punish by a proper proceeding, contempt if any, committed against it. Reversed. QUESTIONS 1. "It has always been one of the powers necessarily incident to a court of justice that it should have this power of vindicating its dignity, of enforcing its orders, of protecting itself from insult, without the necessity of calling upon a jury." Why is this power "inherent in all courts"? 2. What are the criteria for determining whether a case is one of civil contempt or one of criminal contempt? 3. Which of these criteria were available to the trial court? 4. What differences of procedure are there in the two kinds of contempt cases? 5. What is the justification for the rule that in cases of criminal contempt the findings of fact by the judge of the trial court must be treated as conclusive, while in cases of civil contempt the whole record may be examined on appeal? 6. In proceedings for civil contempt for violation of the injunction in Arthur v. Oakes, could imprisonment have been ordered? 7. Discuss the use of imprisonment as a penalty in civil contempt cases based on injunctions relating to labor disputes, 8. If the purpose of criminal contempt is to vindicate the authority of a particular court, why would it not promote the cause of justice to require that the case be tried in a different court? 9. "At common law it was undoubted that no court reviewed the proceedings of another court in contempt matters." What were the reasons for this rule? Is it now a rule of the federal courts in cases of (a) civil contempt, (b) criminal contempt? Sec. 6. That the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the anti-trust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the anti-trust laws. 11 Sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act of October 15, 1914. 38 Stat. L. c. 323. Sec. 20. That no restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United States, or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case between an employer and employees, or between employers and employees, or between employees, or between persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a property right, of the party making the application, for which injury there is no adequate remedy at law, and such property or property right must be described with particularity in the application, which must be in writing and sworn to by the applicant or by his agent or attorney. And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person or persons, whether singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of employment, or from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful means so to do; or from attending at any place where any such person or persons may lawfully be, for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or from peacefully persuading any person to work or to abstain from working; or from ceasing to patronize or to employ any party to such dispute, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful and lawful means so to do; or from paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person engaged in such dispute, any strike benefits or other moneys or things of value; or from peaceably assembling in a lawful manner, and for lawful purposes; or from doing any act or thing which might lawfully be done in the absence of such dispute by any party thereto; nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be considered or held to be violations of any law of the United States. B DUPLEX PRINTING PRESS CO. v. DEERING United States Supreme Court. 1921. 254 U. S. 443. [The defendants were the agents and representatives of a district council and a local lodge of the International Association of Machinists. In order to compel the plaintiff, a Michigan corporation, to unionize its printing press factory, the Association called a strike of the union machinists employed by the plaintiff and instituted a country-wide boycott of its presses. The plaintiff asked for an injunction under the anti-trust acts to restrain the defendants (who had never been employees of the plaintiff) from the acts done in furtherance of the boycott.] MR. JUSTICE PITNEY delivered the opinion of the court: The acts embraced the following, with others: Warning customers that it would be better for them not to purchase, or, having purchased, not to install, presses made by complainant, and threatening them with loss should they do so; threatening customers with sympathetic strikes in other trades; notifying a trucking company usually employed by customers to haul the presses not to do so, and threatening it with trouble if it should; inciting employees of the trucking company, and other men employed by customers of complainant, to strike against their respective employers, in order to interfere with the hauling and installation of presses, and thus bring pressure to bear upon the customers; notifying repair shops not to do repair work on Duplex presses; coercing union men by threatening them with loss of union cards and with being blacklisted as "scabs" if they assisted in installing the presses; threatening an exposition company with a strike if it permitted complainant's presses to be exhibited; and resorting to a variety of other modes of preventing the sale of presses of complainant's manufacture in or about New York City, and delivery of them in interstate commerce, such as injuring and threatening to injure complainant's customers and prospective customers, and persons concerned in hauling, handling, or installing the presses. In some cases the threats were undisguised; in other cases polite in form, but none the less sinister in purpose and effect. All the judges of the circuit court of appeals concurred in the view that defendants' conduct consisted essentially of efforts to render it impossible for complainant to carry on any commerce in printing presses between Michigan and New York; and that defendants had agreed to do and were endeavoring to accomplish the very thing pronounced unlawful by this court in Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274; 235 U. S. 522. The judges also agreed that the interference with interstate commerce was such as ought to be enjoined, unless the Clayton Act of October 15, 1914, forbade such injunction. That act was passed after the beginning of the suit, but more than two years before it was brought to hearing. We are clear that the courts below were right in giving effect to it; the real question being whether they gave it the proper effect. In so far as the act (a) provided for relief by injunction to private suitors, (b) imposed conditions upon granting such relief under particular circumstances, and (c) otherwise modified the Sherman Act, it was effective from the time of its passage, and applicable to pending suits for injunction. Obviously, this form of relief operates only in futuro, and the right to it must be determined as of the time of the hearing. The substance of the matters here complained of is an interference with complainant's interstate trade, intended to have coercive effect upon complainant, and produced by what is commonly known as a "secondary boycott;" that is, a combination not merely to refrain from dealing with complainant, or to advise or by peaceful means persuade complainant's customers to refrain ("primary boycott"), but to exercise coercive pressure upon such customers, actual or prospective, in order to cause them to withhold or withdraw patronage from complainant through fear of loss or damage to themselves should they deal with it. ... [The court quotes from Loewe v. Lawlor, Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Association v. U. S., and Lawlor v. Loewe, to show that the acts of the defendants are a violation of the Sherman Act.] Upon the question whether the provisions of the Clayton Act forbade the grant of an injunction under the circumstances of the present case, the circuit court of appeals was divided; the majority holding that under section 20, "perhaps in conjunction with section 6," there could be no injunction. Defendants seek to derive from them some authority for their conduct. As to section 6, it seems to us its principal importance in this discussion is for what it does not authorize, and for the limit it sets to the immunity conferred. The section assumes the normal objects of a labor organization to be legitimate, and declares that nothing in the Anti-trust Laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of such organizations, or to forbid their members from lawfully carrying out their legitimate objects; and that such an organization shall not be held in itself-merely because of its existence and operation-to be an illegal combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade. But there is nothing in the section to exempt such an organization or its members from accountability where it or they depart from its normal and legitimate objects, and engage in an actual combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade. And by no fair or permissible construction can it be taken as authorizing any activity otherwise unlawful, or enabling a normally lawful organization to become a cloak for an illegal combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade, as defined by the Anti-trust Laws. The principal reliance is upon section 20. This regulates the grant ing of restraining orders and injunctions by the courts of the United States in a designated class of cases, with respect to (a) the terms and conditions of the relief and the practice to be pursued, and (b) the character of acts that are to be exempted from the restraint; and in concluding words it declared (c) that none of the acts specified shall be held to be violations of any law of the United States. All its provisions are subject to a general qualification respecting the nature of the controversy and the parties affected. It is to be a "case between an employer and employees, or between employers and employees, or between employees, or between persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment." The first paragraph merely puts into statutory form familiar restrictions upon the granting of injunctions already established and of general application in the equity practice of the courts of the United States. It is but declaratory of the law as it stood before. The second paragraph declares that "no such restraining order or injunction" shall prohibit certain conduct specified,-manifestly still referring to a "case between an employer and employees, . . . . involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment," as designated in the first paragraph. It is very clear that the restriction upon the use of the injunction is in favor only of those concerned as parties to such a dispute as is described. The words defining the permitted conduct include particular qualifications consistent with the general one respecting the nature of the case and dispute intended; and the concluding words, "nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be considered or held to be violations of any law of the United States," are to be read in the light of the context, and mean only that those acts are not to be so held, when committed by parties concerned in "a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment." If the qualifying words are to have any effect, they must operate to confine the restriction upon the granting of injunctions, and also the relaxation of the provisions of the Anti-trust and other laws of the United States, to parties standing in proximate relation to a controversy such as is particularly described. The majority of the circuit court of appeals appear to have entertained the view that the words "employers and employees" as used in section 20, should be treated as referring to "the business class or clan to which the parties litigant respectively belong;" and that, as there had been a dispute at complainant's factory in Michigan concerning |