blance' of the obverse side of a shilling, Patteson J. held that the jury must be satisfied that, at the time he had it in his possession, the whole of either the obverse or the reverse of a shilling was impressed on the mould, and not only a part. Foster, C. & P. 494, 1836. But on a second indictment, for making a mould intended to make and impress the figure and apparent resemblance' of the obverse side of a shilling, the same judge ruled that it was sufficient to prove that defendant made the mould, and a part of the impression, though he had not entirely completed them. Īb. 495. An indictment under that s. alleging that defendant had in his possession a mould, on which was made and impressed the figure,' &c., of a sixpence, was held bad on demurrer; as not sufficiently showing that the impression was on the mould at the time it was in his possession. A fresh indictment, with the words 'then and there' was held good. Richmond, 1 C. & K. 240; 1 Cox C. C. 9, 1843.

Onus] An indictment under s. 24, above, must negative the authority or excuse,' although the burden of proof is cast upon the accused, but the word 'excuse' includes authority.' Harvey, above.

Defendant's intention about the use of dies of current coin need not be inquired into; there is nothing in the Act to make the intent any part of the offence . . . under feloniously,' a guilty knowledge must be shown; that is to say, that the accused must have knowingly done that which is made an offence by the Act': per Bovill C.J. ib. Intent to defraud' only occurs in s. 13; but to convict there must be some indication of a dishonest purpose or mens rea': 1 Russ. Cri. 362.

Punishment] Uttering false or counterfeit coin or possessing counterfeit gold or silver coin in England or Ireland is a crime within s. 20 of 34-5 V. 112 and 8 E. 7, 59.

Common law] is now seldom invoked; according to 1 Russ. Cri. 356, "Possession of counterfeit coin of the realm with intent to utter it is not an offence at common law. But the unlawful procuring of counterfeit coin with intent to circulate it, though no act of uttering be proved, is a misdemeanour at common law [Fuller, R. & R. 308, 1816], and the possession of counterfeit coin under suspicious circumstances and without any circumstances to induce a belief that the defendant was the maker, was held to be evidence of unlawful procuring with intent to utter [ib.].' The first proposition here is due to the fact that there is no act: by all the judges: Heath, R. & R. 184, 1810.

Coinage offences are triable at Q. S., except when the penalty may be penal servitude for life.

Effect of scientific progress] It was held that a collar marking the edge, by having the coin forced through it by machinery, is an instrument within 8-9 W. 3, 26, above, though this device is of modern invention. Moore, 1 Moo. C. C. 122, 1826. So when it was 'obvious that the legislature could not in providing for the protection of works of art, describe a piracy by means of a process not then within the knowledge of mankind [viz. ' the modern art called photography '] . . . it by no means follows that when words large enough to embrace it are used the prohibition should not be extended to a subsequently discovered mode': per Kelly C.B., Graves v. Ashford, L. R. 2 C. P. 420, 1867.

Embezzlement] and analogous offences are now punished under the Larceny A. 1916. Where a director, by arrangement with his officials, but without the knowledge or consent of the board (in defiance of an express article of association) opened a trust' account at a branch, and from time to time overdrew, and when the bank stopped payment about seven years after there had been any operation at all on the account, owed the bank a large sum on the overdrafts, he being solvent at the time the overdrafts were made, a conviction in the Isle of Man under a s. in a local statute which incorporated verbatim the offence(s) stated in a rpd. English s. now represented by s. 20 (1) (ii) of that A., was quashed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on the ground that there was serious misdirection on fraudulent appropriation within the s. Nelson v. R., 1902, A. C. 250; 20 Cox C. C. 150; 71 L. J. P. C. 55; 86 L. T. 164.

Falsifying accounts] By s. 82 of 24-5 V. 96: Whosoever, being a director, public officer, or manager of any body corporate or public company, shall, as such, receive or possess himself of any of the property of such body corporate or public company, otherwise than in payment of a just debt or demand, and shall, with intent to defraud, omit to make, or to cause or direct to be made, a full and true entry thereof in the books and accounts of such body corporate or public company, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour. Maximum punish

ment: seven years' p. s.

Falsifying books, &c.] By s. 83: Whosoever, being a director, manager, public officer, or member of any body corporate or public company, shall, with intent to defraud, destroy, alter, mutilate, or falsify any took, paper, writing, or valuable security belonging to the body corporate or public company, or make or concur in the making of any false entry, or omit or concur in omitting any material particular in any book of account or other document, shall be guilty of a mis-demeanour.' Punishment as under s. 82.

Publishing fraudulent statements] By s. 84: Whosoever, being a director, manager, or public officer of any body corporate or public company, shall make, circulate, or publish, or concur in making, circulating, or publishing, any written statement or account which he shall know to be false in any material particular, with intent to deceive or defraud any member, shareholder or creditor of such body corporate or public company, or with intent to induce any person to become a shareholder or partner therein, or to intrust or advance any property to such body corporate or public company, or to enter into any security for the benefit thereof, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.' Punishment as under s. 82.

'Deceive or defraud'] See per Buckley J. under False Pretences, 1, and title Agents, &c.

A manager, who has acted throughout as such, though not so appointed within the Companies Acts, is within this s. Lawson, 1905, 1 K. B. 541; 20 Cox C. C. 812; 74 L. J. K. B. 296; 69 J. P. 122; 21 T. L. R. 231: C. C. R.

If defendant knows the statement, &c. to be false with the intent that it shall be acted on by any one it reaches, he is guilty within ss. 83, 84: Birt, 63 J. P. 328, 1899: a general intent to defraud is enough.

These offences are not triable at quarter sessions: by s. 87.

By s. 86: Nothing in any of the last eleven preceding sections [now rpd. except 82-5] . . . nor any proceeding, conviction or judgment to be had or taken thereon against any person under any of the said sections shall prevent, lessen or impeach any remedy at law or in equity which any party aggrieved by any offence against any of the said sections might have had if this Act had not been passed; but no conviction of any such offender shall be received in evidence in any action at law or suit in equity; and nothing in the said sections contained shall affect or prejudice any agreement entered into or security given by any trustee having for its object the restoration or repayment of any trust property misappropriated.'

Compulsory admission of offences] See under Agents.

Railway directors, &c.] See Railways.

Companies (Consolidation) A. 1908-8 E. 7, 69, s. 216] 'If any director, officer or contributory of any company being wound up destroys, mutilates, alters or falsifies any books, papers or securities, or makes or is privy to the making of any false or fraudulent entry in any register, book of account, or document belonging to the company, with intent to defraud or deceive any person, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanour': maximum punishment, two years' imp. w. h. 1. Cf. s. 281. Triable at Q. S.

'COMPOUND' CRIME.

See Index.

Compromising a Prosecution.

511

COMPOUNDING OFFENCES AND INFORMATIONS.

Felonies] Though the bare taking of one's own goods again which have been stolen' (without favour shown to the thief) is no offence, Hawk. P. C. 1, 59, 7, yet where a man not only knows of a felony, but takes his goods again or other amends not to prosecute, this is misprision of felony [below] . . . punishable only with ransom and imprisonment, unless it were accompanied with some degree of maintenance given to the felon, which makes the party an accessory after the fact.' Ib. ss. 5, 6. 'Theft bote' is 'reducible' to it: ib. And so in any other felony an agreement for reward not to prosecute an indictment is punishable as a misdemeanour; though nearly all the precedents of indictments for this species of offence seem to be confined to that compounding of felony which has reference to the recovery of property. Cf. Coke, 3 Inst. 134 and 139. Agreements not to prosecute or to stifle a prosecution are in certain cases criminal. This offence is distinct from that of misprision of felony ': 1 Russ. Cri.

579.

6

Non-owner] But, on the other hand, it has been pointed out that none of the old writers expressly say that the offence cannot be committed by a person who is not the owner. See Burgess, 16 Q. B. D. 141; 55 L. J. M. C. 97; 15 Cox C. C. 779, 1885: C. O. R., where it was held that the offence of compounding a larceny may be committed by a person other than the owner of the goods stolen, or a material witness for the prosecution. Where, in an indictment for compounding a felony, it was averred that the defendant did desist, and from that time hitherto had desisted from all further prosecution, and it appeared that after the alleged compounding he prosecuted the offender to conviction, Bosanquet J. directed an acquittal. Stone, 4 C. & P. 379, 1838; but since Burgess this case has no authority. It is not necessary, however, to allege in the indictment that the defendant desisted from prosecuting the felon; the offence consists in the corrupt agreement not to prosecute. Burgess, above.

Misdemeanours] Whether, at common law, the compounding of misdemeanour is apart from conspiracy' (1 Russ. Cri. 580) in any case a misdemeanour, is perhaps doubtful. Such agreements, when not made with the permission of a court of justice, are clearly, in many cases, illegal. Collins v. Blantern, 2 Wils. 341, 1767; 4 Bl. Comm. 363; Beeley v. Wingfield, 11 East, 46, 1809; Hardey, 14 Q. B. 529, 1850. And in some cases even when made with the permission of the court: Keir v. Leeman, 9 Q. B. 371, 1846, where plaintiff indicted persons for assault coupled with riot and the obstruction of a public officer' (a bailiff executing a fi. fa.), and with the consent of L. Denman and Maule J. offered no evidence, and they were acquitted, promising to pay what was due and costs, the Ex. Ch., affirming the Q. B., held that he could not recover this sum. No case has said that it is lawful to compromise such an offence.' We have no doubt,'

said Tindal C.J., 'that in all offences which involve damages to an injured party for which he may maintain an action it is competent for him, notwithstanding they are also of a public nature, to compromise or settle his private damage in any way he may think fit. It is said, indeed, that in the case of an assault he may also undertake not to prosecute on behalf of the public. It may be so; but we are not disposed to extend this any further.' An indictment for not repairing cannot legally be referred to an arbitrator, nor its subjectmatter, as it is of public concern: Blakemore, 14 Q. B. 544; 4 Cox C. C. 352, 1850, where the judges did not consent. Keir v. Leeman was followed in Windhill Local Board, &c. v. Vint, 45 Ch. D. 351; 59 L. J. Ch. 608, 1890: C. A., where the point was the same as in Blakemore, but the sanction of the judge had been obtained.

Informations on penal statutes] By 18 Eliz. 5, 4 (otherwise 3: amended 42-3 V. 59), no informer or plaintiff under any penal statute shall compound with defendant until after answer nor without leave of the court; and by s. 5 (otherwise 4), if any informer, 'by colour or pretence of process, or without process upon colour or pretence of any matter of offence against any penal law, make any composition, or take any money, reward, or promise of reward,' without the order or consent of the court, he shall stand two hours in the pillory, be for ever disabled to sue on any 'popular' [i.e. a statute permitting an informer to sue] or penal statute, and shall forfeit ten pounds. This statute does not extend to proceedings only cognisable by justices. Crisp, 1 B. & Ald. 282, 1818. But it is not necessary, to bring the case within the statute, that there should be an action or other proceeding pending. Gotley, R. & R. 84, 1805. A mere threat to set a public officer in motion to prosecute for the recovery of penalties (and not therefore being such a threat as a firm and prudent man might not be expected to resist [see under Threats amounting to an indictable offence at common law) is yet, it seems, within this statute. Southerton, 6 East, 126, 1805. A person may be convicted, under this statute, of taking money, though no offence liable to a penalty has been committed by the person from whom the money is taken. Best, 2 Moo. C. C. 124; 9 C. & P. 868, 1840.

Misprision of felony The word misprision means a mere mistake': per L. Denman C.J., Conyers, 8 Q. B. 991, 1846; ' misprision of felony is taken for a concealment of felony or a procuring of the concealment thereof, whether it be felony by the common law or by statute.' Hawk. P. C. 1, 59, 2. 'Silently to observe the commission of a felony, without using any endeavours to apprehend the offender, is a misprision. Ib. (editor's note); cf. 1 Hale P. C. 439. When one is slaine,' whether feloniously or not, it seems, omission to apprehend the slayer is a misprision: 3 Inst. 139, 8 E. 2 (Fitzh.), Cor. 395.' If to the knowledge of the felony there be added assent to it, the assenter is either principal or an accessory. 4 Bl. Comm. 121. But mere standing by when a crime is committed does not constitute that crime [if it does any]: J. H. Gray, 12 Cr. A. R. 244, 1917, who was convicted of manslaughter with another man convicted of murder: the C. C. A. was satisfied that the motive of the latter was not robbery, as was supposed at the trial: former's c. q.

Rewards for recovery of stolen, &c. goods] Similar to the offence of compounding a felony is that of taking a reward for the return of