tion, and, as it cannot be said that the union employes are in any sense competing with appellees, their acts cannot be justified. It is true, as has been stated, that the proposed strike was not to be called for the direct purpose of securing better wages or shorter hours or to prevent a reduction of wages, any one of which would have been a proper object. The motive was more remote than that, but it was kindred to it. The purpose was to strengthen and preserve the organization itself. Without organization, the workmen would be utterly unable to make a successful effort to maintain or increase their wages or to enforce such demands as have been held to be proper. If it is proper for workmen to organize themselves into such combinations as labor unions, it must necessarily follow that it is proper for them to adopt any proper means to preserve that organization. If the securing of the closed shop is deemed by the members of a labor union of the utmost importance and necessary for the preservation of their organization, through which, alone, they have been enabled to secure better wages and better working conditions, and if to secure that is the primary object of the threat to strike, even though in the successful prosecution of the object of the combination injury may result incidentally to non-union men through the loss of their positions, that object does not become unlawful. It is apparent that in this case the sole purpose was to insure employment by the Railways Company of union men, only. The appellees had the right to retain their membership in the union or not, as they saw fit. On the other hand, if the members of the union honestly believed that it was to their best interests to be engaged in the same employment with union men only, and that it was a detriment and a menace to their organization to associate in the same employment with non-members, it was their right to inform the common employer that they would withdraw from its service and strike unless members of the union, only, were employed, even though an acquiescence in their demands would incidentally result in the loss of employment on the part of the non-union men. It was only incumbent upon them to act in a peaceful and lawful manner in carrying out their plans. In Gillespie v. People, 188 Ill. 176, a statute making it a misdemeanor for an employer to prevent an employe, by threats, from joining a labor organization, or to discharge an employe because of membership in a labor organization, was held to be unconstitutional, and the right of an employer to discharge his employe solely because he would not resign from his union was upheld. That employes might suffer by remaining members of their unions, or that they might through necessity be compelled to disband the organizations they had built up and maintained for their own proper benefit, could not affect the right of the employer. He has the right to manage his business as he sees fit. It would seem that labor organizations should be accorded the same right to manage their affairs and to determine what is best for their own interests. To deny them the right to determine whether their best interests required that they should be associated in their work only with members of their organization would imperil their very existence. If they have the right to make such a requirement, then when their employer procures non-union labor they have the right to strike to enforce that requirement, as that is the only peaceable method available to compel an adjustment of their controversies and to preserve the integrity of their organizations. From the facts as disclosed by the bill it can only be said that the members of the union, upon deliberation, concluded that their own welfare and business interests required that they cease working with those who were not members of their organization. This being their primary object, they have the right to quit the employment and go upon a strike, and to use all proper means to secure their re-instatement upon the conditions desired. . .... Judgment reversed. QUESTIONS 1. Which of the three theories mentioned by Commons and Andrews is the theory of the Illinois court? 2. Would the application of either of the other theories have led to a different result? 3. Why did not the non-union employees ask for an injunction restraining the Railways Company from discharging them? 4. Could the Railways Company have secured an injunction restraining the officers of the union from calling a strike for the purpose stated? 5. Just what is the test applied by the court to determine whether the purpose of this strike is legitimate? 6. "The damage resulting to the employer or the general public must not be unreasonable as compared with the benefits to the workmen." (From concurring opinion of Carter, J., in principal case). Do you think this a better test of the legality of strikes than that applied in the opinion quoted above? 7. Does the theory followed by the Illinois court result in the "method of inclusion and exclusion," or does it establish a purely objective standard by which to determine the legality of strikes? 8. If labor unions have the right "to determine what is best for their own interests" and the right to strike in furtherance of those interests, why would not all properly authorized strikes be lawful? 9. In the principal case, would it make any difference if the plaintiffs were under a contract of employment for a definite term? 10. The Shoe Workers' Union makes a contract with the G Shoe Company in which the latter agrees to hire only members of the union and not to retain any worker objectionable to the union from any cause. A few days later D, an officer of the union, notifies the company that P, an employee, is objectionable. The evidence tends to show that the reason for D's action is P's persistent refusal to join the union. P is discharged. Has he a right of action against D? 11. Employees of M, members of a union, threaten to strike if M will not discharge P, a union employee, because of his refusal to pay dues and fines claimed by the union. Would such a strike be legal? 12. Officers of a union order that H's store be picketed as unfair to organized labor and that he be boycotted because of his refusal to discharge his employees, members of the union, who have not paid their dues to the union. Is the purpose of the action of the union legal? 13. The officers of a union, acting under union rules, impose a fine on M, an employer, for not having all his work done by members of the union, and threaten a strike if the fine is not paid. Would the strike be legal? 14. The United Brotherhood of Carpenters decides to force non-union manufacturers of building supplies to unionize their factories, by boycotting them one at a time. Accordingly the officers urge builders not to use materials made by B and call strikes on jobs where such materials are used. Is their object legal? 15. R, the owner of a motion picture theater, is a qualified motion picture machine operator, but cannot join the operators' union because of a rule which bars owners of a theater from membership. To save money he starts to operate his machines part of the time. The union operators refuse to work for him and "banner" the theater as "unfair." Is the object of the action lawful? 16. A state statute provides: "Every contract, agreement, arrangement or combination whereby a monopoly in the manufacture, production or sale in this state of any article or commodity of common use, is or may be created, established or maintained, or whereby competition in this state in the supply or price of any such article or commodity is or may be restrained or prevented, or whereby, for the purpose of creating, establishing or maintaining a monopoly within this state of the manufacture, production or sale of any such article or commodity, the free pursuit in this state of any lawful trade or occupation is or may be restricted or prevented is hereby declared to be against public policy, illegal and void." In this state a bricklayers' union and an association of mason builders contract that members of the union should do all the work in buildings where they were employed, so that men who did the outside work exposed to the weather might also have the easier and safer inside work and so more continuous employment than would otherwise be the case. It was agreed that no members of the union should work for a builder not conforming to this agreement. (a) Is the agreement in violation of the statute? (b) Does it amount to a conspiracy at common law? 17. Is a strike to promote unionization legal in your state? (d) Action for Miscellaneous Objects PICKETT v. WALSH Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Suffolk. 1906. [The plaintiffs were brick and stone pointers in Boston. (The trade of brick or stone pointing consists in going over a building to clean it and put a finish on the mortar at the joints.) The Bricklayers' and Masons' unions of Boston and vicinity claimed that this work should be done by bricklayers or masons, and issued a general notice that members of those unions would thereafter refuse to work for any firm or contractor who did not employ bricklayers or masons to do pointing. Pursuant to this, threats of strikes were made and strikes were called to compel contractors to observe this rule. The pointers had tried to get a charter from the Building Trades Council to form a union, but it was refused on the ground that pointing was part of the bricklayers' and masons' trade. The pointers were not qualified to enter these unions. The plaintiffs asked for an injunction to restrain the officers of the unions from conspiring to interfere with their trade.] LORING, J. . . . The question is whether the defendant unions have a right to strike for the purpose for which they struck; or, to put it more accurately and more narrowly, it is this: Is a union of bricklayers and stone masons justified in striking to force a contractor to employ them by the day to do cleaning and pointing at higher wages than pointers are paid, where the contractors wish to make contracts with the pointers for such work to be done by the piece, because they think they get better work at less cost with no liability for accidents, and where the pointers wish to make contracts for that work with the contractors on terms satisfactory to them? In other words, we have to deal with one of the great and pressing questions growing out of the existence of the powerful combinations, sometimes of capital and sometimes of labor, which have been insti tuted in recent years where their actions come into conflict with the interests of individuals. The combination in the case at bar is a combination of workmen, and the conflict is between a labor union on the one hand and several unorganized laborers on the other hand. It is only in recent years that these great and powerful combinations have made their appearance, and the limits to which they may go in enforcing their demands are far from being settled. It is settled however that laborers have a right to organize as labor unions to promote their welfare. Further, there is no question of the general right of a labor union to strike. On the other hand it is settled that some strikes by labor unions are illegal..... When and for what end this power of coercion and compulsion commonly known as a strike may be legally used is the question which this case calls upon us to decide. In the present state of the authorities it becomes necessary to consider the general principles governing labor unions and strikes by labor unions. The right of laborers to organize unions and to utilize such organizations by instituting a strike is an exercise of the common law right of every citizen to pursue his calling, whether of labor or business, as he in his judgment thinks fit. . . . . This right of one or more citizens to pursue his or their calling as he or they see fit is limited by the existence of the same right in all other citizens. The right and the result are accurately stated by Sir William Erle in his book on Trade Unions in these words: "Every person has a right under the law, as between him and his fellow subjects, to full freedom in disposing of his own labor or his own capital according to his own will. It follows that every other person is subject to the correlative duty arising therefrom, and is prohibited from any obstruction to the fullest exercise of this right which can be made compatible with the exercise of similar rights by others": cited by this court in Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 498. We now have arrived at the point where a labor union, being an organization brought about by the exercise on the part of its members of the right of every citizen to pursue his calling as he thinks best is limited in what it can do by the existence of the same right in each and every other citizen to pursue his and their calling as he or they think best. In addition to the limitation thus put on labor unions there is a fact |