not only of public 1 and high schools,2 but also of Normal schools, is a public purpose for which the power of taxation may be invoked, but the contrary is true of mere private schools. In the language of Judge Cooley 5 in the Supreme Court of Michigan:

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Necessity alone is not the test by which the limits of the State's authority in this direction are to be defined, but a wise statesmanship must look beyond the expenditures which are absolutely needful to continue the existence of organized government and embrace those which may tend to make that government subserve the general well-being of society and advance the present and prospective happiness and prosperity of the people."

§ 348. Erection of public sorghum mills not public purpose.

In a recent decision the United States Circuit Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit, in an exhaustive opinion by Judge Sanborn,6 decided that bonds authorized by the legislature of Kansas, upon vote of the electors of the township, issued to pay a subscription to the capital stock of a corporation organized to erect public sorghum mills, were invalid, and that the tax required was not for a public purpose. In this case the act declared that all mills that received the aid were public mills and should manufacture sugar or syrup for customers. The court said that the limits of the power to tax are by no means the limits of the police power of the State, and added at page 668:

1 Commonwealth v. Hartman, 17 Pa. 118.

2 Richards v. Raymond, 92 Ill. 612.

3 Briggs v. Johnson County, 4 Dillon 148.

4 Curtis v. Whipple, 24 Wisc. 350.

5 People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452.

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6 Dodge v. Mission Township, 46 C. C. A. 661, 54 L. R. A. 242, decided

April, 1901.

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Many private occupations, as the sale of intoxicants, the driving of carriages for hire and the construction of private buildings along the streets of a city, bear such a relation to the public welfare that they may be regulated under the police power of a State, when there is an entire absence of power in its legislature to tax the property of its citizens to promote or maintain these enterprises.'

The court in this case distinguished the decision of the Supreme Court in Burlington Township v. Beasley, supra, § 342, which held that the erection of custom grist mills was a public purpose, saying that the bonds in that case did not show on their face for which of the purposes named in the act they were issued. On the question whether a custom grist mill operated by steam is a work of internal improvement, the court declared that on this point the Burlington Township case illustrates, not the general rule, but an exception thereto, and said, 1. c. p. 665: This decision is the outgrowth of a more primitive state of society when there were no railroads and few good highways, and when custom grist mills in the immediate neighborhoods of productive fields to grind grain for bread for the people and for food for the cattle were a public necessity. In this state of affairs a line of decisions was developed to the effect that aid in the construction and maintenance of custom grist mills driven by water, and the development of the necessary water power to propel them, was a public object, for which taxes might be lawfully levied upon the property of all the citizens. Guernsey v. Burlington Township, 4 Dill. 375, Fed. Cas. No. 5,855; Harding v. Funk, 8 Kan. 315. The Burlington Tp. Case, perhaps, advanced another step, for the decison was that the promotion of a grist mill propelled by steam, as well as one propelled by water, was a public purpose. This proposition, however, together with the entire line of decisions upon which it rests, forms an exception to the general rule

upon this subject, is inapplicable to the public needs and purposes of this day, and ought not to be enlarged."1

After citing the later decisions of the Supreme Court noted above, the court said: "These decisions show the narrow limits and sharp lines which confine this exception to the general rule."2

§ 349. Inspiration of patriotism lawful public purpose. Whatever legitimately tends to inspire patriotic sentiments, and to enhance the respect of citizens for the institutions of their country, and incites them to contribute to its defense in time of war, has been held to be a lawful public purpose, such as will justify the exercise either of the power of taxation or of the power of eminent domain.3

1 The payment of a sugar bounty for the encouragement of the industry was held void, Michigan Sugar Co. v. Auditor General, 124 Mich. 674.

2 The opinion in this case contains a valuable review of the decisions upon this subject. See Deal v. Mississippi County, 107 Mo. 464, and 14 L. R. A. 622, holding invalid a bounty for planting forest trees. As there was no right in the public to the trees or their use and control, the act was held void.

In Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454, an issue of bonds for $20,000,000 for the purpose of loaning money to the owners of land burned over in the great fire of 1872 conditioned upon their rebuilding within a year, the loans to be secured by mortgage, was enjoined as not for a public purpose.

Allen v. Jay, 60 Me. 124, held that the loan of credit for removing a steam saw mill, box factory and grist mill to the village was not for a public purpose. No distinction apparently was made between a saw mill and a grist mill, both being industries pursued for private gain and emolument.

In Weismer v. Douglas, 64 N. Y. 91, bonds issued for the purpose of paying a subscription to stock of a lumber factory, which, it was claimed, would increase the value of adjacent property and promote business by cleaning out the channel of the river and constructing piers, were held void. See also Martha v. Ottawa, 114 Ill. 59; Coates v. Campbell, 37 Minn. 498; Geneseo v. Geneseo Company, 55 Kans. 358.

3 United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 U. S. 668.

On this ground and for the further reason that the public taste is educated thereby, the expenditure of public moneys for the promotion of State exhibits at World's Fairs has been sustained.1

A tax for raising money to pay bounties to soldiers in order to encourage enlistments in time of war is valid, but a tax for the payment of substitutes for individuals to enable them to escape conscription,2 and for the payment of bounties to soldiers after the war, as a testimonial of the public appreciation of their services, were held to be without consideration and void.3

The public purpose however, to warrant the exercise of the power. of taxation must be one which appeals to all the people and is not in any sense partisan. This distinction was forcibly illustrated in a recent Massachusetts case. An act of the legislature authorized the city of Brockton to erect a Memorial Hall to the memory of the soldiers and sailors of the Civil War. This was held to be a valid statute, because the education of the public taste and inspiring sentiments of patriotism in the public mind serve to promote the general welfare. The city council however, under authority of the statute, passed an ordinance appropriating money for a Memorial Hall and Library building to be used in part by a G. A. R. Post. The court held with regard to this appropriation that it was not for a

1 Daggett v. Colgan, 92 Cal. 53, and 14 L. R. A. 475, where the note contains an interesting collation of the State decisions on this subject. Justice Sanborn, in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals recently, July, 1902, in chambers at St. Paul, denied an injunction against condemnation proceedings for the World's Fair in St. Louis for the celebration of the Louisiana Purchase Centennial in 1904. 2 Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen 570.

3 See Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118; Mead v. Acton, 139 Mass. 341. The conduct of an agricultural exhibition and the payment of premiums therein constitute a lawful purpose for taxation, State ex rel. v. Robinson, 35 Neb. 401, and 17 L. R. A. 383.

4 Kingman v. Brockton, 153 Mass. 255, and 11 L. R. A. 123.

public purpose, and that there is no definition of a public purpose and use which includes the support and maintenance of a Grand Army Post, saying (11 L. R. A. I. c. 125): "If once the principle is adopted that a city or town may be authorized to raise money by taxation for conferring benefits on individuals merely because in the past they have rendered important and valuable services for the benefit of the general public, occasions will not be wanting which will appeal strongly to the popular sense of gratitude or to the popular emotion and the interests and just rights of minorities will be in danger of being disregarded."

§ 350. Taxation for public ownership.

The association of the legal view as to what constitutes a public purpose in taxation with the prevailing public opinion as to the scope of governmental activity was forcibly illustrated recently in Massachusetts, in the opinions of the Justices of the Supreme Court rendered to the House of Representatives of the legislature, under provision of the State constitution authorizing the justices to be thus interrogated as to the lawful powers of the legislature. The question was submitted, whether the legislature under the State constitution could authorize cities and towns to manufacture and distribute gas and electricity for use in their public streets and buildings and for sale to the inhabitants. The justices answered:1" If the legislature is of opinion that the common convenience and welfare of the inhabitants will be promoted by conferring upon the municipalities the power of manufacturing and distributing gas or electricity for the purpose of furnishing light to their inhabitants, we think the legislature can confer the power."

But subsequently the House of Representatives submitted

1 Opinion of Justices, 150 Mass. 592, 8 L. R. A. 487.