entry were not with intent to murder him, but only as a trespasser, to gain the possession. In such case, A. being in his own house, need not fly as far as he can, as in other cases of self-defence; for he has the protection of his house to excuse him from flying; as that would be to give up the possession of his house to his adversary by his flight. But in these cases the homicide is excusable rather than justifiable.' East P. C. 287, citing 1 Hale P. C. 445, 485; and Cook, 1640.

A publican refused to serve two men owing to the lateness of the hour. Later one returned, got in and collared the publican, who still refused and struggled to put him out, where the other outside struck him with a sharp instrument which killed him. Buller J. held this to be murder in both, notwithstanding the previous struggle between the landlord and one of them; for the landlord did no more after the warning . . . than he lawfully might; which was no provocation for the cruel revenge taken, more especially as there was reasonable evidence of the prisoners having come a second time, with a deliberate intention to use personal violence, in case their demand for beer was not complied with.' Willoughby, East P. C. 288, 1791. Cf. Archer, 1857.

Several of the foregoing points are illustrated by Meade. He had made himself obnoxious to boatmen by giving information of certain smuggling transactions. They, in revenge, ducked him, and he was rescued by the police. Then they threatened that they would come and pull his house down at night, and at midnight a great number did come about his house, with noise and threatening and violent language; he, in fear, as he alleged, that his life and property were in danger, fired a pistol, by which one of them was killed. Holroyd J. said, 'A civil trespass will not excuse the firing a pistol at a trespasser in sudden resentment or anger. If a person takes forcible Fossession of another man's close, so as to be guilty of a breach of the peace, it is more than a trespass. So if a man with force invades and enters into the dwelling of another. But a man is not authorised to fire a pistol on every intrusion or invasion of his house. He ought, if he has a reasonable opportunity, to endeavour to remove himself without having recourse to the last extremity. But the making an attack upon a dwelling, especially at night, the law regards as equivalent to an assault on a man's person; for a man's house is his castle, and therefore, in the eye of the law, it is equivalent to an assault; but no words or singing are equivalent to an assault, nor will they authorise an assault in return. If . . . there was nothing but the song, and no appearance of further violence-if . . . there was no reasonable ground for apprehending further danger, but... the pistol was fired for the purpose of killing, then it is murder.' Verdict, manslaughter. Meade, 1 Lew. C. C. 184, 1823.

Self-preservation] is a form of self-defence. Dudley and Stephens, another seaman (not indicted), and the deceased, a boy of about seventeen, were wrecked on the high seas, and compelled to put into an open boat, in which they drifted for 20 days. On the twentieth day, when they had all been many days without food or drink, and the boy especially was in extremis, Dudley, with the assent of Stephens (but not of the third man), killed the boy, and all lived on his flesh for four days. It was highly probable that otherwise they would all have died of starvation very soon. It was held by five judges of the Q. B. D. on these facts, found in a special verdict, that defendants

were guilty of murder: sentence was commuted to six months' imprisonment. Dudley, 1884. See Necessity in Appendix.

Abetting suicide] If A. persuade B. to kill himself, and B. do so, A. is guilty of murder; if, e.g., B. takes poison in the absence of A., the persuader, yet A. is a principal in the murder. 1 Hale P. C. 431; citing Vaux's case, 1591; 4 Rep. 44 a. Indictment for the murder of a woman. Defendant stated that they had resolved to drown themselves; ultimately he found himself in the water, but whether by actually throwing himself in from a boat in which they both were, or by accident, did not appear; he got back into the boat, and found that she was gone; he endeavoured to save her, but could not. In his statement, which was read at the trial, he said he intended to drown himself, but dissuaded the woman from doing so. The judge told the jury that if they believed that he only intended to drown himself, they should acquit; but if they both went to the water for the purpose of drowning themselves, each encouraging the other to felony, the survivor was guilty of murder: also that if he was present at the time that she threw herself in, and consented to her doing it,' the act was the act of both, and he would be guilty. They found that both went to the water for the purpose of drowning themselves, and he was convicted. The judges were clear that if deceased threw herself into the water with his encouragement, and through his example, as they had agreed, he was principal (in the second degree), and guilty of murder; but the fact was doubtful. Dyson, R. & R. 523, 1823. This was followed in Alison, a very similar case, where there was no suggestion of accident. (Another case, said, 1 Russ. Cri. 92 q., to be Anon., Fr. Moore, K. B. 754, in 1604, was cited): guilty; 8 C. & P. 418, 1838; and so Jessop, 16 Cox C. C. 204, 1877, where sentence of death was pronounced, but commuted. See Fretwell,

1862.

Accessories] See Aiders, &c., above. To the general rule that principals in the second degree must be present at the perpetration) there are some exceptions founded in necessity and political justice.' Foster, 349, citing Kel. 52-3, and 1 Hale P. C. 616. 'A. with intention to destroy B. layeth poison properly disguised in his way. B. taketh it and dieth. A., though absent when the poison was taken, is a principal; and if this had been done at the instigation of C., he if absent would have been no more than an accessory in the murder, unless they had both mingled' it and laid it in B.'s way, in which case both would have been principals. But if the intermediary innocently administer the poison as a medicine on A.'s instructions, A., though absent, is a principal upon the same foot of necessity.' Ib. Cf. Michael, 1840. See, generally, Common Design, above.

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After the fact] By 24-5 V. 100, 67: Every accessory after the fact to murder shall be liable at the discretion of the court to be kept in penal servitude for life.' A form of indictment will be found p. 92.

Wife] cannot set up coercion by husband in Murder: see Part III.

Direction] The jury must be directed whether provocation or drunkenness is sufficient in any case to reduce to manslaughter. Mowbray, 8 Cr. A. R. 8, 1912.

*Verdict] See under Manslaughter.

MURDER, ATTEMPTED.

See Attempts, including Attempted Suicide.

Intent] By 24-5 V. 100, 11: Whosover shall administer to or cause to be administered to or to be taken by any person any poison or other destructive thing, or shall by any means whatsoever wound or cause any grievous bodily harm to any person with intent in any of the cases aforesaid to commit murder, shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable to be kept in penal ser

vitude for life.'

Destroying, &c. building, ship, with that intent] See 24-5 V. 100, 12: by s. 13, Whosoever shall set fire to any ship or vessel or any part thereof, or any part of the tackle, apparel or furniture thereof, or any goods or chattels being therein, or shall cast away or destroy any ship or vessel, with intent in any of such cases to commit murder, shall be . Conclusion as in s. 11, above.

Attempt] By s. 14: Whosoever shall attempt to administer to or shall attempt to cause to be administered to or to be taken by any person any poison or other destructive thing or shall shoot at any person, or shall, by drawing a trigger or in any other manner, attempt to discharge any kind of loaded arms at any person or shall attempt to drown, suffocate, or strangle any person, with intent in any of the cases aforesaid, to commit murder, shall, whether any bodily injury be effected or not, be guilty . . . Conclusion as in s. 11, above.

Otherwise than in preceding ss.] By s. 15: Whosoever shall by any means other than those specified in any of the preceding sections [above] of this Act, attempt to commit murder, shall be . . .' Conclusion as in s. 11.

Acquittal of murder] was no bar to an indictment for the attempt under 7 W. 4 & 1 V. 85, 3, 5, rpd., but of the same effect as ss. 11-14, above. Connell, 6 Cox C. C. 178, 1853: per Williams and Talfourd JJ., though such a verdict could have been found under 14-5 V. 100, 9.

Loaded arms] See s. 19.

John

Intent and attempt] Any one of a series of acts the final object of which is to kill, as e.g. in slow poisoning, is an attempt. White, 1910, 2 K. B. 124; 79 L. J. K. B. 854; 74 J. P. 318; 22 Cox C. C. 325; 26 T. L. R. 466; 4 Cr. A. R. 257.

A dictum to the contrary effect in Linneker, below, was doubted, viz. although an attempt implies the intent, an intent does not necessarily imply an attempt.'

Proof] The same judge who thought that there must be a positive intention to murder, and that it is not enough that if death had taken place it would have been murder, in Cruse, 1838, which was under 1 V. 85, 2, rpd., doubted it in Jones, 9 C. & P. 258, 1840, and held that the intent might be inferred, if it would have been murder, had death ensued.

For shooting at A. (supposed to be B.) with intent to murder B., and similar cases, see under Grievous Bodily Harm.

Indictment under s. 14, above, for attempting to discharge a loaded pistol at S. with intent to murder him. Defendant, having a grudge against S., went to his house and drew a loaded pistol from his pocket, but it was instantaneously snatched out of his hand. Stephen J. held there was no evidence to go to the jury of any offence under s. 14, considering himself bound by St. George (overruled), where 'it was held that the words 'by drawing a trigger, or in any other manner,' meant in any other manner like drawing a trigger, as, e.g. by striking a percussion-cap with a hammer, and that an attempt to discharge a pistol by attempting to pull a trigger was not an offence within' these words. The only question reserved being whether there was an offence within s. 15, the C. for C. C. R. held that there was not, for s. 15 pointed to means' other than those mentioned in the earlier SS. But they clearly thought the case was within s. 14. Brown, 10 Q. B. D. 381; 52 L. J. M. C. 49; 15 Cox C. C. 199, 1883: C. C. R. See Duckworth, 1892. In a case very similar to Brown, where defendant avowed his intention to kill, the C. for C. C. R. held that it was within s. 18 as well as s. 14, though no trigger was drawn. the struggle to get the revolver having been successful. Linneker, 1906, 2 K. B. 99; 21 Cox C. C. 196.

Common design] of resistance to apprehension to the point of murder may be inferred where two poachers go together, one armed with a gun, and one with a stick, and the former fires, though the jury cannot say which was the one: sentence on the one who did not fire should be lighter: Pridmore, 77 J. P. 339; 29 T. L. R. 330; 8 Cr. A. R. 198, 1913.

Direction] The jury should be informed that they may on indictment, under s. 11, find 'unlawful wounding': J. T. Parks, 1914: verdict varied.

Sentence] S. 9 of 14-5 V. 100 does not prevent sentence under ss. 11-15, above, though, before the latter`ss. were enacted, the 'attempt' mentioned in s. 9 must have been a common law crime: J. White, above.

The C. C. A. increased a term of penal servitude from twelve tofifteen years: W. Simpson, 5 Cr. A. R. 217; 75 J. P. 56, 1910.

The C. C. A. expressed the opinion that on trials of this sort defendant should have counsel: T. Saunders, 3 Cr. A. R. 227, 1909.

MUTILATION OF ANIMALS.

See Animals and Cattle.

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MUTINY AND MILITARY AND NAVAL OFFENCES.

Mutiny is one of the many offences which only persons subject to military and naval law can commit.

That law is contained

I. In the Army A. 1881, 44-5 V. 58, as replaced by Army (Annual) Acts' and as amended from time to time; and

II. In the Naval Discipline Acts, 1866, 29-30 V. 109; 1884, 47-8 V. 39; 1909, 9 E. 7, 41; 1915, 5-6 G. 5, cc. 30, 73.

I. Army] Some 'civil' offences, if committed by military persons, are triable by court-martial; but by proviso to s. 41 of 44-5 V. 58: (a) A person subject to military law shall not be tried by courtmartial for treason, murder, manslaughter, treason-felony or rape committed in any place within Her Majesty's dominions, other than the United Kingdom and Gibraltar, unless such person at the time he committed the offence was on active service or such place is more than one hundred miles as measured in a straight line from any city or town in which the offender can be tried for such offence by a competent civil court.

(b) A person subject to military law when in Her Majesty's dominions may be tried by any competent civil court for any offence for which he would be triable if he were not subject to military law.'

S. 162 (1) provides that the ordinary courts, in punishing, for an offence already punished by a court-martial, may take that punishment into consideration. See Marks v. Frogley, 1898, 1 Q. B. 888; 67 L. J. Q. B. 605; 78 L. T. 607; 19 Cox C. C. 92: C. A.

By (3), a commanding officer not delivering up to the civilian ministers of justice of any grade anyone under him properly claimed or not assisting the former in apprehending is guilty of a misdemeanour: by (4), a certificate of such conviction, with the judgment, must be sent to the Secretary of State.

Evidence] excluded by the Regulations from a court-martial, e.g. a confession or disclosure, may be admissible in a civil court: Colpus, &c.

Venue] By (5): 'Any offence committed by any such commanding officer out of the United Kingdom shall for the purpose of apprehension trial and punishment of the offender be deemed to have been committed within the jurisdiction of Her Majesty's High Court of Justice in England; and such court shall have jurisdiction as if the place where the offence was committed or the offender may be for the time being were in England.'

By 25-6 V. 65, 1, 3, where one person subject. . to the Mutiny Act' is charged with the murder or manslaughter of another, the Q. B. may on the application of the War Secretary order the trial to take place at the Central Criminal Court.