, any court dealing with an offence under that A. which is also an offence at common law or under another A. may order proceedings at common law or under such other A.

Other false tokens—relation to forgery] The question was much considered in Closs, D. & B. C. C. 460; 27 L. J. M. C. 541; 7 Cox C. O. 494, 1858. That was an indictment for (obtaining money by false pretences of which defendant was acquitted-and) keeping, and exposing for sale, and selling a picture, on which was unlawfully painted the forged signature of J. Linnell, intending thereby to denote that the picture was an original picture by that artist-of which he was convicted. This was held to be a fraud at common law. Cockburn C.J. said, 'We have carefully examined the authorities, and the result is, that we think if a person, in the course of his trade openly and publicly carried on, were to put a false mark or token upon an article so as to pass it off as a genuine one, when in fact it was only a spurious one, and the article was sold, and money obtained by means of that false mark or token, that would be a cheat at common law.' The count for a common law cheat by means of a forgery was held to fail, and as the other count was held bad for not alleging with sufficient clearness that it was by means of the false token, that the defendant passed off the picture as genuine: c. q. East's conclusion on the whole matter (827) is 'the false token must be such as is calculated to gain the party some additional credit and confidence beyond his own assertion or what is resolvable into such'; and it is even more true than in his day that this enquiry is become less important' owing to statutes. For forgery at common law, see Hamilton, 1901, where the definition of Hawk. 1, 71, 1, above, of a common law cheat was said, by Mathew J., to be far too wide' (so 65 J. P. 266, correctly).

6

Cards, dice, &c.] Cheating was considered an indictable offence at common law. Tremaine, P. C. 91, sets out an indictment against Arnope, in 1685, for cheating with picture cards at whist- quendam lusum illicitum vocatum whist and passage': also false dice. See under Gaming.

Not indictable] The following cheats have been held not to be indictable at common law; though many of them are now so by statute. Most of these decisions rest on the ground that they relate to cheats not of a public nature.

'A bare lie' has been dealt with: Pinkney, above. Thus, where an indictment charged a selling eight cwt. gum at seven pounds per cwt., with the false affirmation that the gum was gum seneca, and that it was worth seven pounds, whereas it was not gum seneca, and was not worth more than three, &c., it was quashed, because no false token was used. Lewis, Sayer, 205, 1755. See also Lara, East P. C. 819, 827; 6 T. R. 565; 2 Lea. 647, 1794. But such an offence is punishable as a false pretence. Cf. Ridgway, 1862, and H. Williams, 1836.

So where a brewer was indicted for sending to a publican so many vessels of ale, marked as containing a certain measure, and writing a letter, assuring him that they did contain so much, when in fact they did not, but less, &c., the indictment was quashed on motion, as ‘the prosecutor could not have been imposed on without his own carelessness.' Wilders, 1720, cited Wheatly, below; East P. C. 819; doubted by Foster J., who thought the marking was a token. On the same principle, where a miller detained corn [perhaps as toll] sent to him to be ground, the indictment was quashed, it being merely a private matter for which an action would lie. Channell, 2 Str. 793; 1 Sess. Ca. 366; East, ib. 818, 1727. Receiving good barley, and delivering meal in return different from the produce thereof, and musty, &c., was held not to be indictable. L. Ellenborough said, that if the case had been that the miller had been owner of a soke mill [i.e. a monopoly], to which the inhabitants of the vicinage were bound to resort to get their corn ground, and he, abusing the confidence of his situation, had made it a colour for practising a fraud, this might have presented a different aspect; but as it then stood, it seemed to be no more than the case of a common tradesman, who was guilty of a fraud in a matter of trade or dealing, such as was adverted to in Wheatly, below, and the other cases, as not being indictable. Haynes, 4 M. & S. 214, 1815; hence Wood, 1 Sess. Ca. 277, no. 217, 1743, is doubted: 2 Russ. Cri. 1513 y. So selling sixteen gallons of ale as eighteen; L. Mansfield, as reported by East, said, 'It amounts only to an unfair dealing, and an imposition on this particular man, by which he could not have suffered but for his own carelessness in not measuring it; whereas fraud, to be the object of criminal prosecution, must be of that kind which in its nature is calculated to defraud numbers, as false weights and measures, false tokens, or where there is a conspiracy.' Wheatly, 2 Burr. 1125; 1 W. Bl. 273; East P. C. 818, 1761. A baker had contracted with the guardians of a parish to deliver loaves of a certain weight. The relieving officer gave the recipient tickets to take to the baker; they were his weekly vouchers, when he made a statement to the relieving officer of the number of loaves supplied, and the latter would give him credit for the amount, and he would be paid by the guardians later; by a clause in the contract, the guardians had the power, in case of any breach, to deduct damages caused thereby from the amount payable. Loaves short of the weight were supplied. It was held by fifteen judges, after several arguments, that this was a mere private fraud, and not indictable at common law. Eagleton, 24 L. J. M. Ĉ. 158; D. & P. C. C. 515; 6 Cox C. O. 559, 1854-5; see the other references and Glanvill, 1710.

Evidence of similar acts] See under Conspiracy.

Triable at Q. S.

CHILDREN.

I. OFFENCES AGAINST; II. OFFENCES BY.

I.

Common law] See under Servants.

The Dangerous Performances Acts] The effect of 42-3 V. 34, 3, 4, and 60-1 V. 52, 1, 2, is that where in the course of a public exhibition or performance which in its nature is dangerous to the life or limb of any male under sixteen or any female under eighteen taking part therein, any accident causing actual bodily harm occurs to' such person, the employer of such' person shall be liable to be indicted as having committed an assault' and the court of conviction may award compensation up to twenty pounds for such person: provided that no person shall be punished twice for the same offence.' If the defendant disputes the age accepted by the court, the onus of disproof is on him. Unless an accident has actually occurred the consent of the local 'chief officer of police' must be obtained for a prosecution.

= &

Cruelty] The governing A. is 8 E. 7, 67. By s. 131 in this A. 'child a person under the age of fourteen; young person person between fourteen and sixteen; guardian' includes any person who in the opinion of the court. has for the time being the charge of or control over the child, young person or youthful offender.'

Age] By s. 123 (1), when it appears to the court' that a person brought before it (not to give evidence), whether charged or not,' is under sixteen, it shall make due inquiry' and shall take such evidence as may be forthcoming at the hearing, but no subsequent proof that the age. has not been correctly stated to the court' shall invalidate its order or judgment and for the purposes of this Act'the age presumed or declared by the court. . . shall . . . be deemed to be the true age.'

(2) 'Where in a charge or indictment for an offence under this Act or any of the offences mentioned in the First Schedule [below] to this Act, except an offence under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885, it is alleged that the person by or in respect of whom the offence was committed was a child or young person or was under or above any specified age, and he appears to the court to have been at the date of the commission of the alleged offence a child or young person or to have been under or above the specified age, as the case may be, he shall for the purposes of this Act be presumed at that date to have been a child or young person or to have been under or above that age, as the case may be, unless the contrary is proved.'

By (3), an allegation that a 'child' is a young person' or vice versâ shall not be a defence' if the offence may be charged in both cases; but (4) 'where a person is charged with an offence under this Act in respect of a person apparently under a specified age, it shall be