Provided also that the protection intended to be afforded by this section shall not be available as a defence in any proceedings if it shall be proved that the defendant has been requested to insert in the newspaper in which the report or other publication complained of appeared a reasonable letter or statement by way of contradiction or explanation of such report or other publication and has refused or neglected to insert the same: Provided further that nothing in this section contained shall be deemed or construed to limit or abridge any privilege now by law existing or to protect the publication of any matter not of public concern and the publication of which is not for the public benefit.

For the purposes of this section public meeting' shall mean any meeting bona fide and lawfully held for a lawful purpose and for the furtherance or discussion of any matter of public concern whether the admission thereto be general or restricted.'

By s. 8: ... No criminal prosecution shall be commenced against any proprietor, publisher, editor, or any person responsible for the publication of a newspaper for any libel published therein without the order of a judge at chambers being first had and obtained.

Such application shall be made on notice to the person accused, who shall have an opportunity of being heard against any such application.' There is no appeal from this order. Ex parte Pulbrook, 1892, 1 Q. B. 86; 61 L. J. M. C. 91; 17 Cox O. O. 464.

Yates, 11 Q. B. D. 750; 52 L. J. M. C. 778, 1883, where a majority (three against two) were unanimously affirmed on appeal; Yates v. R., 14 Q. B. D. 648; 54 L. J. Q. B. D. 258; 49 J. P. 436; 15 Cox C. C. 686, 1885, decided in effect that s. 8 of 51-2 V. 64 does not apply to criminal informations for libel filed by the order of the court at the instance of private prosecutors; neither does it apply to criminal informations filed by the attorney-general.

I hereby allow the prosecution of the publisher, proprietor, or editor of the Freethinker, or any other person responsible for the publication therein of blasphemous articles between the dates of March 26, and June 11, 1882,' was held by L. Coleridge C.J. (apparently on the authority of a divisional court, 15 Cox C. C. 221-2, viz. Field and Stephen JJ., the Times, Nov. 7, 1882) to be a sufficient fiat by the Director of Public Prosecutions within the A., though no one was mentioned by name. Bradlaugh. But the exact reverse was held (by three judges to two) in Allison, 16 Cox C. C. 559; 53 J. P. 215; 59 L. T. 933 (or Judd, 37 W. R. 143), 1888: C. C. R.: c. q. Names must be mentioned. No fiat can authorise the prosecution of the mere printer who has no knowledge of contents. Ib.

Responsible for the publication'] 'It is submitted that the printer is included in this phrase, but not the writer and composer of the libel, even though he be a reporter on the staff of the paper': Odgers on Libel, p. 716, 5th ed. So Fraser on Libel, p. 340, 5th ed.; but see Allison, above.

S. 6 (1881 A.): the Vexatious Indictments A. applies.

Evidence] Under the earlier law a certified copy of the affidavit lodged at the stamp-office, and a newspaper corresponding in title, printer, publisher, &c., exactly with those in the affidavit, were sufficient evidence of publication. Hunt, 31 St. Tr. 375, 1811; Moyne v. Fletcher, 9 B. & C. 382, 1829. But where the affidavit and the newspaper varied in the abode of the proprietor, Murray v. Souter,

1829, cited 6 Bing. 414, or the printing place, Franceys, 2 A. & E. 49, 1834, it was held insufficient.

See for sufficient evidence of the identity of the newspaper under S. 8 of rpd. 6-7 W. 4, 76, Baker v. Wilkinson, Carr. & M. 399, 1842; Woolmer, 12 A. & E. 422, 1840; Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 3 C. & K. 10; 14 Q. B. 185; 19 L. J. Q. B. 10, 1850; and Gathercole v. Miall. The purchase of a copy at the office eighteen years after the date of the libel was held to be sufficient publication. Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, above (Q. B.).

Where the printer swore that a copy produced was part of an issue published in the ordinary way, that copy was given in evidence, though it had not been published, and was unstamped. Pearce, 1 Peake 106, 1791.

Interrogatories] S. 19 of 6-7 W. 4, 76 (rpd.), has been embodied in 32-3 V. 24, sched. 2, and is: 'If any person shall file any bill in any court for the discovery of the name of any person concerned as printer, publisher, or proprietor of any newspaper, or of any matters relative to the printing or publishing of any newspaper, in order the more effectually to bring or carry on any suit or action for damages alleged to have been sustained by reason of any slanderous or libellous matter contained in any such newspaper respecting such person, it shall not be lawful for the defendant to plead or demur to such bill, but such defendant shall be compellable to make the discovery required; provided always that such discovery shall not be made use of as evidence or otherwise in any proceeding against the defendant, save only in that proceeding for which the discovery is made.' [Slanderous here seems to refer to slander reported in the newspaper.]

Newspaper reports] 'It is now well established,' said Cockburn C.J. (Wason v. Walter in 1868, and anticipating s. 3, above), 'that faithful and fair reports of the proceedings of courts of justice, though the character of individuals may incidentally suffer, are privileged, and that for the publication of such reports the publishers are neither criminally nor civilly responsible. . The general advantage to the country in having these proceedings made public more than counterbalances the inconvenience to the private persons whose conduct may be the subject of such proceedings. Though ex parte proceedings had been regarded as a probable exception' from the rule, 'Yet ex parte proceedings before magistrates, and even before this court, as, for instance, on applications for criminal informations, are published every day, but such a thing as an action or indictment founded on a report of such an ex parte proceeding is unheard of, and if any such action or indictment should be brought, it would probably be held that the true criterion of the privilege is not whether the report was or was not ex parte, but whether it was a fair and honest report of what had taken place, published simply with a view to the information of the public, and innocent of all intention to do injury to the reputation of the party affected.' See also Usill v. Hales, 3 C. P. D. 319; 47 L. J. C. P. 323, 1878.

The publication of a seditious libel will not be privileged on the ground that it is copied from another newspaper, above. It is a question for the jury whether it was so copied as an item of news or for a seditious purpose, and they may consider the surrounding circumstances in order to arrive at the intention of the publisher. Sullivan and Pigott, 1868, at 46 and 61.

The conduct and management by the clergyman of a parish of a charity, from the benefits of which dissenters are by his sanction excluded, is not the lawful subject of public comment in a newspaper so as to excuse the publication of untrue and injurious matter respecting the clergyman in relation to the charity. Gathercole v. Miall. It was urged, against a rule for an information for a blasphemous and seditious libel, that it was, in fact, a correct report of a judicial proceeding; yet the court held that if that involved anything blasphemous. indecent, &c., the right had gone. Mary Carlile, 3 B. & Ald. 167. 1819. This was not denied in the Evening News case, 3 T. L. R. 255, 1886-alleged unnecessary details of a pending divorce suit-but the Court thought the motion should have been made as soon as the reports began. Where a newspaper stated that there was a riot at C.. and that a person fired a pistol at an assemblage of persons, and on this imputed neglect of duty (to prevent a riot) to the magistrates, Patteson J. held, that on a criminal trial, defendant's counsel could not, with a view of showing that the libel did not exceed the bounds of free discussion,' go into evidence to prove that there was in fact a riot, and a pistol fired. Brigstock, 6 C. & P. 184, 1833.

Fox's Act, 1792] By 32 G. 3, 60, reciting that doubts have arisen whether, on the trial of an indictment or information for the making or publishing any libel, where an issue or issues are joined between the king and the defendant or defendants on the plea of not guilty pleaded, it be competent to the jury impanelled to try the same to give their verdict upon the whole matter in issue, [s. 1] on every such trial the jury sworn to try the issue may give a general verdict of guilty or not guilty upon the whole matter put in issue upon such indictment or information, and shall not be required or directed by the court or judge before whom such indictment or information shall be tried, to find the defendant or defendants guilty merely on the proof of the publication by such defendant or defendants of the paper charged to be a libel, and of the sense ascribed to the same in such indictment or information.' By s. 2: 'On every such trial the court or judge before whom such indictment or information shall be tried. shall, according to their or his discretion, give their or his opinion and directions to the jury on the matter in issue between the king and the defendant or defendants, in like manner as in other criminal cases. By s. 3: Nothing herein contained shall extend, or be construed to extend, to prevent the jury from finding a special verdict in their discretion, as in other criminal cases.' And by s. 4: 'In case the jury shall find the defendant or defendants guilty, it shall and may be lawful for the said defendant or defendants to move in arrest of judgment on such ground and in such manner as by law he or they might have done before the passing of this Act. . . .

Venue] The libel must have been published in the county in which the venue is laid. Where the libel is once published, the procurer thereof is guilty of a publication in every county in which it is afterwards published. Johnson, 7 East 65, 1805, where the Case of the Seven Bishops on this point is explained. Cf. Buller N. P. 6. On an information for a libel, in the county of Leicester, it appeared that it was written in that county, on August 22, and delivered on the 24th by A., who was not called, to B. in Middlesex. It was enclosed in an open envelope, addressed to A. with instructions or a request to forward it to B., and there was no trace of a seal or postmark.

There was no evidence that A. was about that time in Leicestershire. The judge directed the jury, that as B. had it open, they might presume that A. received it open, and that, as the defendant wrote it in the county of Leicester, it must be presumed that A. received it in that county. It was urged, on a motion for a new trial after conviction, that there was no evidence of a publication in Leicestershire; but the K. B. held that the direction of the judge was proper, and that if the delivery open could not be presumed, a delivery sealed, with a view to and for the purpose of publication, was a publication: and they held that there was sufficient to presume some delivery, either open or sealed, in the county of Leicester. Burdett, 1820. It was also discussed whether it was essential that the whole offence must have been committed in the venue county. Three judges expressed an opinion that the composing and writing a libel in the county of L., and afterwards publishing it in M., though not in L., gave jurisdiction to a jury of the county of L., as well as to one in M., and that the composing and writing with intent afterwards to publish was a misdemeanour (cf. Beare; Knell, 1 Barnard. K. B. 305 in 1729); but Bayley J. (at 155) held that the whole corpus delicti must be proved within one county, and that there was no distinction in this respect between felonies and misdemeanours. Abbott C.J. said, To write and publish a libel is a misdemeanour compounded of distinct parts, each of which parts (for I am speaking of a published libel) being an act done in prosecution of one and the same criminal intention is a misdemeanour . . and the whole may be tried in that county wherein any part can be proved to have been done.'

Postmarks (proved) are evidence that the letters on which they are were in the offices named at the times denoted by the marks. Plumer, R. & R. 264, 1814. Cf. Warren v. Warren, and see Odgers on Libel, 675, 728, 5th ed.

Sentence] S. 5 of 6-7 V. 96 is not exhaustive of the court's punitive powers; in Trueman, 1913, 3 K. B. 164; 9 Cr. A. R. 45; 82 L. J. K. B. 916; 77 J. P. 428; 23 Cox C. O. 550; 29 T. L. R. 599, the maximum term of imprisonment and orders (1) to pay the costs of the prosecution; (2) to enter into a recognisance for good behaviour for twelve months; (3) to find one surety in 50l. or a further term of twelve months, were upheld: serious libel on a magistrate who had convicted appellant, aggravated by plea of justification.

Costs] See that title. By 8 E. 7, 15, 6 (2), defamatory libel on a private prosecution is one of the offences on acquittal for which a private prosecutor may be ordered to pay the (taxed) costs, in whole or part, of defendant. The wording of that sub-s. disposes of the points in Steel, 1 Q. B. D. 482; 45 L. J. Q. B. 391; 13 Cox O. C. 159, 1876; and Latimer, 15 Q. B. 1077; 20 L. J. Q. B. 129, 1850.

Corporations] may be indicted and fined: per L. Blackburn, Pharmaceutical Society v. London & Provincial Supply Assocn., Ltd., 5 App. Cas. at 870; 49 L. J. Q. B. 742; 28 W. R. 960; 43 L. T. 389, 1880. Quarter sessions] may try obscene libels only.

LICENCE (TICKET OF LEAVE') HOLDERS, OFFENCES BY. See Suspects.

LIMITED COMPANIES, OFFENCES BY.
See Companies.

LIVING ON IMMORAL EARNINGS.

See Procuration, Prostitution, and Rogues.

MALES.

Vagrancy A. 1898, 61-2 V. 39] S. 1 (1): 'Every male person who (a) knowingly lives wholly or in part on the earnings of prostitution; or (b) in any public place persistently solicits or importunes for immoral purposes, shall be deemed a rogue and vagabond within the meaning of the Vagrancy Act, 1824, and may be dealt with accordingly.

(3) Where a male person is proved to live with or to be habitually in the company of a prostitute, or is proved to have exercised control, direction or influence over the movements of a prostitute in such a manner as to show that he is aiding, abetting or compelling her prostitution with any person or generally, he shall, unless he can satisfy the court to the contrary, be deemed to be knowingly living on the earnings of prostitution.' The words in italics are an amendment of 2-3 G. 5, 20, 7 (1).

Crim. L. Am. A. 1912, 2-3 G. 5, c. 20] S. 7 (5): 'A person charged with an offence under the Vagrancy Act, 1898 may, instead of being proceeded against in England as a rogue and vagabond, be proceeded against on indictment, and on conviction' maximum sentence may be two years' imprisonment with hard labour, plus, on subsequent conviction on indictment, in the case of a male, one private whipping. The number of strokes and the instrument... shall be specified by the court in the sentence.' But the second conviction need not be the second on indictment: F. Austin, 8 Cr. A. R. 169, 1913, where there were three summary convictions before the 1912 A. came into force.

FEMALES.

S. 7 (4): Every female who is proved to have for the purposes of gain, exercised control, direction or influence over the movements of a prostitute in such a manner as to show that she is aiding, abetting