be valid and available. Pooley, R. & R. 12; Lea. 887; 3 B. & P. 311, 1800: unstamped draft.

A servant being sent with a letter, and a penny to pay the postage, and finding the office shut, put the penny inside the letter, and fastened it by means of a pin, and then put the letter into the box, which a post-office messenger stole; it was held by L. Denman C.J. that he might be convicted of stealing a post letter containing money, although the money was not meant for the addressee. Mence, Carr. & M. 234, 1841.

Evidence] It seems that what is mentioned in the letter secreted, &c., will not be evidence against defendant to prove that the letter contained an enclosure mentioned in it. Plumer, 1814, where both the letter opened and a bill mentioned in it were found in defendant's, a sorter's, pocket. The letter was read, the judge reserving the point, which was not decided. The letter had marked upon it, paid 28.,' i.e. double postage. This was written by the clerk of the writer, who was not called; and there was also an official mark that two shillings had been paid. There being no other proof that a double letter had been posted, the judges held a conviction wrong.

Ib.

On an indictment under rpd. statutes, the jury found specially that defendant was a person employed by the post-office, &c., that he secreted a letter which came into his hands by virtue of his office, containing a 101. note, but that he did not open the same, nor know that the bank-note was contained therein, but that he secreted it with intent to defraud the king of the postage (eightpence), which had been paid to him [and not to embezzle the note]. He, it is stated, remained in prison at least five years-which seems to imply that the judges thought he was guilty (but see Howatt, below)-but no judgment appears to have been given. Sloper, East P. C. 583; Lea. 81,

1772.

Where defendant, with intent to steal the mail-bags, pretended to be the guard, and procured them to be let down to him from the window of the post-office by a string, and carried them away, all the judges held a conviction right, on a count for stealing the letters out of the post-office, for his artifice in obtaining the delivery of them was the same as if he had actually taken them out himself. Pearce, East P. C. 603, 1794. See Kay, below. It was held, also, that a letter-carrier taking letters out of the office, intending to deliver them to the owners, but to embezzle the postage, could not be indicted (under the then statutes) for stealing such letters. Howatt, East P. C. 604; Lea. 83, 1795; cf. Sloper, above. See Dowdeswell and James, 1890.

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'Post-office' defined] S. 89, above. It was held that a receiving house' was not such, but such house was a place for the receipt of letters' within the A.; and, if a shop, the whole shop, and not merely the box, was to be considered as 'a place for the receipt of letters,' and, therefore, the putting of a letter on the shop counter, or giving it to a person belonging to the shop, was a posting it. Pearson, 1831. To constitute the offence under 52 G. 3, 143, 3, rpd. of stealing a letter from the place of receipt, it was held, that the letter must be carried wholly out of the shop, and, therefore, if a person took and opened a letter in the shop, and there stole the contents, without taking it out of the shop, the case was not within that s. Ib.

Possession of posted letters] In Pearce, above, 'the property did

not pass; the postmaster having no property in the mail-bag to part with East P. C. 673 [its contents?]. The owner of a watch placed it with the seller to be regulated; defendant, pretending by letter that he was the owner, desired the watchmaker to send it by post directed to the owner, and then by personating him obtained it from the postmaster. He was held to be rightly convicted of larceny, for, on receipt by the postmaster, the special property of the seller, the bailee ceased, the general property of the true owner became entirely unincumbered, and drew to it the possession, unless the postmaster himself became the bailee. But this he did not, according to Pearce's

case.' Kay, D. & B. C. C. 231; 26 L. J. M. C. 119; 7 Cox O. C. 289, 1857: the judgment which turned on the form of indictment was most severely criticised by Bramwell B. (who doubted at the trial) in Middleton, 1873, which see, and Dowdeswell. See Cryer, 1857.

'An officer of the post-office,' says Wright on Possession, p. 164, seems not as such to be a bailee of letters or other things in his charge, but to be merely a custodian for (and in a position similar to that of a servant of the sender [citing Kay, Gardner, Pearce, Alderson B. in Watts, 1850, 2 Den. 25].'

Some of the above offences are not triable at Q. S. See Quarter Sessions.

POUND-BREACH.

An indictment for this, i.e. rescuing cattle distrained and impounded, was tried at Bedfordshire Q. S. in 1893: Butterfield, 17 Cox C. C. 598.

See under Libel.

PRESS OFFENCES.

False news] See the Conspiracy cases and 7-8 V. 24, 4, which expressly preserves this offence, so that, despite the repeal of the whole A., it survives. Cf. 52-3 V. 63, 38. See Panic. To attempt to influence prices by this means is a misdemeanour.

Elections] See that title.

PRICES, ILLEGALLY INFLUENCING.

See Trade, &c.

PRISON BREACH AND CONNECTED OFFENCES.

Where a person is in lawful custody on a charge of treason or felony and effects his escape by force, this offence is a felony at common law; where he is in custody on an inferior charge, it is a misdemeanour. 2 Inst. 589; 1 Hale P. C. 607; see 1 E. 2, st. 2, below.

On a prosecution there must be proved-1, the offence punished by 2, the lawfulness of the imprisonment; and 3, the breach.

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1. The charge] The statute de frangentibus prisonam, 1 E. 2, st. 2 (or 23 E. 1, according to The Statutes Revised, from which the text is here taken), enacts, that none from henceforth that breaketh prison shall have judgment of life or member for breaking of prison only; except the cause for which he was taken and imprisoned did require such judgment, if he had been convict thereupon according to the law and custom of the realm, albeit in times past it hath been used otherwise.' If the offence, therefore, for which the person is arrested does not require judgment of life or member, prison-breach is not a felony. And if the offence for which the person is committed be supposed in the mittimus [= the authority to the gaoler to detain] to be of such a nature as requires a capital judgment, yet if in the event it be found of an inferior nature, and not to require such a judgment, it seems difficult to maintain that the breaking of the prison on a commitment for it can be felony. Hawk. P. C. 2, 18, 15. Perhaps the stating the offence in the mittimus to be one of lower degree than felony, will not prevent the breaking from being a felony, if in truth the original offence was not lower. Ib. One charged with high treason, who breaks prison, is only guilty of felony. Ib. s. 17. It is immaterial whether the person breaking had been tried or not. Ib. s. 16.

If the custody is on a capias, or on a mittimus, on suspicion of felony, he is within the statute, be he never so innocent, and the prosecution never so groundless'; for he is bound to submit to his imprisonment, until 'discharged by due course of law.' But there is a distinction between the two, for a capias is a lawful warrant and matter of record, whether there has been a felony or not; but, if there has been none, breaking prison on a mittimus is no felony. 2 Inst. 590; 1 Hale P. C. 610; Hawk. ib. ss. 5-7. A man may therefore be convicted for breaking prison before he is convicted of the felony for which he was imprisoned. 2 Inst. 592; 1 Hale, 611; Hawk. ib. s. 18-the breach of prison' being a presumption of the guilt of the principal offense.' Hale, 612. Yet if he has been tried and acquitted of the principal offence, he ought not to be indicted for the breaking. And if he has been so indicted before the acquittal, after it, he may plead that acquittal in bar to the indictment for breach. 1 Hale P. C. 611, 612. But a dismissal of a charge by magistrates is not tantamount to an acquittal on indictment: per Martin B., Waters, 12 Cox C. C. 390, 1873, where defendant, arrested

Lawful Imprisonment.

961

without warrant, had been remanded by a magistrate without any evidence on oath, had escaped from a lock-up,' and had voluntarily appeared at the hearing; guilty, six weeks' imprisonment.

2. The legality] The imprisonment must be lawful; actual imprisonment will not be sufficient; it must be primâ facie justifiable. Therefore where a felony has been committed, but defendant is apprehended for it, without just cause of suspicion, and the mittimus is informal, and he breaks prison, this will not be felony, though it would (probably) be otherwise if there were such strong causes of suspicion as justify his arrest and commitment. Hawk. ib. ss. 8, 15; 1 Hale P. C. 610. So if his imprisonment on mittimus is unjustifiable; see last paragraph.

The statute extends to a prison in law,' as well as to a prison in deed,' and to lawful arrest.' 2 Inst. 589. An imprisonment in the stocks (ib.), or in the house of him who makes the arrest, or in the house of another, is sufficient. 1 Hale P. C. 609. So if one arrested for felony or suspicion thereof, felony in fact having been committed, violently rescues himself from the hands of the arrester. Ib. (relying on Coke, here cited). So Hawk. as above, s. 4, for imprisonment is nothing else but a restraint of liberty.'

It is therefore enough if the gaoler have a sufficient notification of the offense for which he was committed, and the prisoner of the offense whereof he was arrested, and commonly, they know their own guilt, if they are guilty, without much notification.' Hale, ib. 610.

3. The breach] An actual breaking with force, and not merely a constructive breaking, must be proved. If the gaoler sets open the prison doors, and the felon escapes,' this is no felony in the latter, though it may be in the former. Hale, ib. 611. And if the prison be fired, and the prisoner escapes to save his life, this excuses the felony, unless the prisoner himself set fire to the prison, or it be done with his privity. Ib., after 2 Inst. 590. In these cases the breaking amounts to a misdemeanour only (escape). And so, if other persons without his privity break the prison and he escape, he is only guilty of escape. Hawk. as above, ss. 9, 10. No breach of prison will amount to felony, unless the prisoner escape.' Hawk. ib. 8. 12, e.g. if he be taken away by force: 2 Inst. 590; 1 Hale, 611. A man convicted of felony, in escaping over the walls of Brixton prison, threw down some bricks from the top, which had been purposely placed there loose, without mortar, in the form of pigeon holes, for the purpose of giving an alarm, and so preventing escapes. A doubt arose whether there was such force used as to constitute prison-. breaking, but the judges were unanimously of opinion that the conviction was right. Haswell, R. & R. 458, 1821.

Punishment] As a high misdemeanour' (not felony), this offence is punishable by fine and imprisonment. Hawk. as above, s. 21; 4 Bl. Com. 130.

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Accessories] See 28-9 V. 126, 37, and that title. By s. 4, prison shall mean gaol, house of correction, bridewell, or penitentiary; it shall also include the airing grounds or other grounds or buildings occupied by prison officers for the use of the prison, and contiguous thereto.'

A crowbar is included in the words of s. 37, any other article or thing,' which may not be used to help escape. Payne, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 27; 35 L. J. M. C. 170, 1866.

In Holloway, 1851, the indictment under 4 G. 4, 64, 43, rpd., charged that A., being a prisoner, and endeavouring to effect his escape, had procured a key to be made, and had made overtures to defendant, a turnkey, to induce him to assist him, &c., that defendant received the key with intent to enable A. to escape, &c. It was held that the offence and intent were stated with sufficient certainty. For Homicide of the prison-breaker, see that title.

Other offences] Triable at Q. S.

Except for mutiny or incitement to mutiny or gross personal violence to an officer of the prison,' 61-2 V. 41, 5 (1) (b), corporal punishment may not be inflicted by prison rules, and when it may, only with certain safeguards. Ib.

Vagrancy A. 1824] Anyone committed under this A. who breaks or escapes shall be deemed an incorrigible rogue' (which title see) within the A. and may be punished as such: ss. 5, 10.

PRIZE-FIGHTING.

See Affray, Assault, and this title under Manslaughter; and cf. Taylor, 1875.